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1.1 - Aim 
Scholars have long sought to understand why and how ethnic conflict occurs, and why it persists. Despite 
the rapid expansion of the field of conflict studies in the past few decades, there is still much we do not 
yet fully understand, and there are important issues that have not been addressed. First, to date there is 
no definitive consensus on the nature of the connection between horizontal inequalities -- differences 
between  culturally defined groups -- and ethnic conflict. Quantitative studies have shown socioeconomic 
and political horizontal inequalities to be positively associated to ethnic conflict in some cases, but 
unrelated in others. The diversity of the findings implies that horizontal inequalities and conflict share a 
complex relationship, and the underlying mechanisms require further investigation. Second, the positive 
relationship between political inequalities and conflict is often attributed to the grievances formed when 
groups are excluded from political access, despite strong evidence pointing specifically toward political 
discrimination by the state (repression) as the main cause of rebellion. Third, researchers studying 
inequalities have mainly relied on information that has been ‘objectively’ measured. However, they 
acknowledge that people develop grievances based on their own perceptions, rather than the information 
at academics’ disposal. Perceptions may be shaped by ‘objective’ inequalities, but are also likely to be 
influenced by other factors at the individual level, such as how strongly individuals identify with their 
ethnic group, their personal wealth, or their educational background. Fourth, grievances alone are usually 
insufficient to mobilize individuals toward violence. Social capital, which functions as the glue that holds 
communities together, is often required for individuals to commit to a larger cause and mobilize 
collectively. Most of the literature on social capital has touted its positive effects for development and 
governance, but its role in the context of violent collective action is ambiguous and remains understudied. 
Despite acknowledging the substantial role that perceptions, identities, and social capital have in shaping 
conflict, due to their intangible nature, scholars do not yet have much empirical evidence to support their 
claims. These concepts could be considered the ‘dark matter’ of conflict, to borrow a term from 
astrophysics. Dark matter accounts for a significant proportion of all matter in the universe, but because 
its properties do not interact with ordinary matter such as light, it cannot be observed with the 
instruments currently at our disposal. Nevertheless, its presence and effect on gravitational forces is 
undisputed in theories of astrophysics (Ibarra, 2015). In a similar way, how individuals perceive 
inequalities is far more difficult to observe than the inequalities themselves, but perceptions are critical 
to understanding whether inequalities lead to violence or not. Categorizing people according to a 
preconceived notion of identity can be problematic because identity can have a different meaning for 
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every individual, but how individuals associate with their identity will undoubtedly have an effect on the 
way they view the status of their identity group. How social capital is measured remains a topic of ongoing 
debate, but it is evident that the glue that holds a community together can influence how communities 
respond to difficult circumstances. 
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the relationship between inequalities and conflict in a systematic 
manner, and to reassess the theoretical assumptions made by the conflict literature at the group and 
individual level by accounting for this ‘dark matter’. In order to achieve this, I tackle the problems outlined 
above using a three-pronged approach that consists of 1) disaggregating the concepts by their 
components, 2) constructing a framework that links the individual and group levels of analysis, and 3) 
exploring the role of intangible characteristics such as perceptions, identity salience, and social capital. In 
this thesis I find that at the group level, the relationship between horizontal inequalities and ethnic conflict 
depends on the type of inequality, and that the degree of political discrimination by the state makes ethnic 
groups more prone to conflict, particularly when there is a strong presence of elites. At the individual 
level, I find that the salience of ethnic identity and individuals’ socioeconomic context not only moderate 
the relationship between horizontal inequalities and perceived collective grievances, but are also 
important indicators of both grievances and violent behaviour. I also find that social capital has an 
ambiguous relationship with violence, with different dimensions of social capital having opposite effects 
on support for and the use of violence. The following sections discuss the research on horizontal 
inequalities and ethnic conflict thus far, outline the theoretical framework and research questions 
answered in this thesis, explain the methodological approach utilized, and provide a brief overview of the 
empirical chapters that follow. 
 
1.2 – Inequalities and ethnic conflict 
Due to the prevalence of internal conflicts in contemporary society (see Figure 1.A), scholars of various 
disciplines have endeavoured to understand why they occur. One of the most widespread types of internal 
conflicts are so-called ‘ethnic’ conflicts: conflicts between groups that distinguish themselves from one 
another by emphasizing differences in heritage, language, culture, religion or physical characteristics. It 
has long been theorized that ethnic identities can resolve the collective action problem, defined as a 
situation in which individuals who would benefit from cooperating are discouraged to do so because of 
conflicting interests (Olson, 1965). However, although ethnic identities often play a key role in shaping 
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incentives for violence (Pearlman and Cunningham, 2012), today most analysts agree that identity itself 
is not a direct cause of violent conflict. Instead, it can exacerbate tensions when groups clash due to other 
factors, such as bad governance, deprivation, discrimination, and resource disputes.  
Figure 1.A - Armed Conflict by type, 1946-2017 
 
Source: Armed Conflict Database, Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Pettersson and Eck, 2018). Ethnic conflicts are classified within 
internal or internationalized internal conflicts. 
The literature on ethnic conflict coalesces around a general theoretical framework that includes 
socioeconomic, demographic and political factors (Gurr and Harff, 1994; Sambanis, 2001; Cordell and 
Wolff, 2009). Research points to a strong link between inequalities and conflict (Østby, 2013; Cederman 
and Wucherpfennig, 2017), especially for ‘horizontal inequalities’. These are defined as differences 
between culturally formed groups (Stewart, 2008). Differences between individuals, or ‘vertical 
inequalities’, may also generate grievances, but are unlikely to lead to organized group conflict because 
grievances will not be experienced collectively. Horizontal inequalities, however, may enhance ethnic 
group grievances and thus facilitate mobilization for conflict (Østby, 2008).  
The unreliability of group-level inequality data long prevented scholars from thoroughly assessing the 
relationship between horizontal inequalities and conflict (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Miguel, 2004). 
However, as data have become more widely available, scholars have made inroads towards improving our 
understanding of the relation between horizontal inequalities and conflict. In the past decade, researchers 
have been able to study the effects of socioeconomic, population size and political horizontal inequalities 
on conflict incidence. Socioeconomic inequalities, such as uneven education levels and wealth distribution 
between ethnic groups, have been found to exacerbate the potential for ethnic conflict because of the 
grievances they generate (Cederman et al., 2013). Still, the literature has not reached a consensus on the 
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effect of horizontal inequalities. Østby’s (2008) seminal research found the evidence for social inequalities 
to be more robust than for economic inequalities. Other studies have found an insignificant or even 
negative relationship between economic horizontal inequalities and conflict, and suggest this may be 
because economically disadvantaged groups have a relative lack of capacity to wage war (Huber and 
Mayoral, 2014; Mitra and Ray, 2013). More consensus can be found in studies that focus on the 
relationship between population size inequalities and violence. In line with the capacity argument for 
economic inequalities, conflict is more likely the closer in size that ethnic groups are to each other 
(Esteban et al., 2012; Balcells et al., 2016). This finding holds both when dominant groups are small 
(Ellingsen, 2000) and when marginalized groups are large (Cederman et al., 2010).  
Political inequalities refer to differences in access to power, and range from ethnic groups being strongly 
represented in government to groups being politically discriminated. Exclusion from political power has 
been found to make groups more conflict prone (Cederman et al., 2013). If an ethnic group is 
underrepresented in the government, its members may feel their political demands are unattended and 
decide to use more aggressive means to achieve them. Proportional political representation for ethnic 
groups may lead to reduced ethnic conflict (Saideman et al., 2002), as the opportunity cost of rebellion is 
higher in countries with more political freedoms and rights. If discriminatory practices are used against 
ethnic groups - such as when there is a history of injustice towards a particular community, or when the 
government restricts traditional practices or the use of a language - the chance of ethnic conflict can 
increase. Political discrimination is likely to breed strong grievances amongst repressed groups, but it may 
also limit their capacity to address the imbalance (Gurr, 1993). Slightly repressive governments may face 
greater backlash from minorities, whereas highly repressive governments may discourage any type of 
rebellion (Reynal-Querol, 2002).  
 
1.3 - Theoretical framework 
Although the research discussed above has expanded our knowledge on the relationship between 
horizontal inequalities and conflict, there are several questions that have not yet been answered. The 
following research questions will be examined in the corresponding four chapters of this thesis, with the 
first two focusing on the group context and the second two examining the individual context:  
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RQ1 In which way and to what extent do educational, economic and population size inequalities 
between ethnic groups influence the risk of conflict incidence between the groups? 
RQ2 To what extent and under which conditions is the effect of political exclusion on ethnic conflict 
attributable to political discrimination against ethnic groups?  
RQ3 To what extent and under which conditions do individuals perceive relative group deprivation 
as collective grievances? 
RQ4 In which ways are indicators for the cognitive and structural dimensions of social capital 
associated to the reported support for and use of political violence?  
Figure 1.B - Relationship between horizontal inequalities and ethnic conflict 
 
The solid lines represent the relationships examined in this thesis. The dotted line illustrates how individual 
characteristics can moderate the effect of group characteristics on the opportunity mechanism. Due to a lack of 
available data measuring opportunities, testing these relationships were beyond the scope of this research. 
 
The relationship between horizontal inequalities and conflict is theorized to work through either of the 
two conflict mechanisms of motivation and opportunity highlighted in Figure 1.B. When groups 
experience inequalities and discrimination, they are likely to perceive themselves as relatively deprived. 
The collective grievances they may develop as a consequence create motivation for conflict (Gurr, 1993). 
The opportunity argument suggests that inequalities reflect the capacity that the group has relative to its 
opponents with respect to the materials and manpower required to mobilize for collective action and 
successfully wage war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).  
Much of the literature on horizontal inequalities finds a positive relationship with ethnic conflict (Stewart, 
2008; Østby, 2008; Cederman et al., 2011), so explanations by and large focus on the motivation 
mechanism, and do not account for the link to the opportunity mechanism. However, recent studies have 
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• Educational inequalities / deprivation 
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found empirical evidence for a negative relationship between economic and population size inequalities 
and conflict (Huber and Mayoral, 2014; Balcells et al., 2016). These studies contend that when horizontal 
inequalities increase, the difference in capacity to wage war between groups also increases, reducing the 
perceived opportunities for the disadvantaged group to win a conflict.  
One of the main contributions of the first two empirical chapters is to posit that in the group context, the 
relationship between horizontal inequalities and conflict is likely to function through both motivation and 
opportunity mechanisms, as the two arrows leading from the group context in Figure 1.B illustrate. 
Horizontal inequalities may create countervailing forces that simultaneously increase and decrease the 
risk of conflict. The direction of the relationship with conflict ultimately depends on the strength of each 
horizontal inequality’s association with either mechanism. To complicate matters further, horizontal 
inequalities do not usually occur in isolation. They often occur simultaneously or together with other 
conditions, and the combination of factors may alter the balance between the opposing mechanisms 
(Bara, 2014). This underlines why it is essential to scrutinize the characteristics of horizontal inequalities 
in order to determine their link to motivations and opportunities. Chapter 2 focuses on discerning how 
educational, economic, and population size inequalities are related to these mechanisms in order to 
comprehend their relationship with ethnic conflict. 
The approach of deconstructing the relationship between horizontal inequalities and conflict can also be 
applied to political inequalities. Differences in the political access of ethnic groups have long been 
regarded as a cause of ethnic conflict because groups feel underrepresented or excluded from power 
(Wimmer et al., 2009; Cederman et al., 2013). However, these differences could also represent existing 
socioeconomic or population size imbalances between groups, or reflect the traditional or isolated way 
of life that some cultures voluntarily choose to maintain. In these instances, groups are less likely to 
develop motivations for conflict since their political differences are seen as ‘natural’. Furthermore, 
politically excluded groups will have fewer opportunities to engage in violence as they will be less able to 
form political alliances and allocate state funds toward supporting their conflict (Gurr, 1993). Ethnic 
groups are more prone to fighting if their motivation outweighs the limitations they face. This scenario 
seems more likely if the excluded groups are also politically discriminated by the state, because repression 
tends to produce strong grievances. The question of whether political discrimination is the underlying 
determinant of ethnic conflict is explored in depth in Chapter 3. In addition, I explore the conditions under 
which the effects of political discrimination on conflict may vary, such as when elites have a large presence 
in the group. 
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In Chapters 4 and 5 I examine the framework for the individual context, as shown in the central box in 
Figure 1.B. The relationship between inequalities and political violence at the individual level follows the 
two-sided logic of the conflict mechanisms at the group level. Inequalities can create the perception for 
individuals that their group is relatively deprived. On the one hand, if their group is smaller or 
socioeconomically deprived in comparison to other groups in the country, individuals may feel their ethnic 
group is being unfairly treated, in which case they are more likely to mobilize with their group in protest 
and potentially resort to violent action. On the other hand, if their group is relatively smaller or 
socioeconomically deprived, the group will also have less resources than others, so individuals might 
believe that their group is less likely to defeat more advantaged groups in conflict. Individuals might thus 
be less inclined to risk their lives by engaging in political violence, even if they have more incentive to do 
so. 
Nonetheless, group characteristics alone cannot fully explain why individuals resort to using violence. 
Conflict analysis models need to account for variation in characteristics between individuals, such as their 
socioeconomic background, the salience of their identity and the level of social capital (outlined in the 
central box in Figure 1.B). These factors can also influence individuals’ decision to engage in political 
violence by distorting their perceptions of collective grievances (motivation) and their prospects of 
winning the conflict (opportunity). It is also possible that the motivations and opportunities to engage in 
violence are determined by a combination of individual and group-level factors, as the arrows in Figure 
1.B going from the individual context to the arrows between group context and motivation/opportunity 
indicate. This has been exemplified by studies on how inequalities between groups and inequalities 
between individuals work in unison to shape conflict (Huber and Mayoral, 2014; Langer and Smedts, 
2013).   
The complexity that individual factors add to the relationship between inequalities and political violence 
highlights an important flaw in the literature. The measurement of inequalities in contemporary research 
can be problematic because scholars use ‘objectively’ observed indicators of inequality, yet individuals’ 
perceptions of inequalities are not necessarily based on the same information. People usually do not have 
access to detailed information and will develop collective grievances based partly on their personal 
experiences or those of others. This increases the risk of individuals making inaccurate or misled 
comparisons with other groups. Langer and Smedts (2013) show for example that the presence of one 
horizontal inequality might contaminate individuals’ perception of other horizontal inequalities. 
Individuals who are members of a group that experiences inequalities in education may also perceive their 
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group to be economically deprived, even if this is not the case. Other factors, such as individuals’ 
attachment to their ethnic group, their own personal socioeconomic background, manipulation by elites, 
and media consumption, are likely to have an effect on whether individuals perceive their group to be 
discriminated or not (Langer and Smedts, 2013). This has led scholars in the field to propose a shift their 
research towards a perceptions-based approach (Langer et al., 2017). 
Another important, yet often overlooked, issue is the role of identity. In order to conduct empirical 
research with groups as the unit of analysis, scholars must assume that ethnic identity is fixed and 
politically relevant (Stewart, 2005). But ethnic identity is not static or unanimous for a group’s members. 
Some individuals may associate strongly with their ethnic identity, whilst others might not be so attached, 
or they may hold overlapping ethnic and national identities. When identities are salient, politics stemming 
from an identity can often exacerbate the differences and distrust between groups, increasing the 
motivation for conflict (Gurr, 1993). Groups with strong ethnic identities are more likely to clash with 
other identities, as differences are harder to bridge (Toft, 2003). In contrast, if identities are diluted, or 
attachment to them weakens, group grievances might be felt less acutely by individuals, which could make 
them less inclined to mobilize with their ethnic group. Studies have shown that when the salience of ethnic 
identity varies per individual, the risk of conflict decreases (Bhavnani and Miodownik, 2009; Miodownik 
and Bhavnani, 2011). Chapter 4 addresses both issues of identity and perceptions by examining to what 
extent horizontal inequalities are perceived as collective grievances by members of an ethnic group, 
illustrated in Figure 1.B by the arrow going from group characteristics to motivation. In addition, the 
Chapter analyzes whether factors on the individual level, such as the individuals’ socioeconomic 
background and attachment to their ethnic identity, moderate this relationship.  
The final critique on prevailing conflict research has to do with the strong emphasis on inequalities as 
explanatory factors of conflict (see Østby, 2013). The importance of political and socioeconomic resources 
for community development and improving ethnic group status in society supports the reasoning behind 
the current focus. However, to some extent this focus is also due to the relative ease of measuring 
quantifiable indicators, such as access to education and employment, compared to less tangible 
characteristics of a society, such as social capital. Blattman and Miguel (2010) note that the scarcity of 
data should not diminish from the importance of intangible characteristics. Phenomena such as social 
capital are especially relevant when dealing with intercommunal relationships. Social capital refers to the 
resources available to individuals and groups that arise from their social networks, which can be used to 
improve the efficiency of society or facilitate coordination for collective action (Putnam, 1993; Ostrom 
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and Ahn, 2009). Early studies examining the conflict potential of social capital indicators such as 
associational membership (Varshney, 2001), trust (Krebs, 2007), and social cohesion (Bhavnani and 
Backer, 2007) have shown they can perform critical functions in the build-up to violence.   
Although social capital is traditionally considered to be beneficial for a community and is usually 
associated with less violence (Cassar et al., 2013; Grosjean, 2014), recent studies have shown that this is 
not always the case – for example, social networks can improve the access to information and resources 
available to individuals, which could increase the opportunities for violent collective action (El Hajj et al., 
2011; McDougall and Banjade, 2015). Social capital is a broad concept - to fully comprehend its 
relationship with violence it is useful to examine it according to two different dimensions. These include 
structural social capital, which refers to the social networks that individuals participate in, and cognitive 
social capital, which relates to the norms and values that people in a community share. Studies have 
shown that these dimensions do not have the same relationship with (indirect) measures of violence 
(Dinesen et al., 2013; Hansen et al., 2014). According to these studies, high levels of cognitive social capital 
lead to more trust and solidarity within a community, and the resulting social cohesion will reduce that 
community’s exposure to violence. In contrast, high levels of structural social capital increase civic 
engagement, and the collective action that ensues will increase that community’s exposure to violence. 
Chapter 5 focuses on discerning between these two dimensions of social capital and testing whether their 
relationship with violence hold for more direct measures of political violence than those that have been 
tested thus far. The relationship of the dimensions of social capital with violence is investigated in the 
context of the conflict mechanisms highlighted in Figure 1.B. 
 
1.4 – Focus on Africa 
The region under analysis is the African continent. One of the main reasons for focusing on a specific 
region is that the concept of ethnic identity has different categorizations depending on the region under 
study. In different contexts, alternative measures of identity are used. In North America identity is often 
categorized according to race, in South America it is discerned mainly by social class, in most of Africa by 
ethnolinguistic groups, and in Asia by either caste (e.g. Nepal/India), religion or ethnicity, depending on 
the country. Other categorizations include geographical region, dialect, and indigenous groups. The 
diverse interpretations of what constitutes an ethnic identity makes it difficult to be able to generalize 
across different regions, as the notion of ethnicity changes according to the society being studied.  
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For this reason, I decided to examine only countries in Africa, where ethnic cleavages are for the most 
part defined along ethnolinguistic lines. The African continent is an interesting testbed because the region 
is ethnically highly diverse (Posner, 2004) and it is very susceptible to ethnic conflict. Figure 1.C illustrates 
the proportion of state-based armed conflicts1 per region. The Middle East, which is often considered to 
be a conflict-prone area, represents less than 6% of armed conflicts observed since 1946.2 Since the 1960s, 
when most African countries achieved independence, a large percentage of all armed conflicts observed 
has taken place on the African continent. This percentage has gradually increased over time, and in the 
last decade, Africa has surpassed Asia as the region with the highest share of ongoing conflicts (37% vs. 
34%). Many, if not most of these conflicts, consisted of violence between ethnic groups (Esteban et al., 
2012). This underlines the importance of concentrating on African countries to understand why 
contemporary ethnic conflicts occur. 
Figure 1.C – Armed Conflict by region, 1946-2017 
 
Source: Armed Conflict Database, Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Pettersson and Eck, 2018) 
 
1.5 – Methodological Approach 
A quantitative approach is employed throughout the project, using multilevel and (ordered) logistic 
regression analysis on panel data for the next two chapters and on cross-sectional data for the two 
 
1 A state-based armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use 
of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, resulting in at least 25 battle-
related deaths in one calendar year. 
2 The graph represents incidences of conflict but does not indicate their intensity. 
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subsequent chapters. This approach allows a broad study across a range of countries. Having a large 
sample of countries makes it possible to identify the most salient factors at play, control for country-level 
variance and isolate the local characteristics that do not hold up in all observations. Additionally, the panel 
data allows for the examination of the relationship between horizontal inequalities and ethnic conflict 
over time.  
 In the first part of the thesis, a unique method of dyadic analysis is used to examine the relationship 
between horizontal inequalities and ethnic conflict. To construct an original Ethnic Dyad Database (EDD), 
I extracted socioeconomic and demographic information for individuals and households from the 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), and aggregated it to the group level for each of 290 main ethnic 
groups identified in 29 African countries. This allowed the construction of group-level averages for all 
ethnic groups. Ethnic group categories are not always the same across different survey years, therefore 
the groups needed to be harmonized before they could be compared over time. The Ethnic Dyad Database 
is created from this aggregated database by pairing every possible combination of ethnic groups within a 
country, resulting in 1548 ethnic dyads and 38,213 ethnic dyad year observations. Data on the political 
status of the ethnic groups are taken from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Vogt et al., 2015). 
The socioeconomic and political data for ethnic groups in a dyad are matched with a variable for whether 
conflict between those ethnic groups is observed in a given year or not. Ethnic conflict data are obtained 
from the Dyadic Dataset (Pettersson and Eck, 2018), the Non-State Conflict Dataset (Sundberg et al., 
2012), and the One-Sided Violence Dataset (Eck and Hultman, 2007) from the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program (UCDP). Multi-level logistic regressions are run on this dyadic dataset, with country fixed-effects 
dummies and controls for clustering of ethnic groups within dyads. Chapter 2 focuses on socioeconomic 
horizontal inequalities, whilst Chapter 3 integrates political horizontal inequalities. 
The second part of the thesis explores the nexus between the characteristics from the individual and 
group context, and focuses on more intangible characteristics such as perception, the salience of identity 
and social capital. Variables for these attributes are taken from the Afrobarometer surveys, which are 
public opinion surveys for individuals of 220+ ethnic groups across 27+ countries in Africa. Individuals are 
asked about their ethnicity, how strongly they associate with their ethnic identity, whether they feel their 
ethnic group is discriminated against, as well as about their support for and participation in violence. In 
addition, respondents are queried on indicators that measure their level of social capital and 
socioeconomic context. The analyses are run at the individual level, with a total of 40,455 observations 
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for the analysis on social capital and violence and 80,158 observations for the analysis on perceived 
collective grievances. The analysis on grievances could be conducted on more observations as two rounds 
of the Afrobarometer could be used (5 and 6). The socioeconomic information is aggregated to the ethnic 
group level and compared to the national average to indicate to what extent the groups is deprived 
compared to other groups in the country. The models also control for clustering of individuals within 
ethnic groups and countries. 
Figure 1.D – Coverage of DHS, EPR, and Afrobarometer databases for countries in Africa 
 
Sources: DHS (ICF, 1990-2014), EPR (Vogt et al., 2015), and Afrobarometer Surveys Rounds 5 & 6 (2012 & 2014). 
Figure 1.D illustrates the coverage of the DHS, EPR and Afrobarometer datasets in Africa in which ethnicity 
data were available. The map shows that most countries on the African continent are included and the 
three databases overlap in coverage for at least 20 of the 27-30 countries in each analysis. Of the countries 
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that do not overlap across all databases, information for Chad, Central African Republic, Congo, DR Congo, 
Ethiopia, Rwanda and Angola is contained in both the DHS and EPR datasets, so these Sub-Saharan 
countries are incorporated into the dyadic analysis. Due of the lack of political data, Burkina Faso could 
only be included in the analysis on socioeconomic horizontal inequalities. For the second part of the thesis, 
the additional countries in the analysis using the Afrobarometer data are Morocco, Algeria, Burundi, 
Tanzania, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar and Mauritius. The Afrobarometer surveys do not cover Chad, 
Central African Republic, Congo, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Angola, however. For the countries in 
grey, either information on ethnic groups was not recorded or the countries were not included in any of 
the databases. Overall, the wide coverage of the databases used in this research indicates that the results 
are generalizable across a majority of African countries. 
 
1.6 – Overview of chapters 
The chapters are organized according to the four research questions outlined in section 1.3. Chapters 2 
and 3 seek to understand the subtle differences in the relationship between horizontal inequalities and 
ethnic conflict sketched out in Figure 1.B. Chapter 2 focuses on socioeconomic inequalities, while Chapter 
3 focuses on political inequalities. Chapters 4 and 5 study how the individual-level factors in Figure 1.B 
relate to political violence. Chapter 4 examines how perceived collective grievances are formed, Chapter 
5 studies the relationship of social capital with violence, and Chapter 6 concludes the thesis with a 
summary of the results, and a discussion of the contributions and limitations of the research. The chapters 
are described in further detail below. 
 
Chapter 2 – Socioeconomic inequalities and ethnic conflict 
Theories on ethnic conflict predict that horizontal inequalities should be associated with a greater 
likelihood of violent conflict, but empirical results have been mixed. One reason might be that different 
types of inequalities have opposite effects on the likelihood of conflict. I posit in Chapter 2 that 
educational inequalities are likely to incentivize collective action by inducing grievances, while economic 
and population size inequalities may actually dis-incentivize collective action by limiting opportunities for 
disadvantaged groups to engage in rebellion, as illustrated in Figure 1.B. I formulate the hypotheses that 
larger educational inequalities between groups will increase the risk of conflict, whilst economic and 
population size inequalities between groups will decrease the risk of conflict. I also examine whether the 
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relationship between horizontal inequalities and ethnic conflict might change under certain conditions on 
the national level, such as the level of democracy and rule of law, and on the group level, such as whether 
the group is wealthy or in power. 
 
Chapter 3 – Political Inequalities and ethnic conflict 
According to the conventional literature, political inequalities are expected to have a positive effect on 
conflict incidence. The literature on political inequalities often uses grievance-based mechanisms to 
explain the relationship between political exclusion and conflict. However, it tends to treat the grievance 
argument with broad-brush strokes and does not differentiate between types of exclusion. In Chapter 3, 
I disaggregate politically-excluded groups into two subgroups: those that face discrimination by the state 
designed to exclude them from political power, and those that have no political power but are not 
explicitly discriminated against. In the context of the conflict mechanisms in Figure 1.B, I hypothesize that 
excluded groups who are explicitly discriminated against by the state are more likely to experience 
grievances and therefore be more prone to conflict with groups in power than excluded groups who are 
not discriminated against. Furthermore, I examine the conditions under which discriminated ethnic 
groups might be more or less prone to conflict. The expectation is that discriminated groups are less likely 
to engage in conflict if they are relatively poorer than the other group, and are more likely to engage if 
their ethnic group consists of a larger proportion of elites.  
 
Chapter 4 – The formation of collective grievances  
Chapter 4 hones in on how the motivation mechanism functions on the individual level, represented in 
Figure 1.B by collective grievances. Scholars within the conflict-inequality field often argue that 
inequalities between groups lead to intergroup conflict because of the collective grievances experienced 
by relatively deprived groups. With this claim they make two critical assumptions that have hitherto not 
been properly tested. First, they assume that observed group inequalities are connected to perceived 
group grievances. Second, despite acknowledging that attachment to identity and socioeconomic 
characteristics may vary per individual, they assume that group identities are salient and that groups are 
unitary actors. This chapter addresses these issues by investigating how group and individual 
characteristics may influence individual perceptions of collective grievances. I expect that the more 
relatively deprived an ethnic group is in education or wealth, or the smaller it is relative to other groups 
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in the country, the more likely individuals belonging to that group will perceive their group to be unfairly 
treated. Individual perceptions of collective grievances will also be higher if the share of elites in the group 
is larger. I anticipate these effects to be moderated by individuals’ attachment to their ethnic identity and 
their socioeconomic background. A salient ethnic identity is likely to increase the effect of relative 
deprivation on collective grievances, whilst a higher individual socioeconomic status is expected to reduce 
the perception of grievances potentially generated from experiencing intergroup cleavages. 
  
Chapter 5 – Social capital and violence 
Chapter 5 incorporates an intangible characteristic into the model that is usually overlooked in the conflict 
literature, as shown in the central box in Figure 1.B. Social capital has been promoted in research and 
policy circles as a way to achieve social transformation and economic development. There is also, 
however, a potential ‘dark side’ to social capital. In this final empirical chapter, I investigate whether 
structural and cognitive social capital have different relationships with the reported propensity towards 
violence. Structural social capital in the form of community and religious associational membership 
increase civic engagement, which allows an easier diffusion of grievances and facilitates collective 
mobilization. Cognitive social capital provides a ‘glue’ or social cohesion within a community, because 
characteristics such as communal trust and a shared identity are thought to bring people together. 
Connecting these arguments to political violence, I hypothesize that higher levels of structural social 
capital are positively related to support for or use of violence, whilst higher levels of cognitive social capital 
are negatively related to support for or use of violence. 
 
Chapter 6 - Conclusion 
In the final chapter of the thesis, I present a summary of the results, outlining the answers to the four 
research questions on the effects of horizontal inequalities, political discrimination, perceptions, identity, 
and social capital on grievances and conflict. I subsequently draw overall conclusions from the research 
and discuss the theoretical and methodological contributions of this thesis to the existing conflict 
literature. By disaggregating concepts and the unit of analysis, investigating the nexus between the 
individual and the group level, and examining intangible characteristics such as perceptions and social 
capital, the thesis sheds new light on the processes that lead to conflict. The final chapter continues with 
a discussion on the limitations of the research, and finishes with a section that highlights the major 
takeaways of the findings.  
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Chapter 2  
 
Socioeconomic inequalities 
and ethnic conflict1
 
 
  
 
1 Based on Alcorta, Ludovico, Smits, Jeroen, and Haley J. Swedlund. 2018. Inequality and ethnic conflict 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, Social Forces, Advance online publication, https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soy049  
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Abstract 
Theories of ethnic conflict predict that between-group inequality should be associated with 
a greater likelihood of violent conflict, but empirical results are mixed. One reason might be 
that different types of inequalities have opposite effects on the likelihood of conflict. Group 
inequalities reflect differences in group endowments and capacity. In this chapter, I posit 
that educational inequalities are likely to incentivize collective action by inducing grievances, 
whilst economic and population size inequalities may actually dis-incentivize collective 
action by limiting opportunities for disadvantaged groups to engage in rebellion. I test these 
hypotheses using the Ethnic Dyad Database, which incorporates 1,548 dyads formed by 290 
ethnic groups living in 29 Sub-Saharan African countries. The analysis reveals that 
educational inequalities are indeed positively associated with conflict incidence, whilst 
economic and population size inequalities are negatively associated with conflict incidence.  
The positive association between educational inequality and conflict is stronger if the groups 
are wealthier. A higher joint educational level of the groups is associated with less conflict, 
particularly under more autocratic regimes. These findings demonstrate that to understand 
the relationship between inequality and conflict, it is important to disaggregate the effects 
of inequalities according to the underlying mechanisms and the political context with which 
they are associated. 
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2.1 - Introduction 
It is well established that inequalities between different ethnic groups can sometimes result in tensions 
between these groups, particularly when ethnic groups have to compete for resources and 
endowments (Bollig, 1993), or when social identities overlap with major political or economic 
grievances (Gurr, 1993). More recently, however, scholars have noted that different types of 
inequalities may have different effects on conflict incidence (Østby, 2008), with some inequalities even 
decreasing the likelihood of conflict (Besançon, 2005). Although this possibility is widely 
acknowledged, data limitations have made it difficult to test the impact of different types of inequality 
on conflict incidence. As a result, we still lack clarity on how different types of inequalities affect the 
likelihood of conflict between ethnic groups. 
This chapter contributes to the field by using a new dataset to test the impact of three different types 
of inequalities—educational, economic, and population size inequalities—on ethnic conflict. I find that 
educational inequalities between ethnic groups are positively correlated with conflict risk, while 
economic and population size inequalities are negatively correlated with conflict risk. I argue that the 
discrepancy in the effects of inequalities is because educational inequalities can foster grievances 
amongst groups, which increase the motivation to engage in conflict, while economic and population 
size inequalities may actually dis-incentivize conflict by limiting opportunities for rebellion. 
The research improves over earlier studies of ethnic conflict by using a much more comprehensive 
database. Rather than using national-level data or focusing only on the largest ethnic group(s) within 
a country, I examine the differences between all combinations of ethnic groups in 29 Sub-Saharan 
Africa countries. By bringing together data on 290 ethnic groups within these countries over the period 
1990–2014, I constructed a database containing information on 1,548 within-country pairs of groups 
(referred to as “ethnic dyads” henceforth). This database provides a much more detailed insight of the 
associations between intergroup inequalities and ethnic conflict than has been possible in prior 
research. I draw on this dataset to address the following research question: 
In which way and to what extent do educational, economic and population size inequalities between 
ethnic groups influence the risk of conflict incidence between the groups? 
The findings support the argument that different types of inequalities can have different impacts on 
the probability of conflict incidence, suggesting that the relationship between inequalities and the 
occurrence of violent conflict is more complicated than it is often suggested. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I discuss how the relationship between inequality 
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and conflict has been analyzed in the past. In the third section I tie horizontal inequality to the debate 
between motivations and opportunities, and formulate hypotheses about the effects of different types 
of inequalities on conflict. In section four I discuss the data and methods used in this research. I provide 
the results of the empirical analysis in the fifth section. In section six I discuss the relevance of these 
findings to the academic debate on inequalities and conflict. Finally, I outline the implications of the 
results and offer concluding remarks. 
 
2.2 - Vertical versus Horizontal Inequalities 
Communities in least developed countries are often deprived of their political rights and public services 
due to a lack of state resources and/or capacity (Besley and Persson, 2010). This may generate feelings 
of injustice, particularly if the allocation of resources and services is unfairly distributed between 
communities (Horowitz, 1985). Inequalities can strengthen the extent of these grievances and lead to 
competition for scarce resources, which could eventually result in violence (Bollig, 1993). 
The traditional method to measure relative deprivation and its impact on conflict incidence was to 
investigate vertical inequalities; that is, to observe inequalities between individuals within a population 
using national-level data. However, the link between vertical inequality and conflict between groups 
was difficult to establish empirically. Gurr (2000) claimed the relationship between relative deprivation 
and conflict was positive, whereas other scholars determined the relationship to be less significant than 
other factors (i.e., Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Still others found a negative 
correlation between vertical inequality and ethnic war (Besançon, 2005). 
One of the likely reasons why scholars had difficulties finding a clear-cut link between vertical 
inequalities and conflict was the use of national-level data. Causal factors that provide intuitive 
explanations for conflict, such as inequality and discrimination between groups, tend to vary within 
countries. As a result, their impact cannot be accurately captured with national-level data (Cramer, 
2003; Buhaug et al., 2011). This has led to a new approach among scholars to disaggregate the study 
of civil war and to focus on systemic inequalities between culturally formed identity groups, that is, 
horizontal inequalities (Stewart, 2008). 
In order for horizontal inequalities to become a basis of discontent and antipathy, group identity has 
to be socially significant to its members. Members have to feel attached enough to the group to 
identify with other members who feel aggrieved and to aggregate their experience to a collective 
injustice. Group members therefore must share some identifiable attributes that are stable over time 
and are perceived to notably influence group behavior and well-being. These characteristics place 
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constraints on the possibility to select a group identity and must be in place before collective 
mobilization can emerge. If people can easily switch between ethnic identities, members are less likely 
to feel attached to the group and might be inclined to change groups when it benefits them. This would 
reduce inequalities between groups until an equilibrium is reached (Stewart, 2008). When identities 
are relatively static, however, members are more likely to develop feelings of belonging toward their 
group and therefore to experience inequalities collectively. 
The shift toward studying horizontal inequalities (henceforth, simply inequalities) has proved fruitful, 
and the relationship between horizontal inequalities and ethnic conflict has been more robustly 
established (e.g., Murshed and Gates, 2005; Østby, 2008; Cederman et al., 2013). Research has shown 
that when horizontal inequalities coincide with identity cleavages, they may enhance group grievances 
and thus facilitate mobilization for conflict (Cederman et al., 2011). Nonetheless, the literature on the 
relationship between inequalities and conflict incidence is still limited in several ways. 
First, while there is strong support in the literature for a positive relationship between educational 
inequalities and conflict incidence (Mancini, 2008; Østby, 2008), findings are less consistent on the 
impact of economic inequalities (e.g., Østby, 2008; Buhaug et al., 2011; Cederman et al., 2011; Deiwiks 
et al., 2012). Contrasting results suggest that the relationship between inequalities and conflict is not 
necessarily straightforward, and that we should not assume that all types of horizontal inequalities 
have the same effect on the incidence of violence. As I explore in detail in the subsequent section, 
different types of inequalities might have different effects on ethnic conflict incidence, because the 
associations with the underlying mechanisms likely differ. 
Second, cross-national research has, for the most part, focused on ethnic groups as the unit of analysis 
rather than ethnic dyads. The latter, however, more accurately captures the dynamics between groups 
in a conflict situation. Dyadic analysis allows for the observation of subtler differences that would 
otherwise go unnoticed. For example, when studying inequality and conflict in Nigeria, scholars often 
emphasize religious and economic differences between the poorer, Islamic north and the oil-rich, 
Christian south (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Fenske and Zurimendi, 2017). While these 
differences are no doubt important, they cannot explain conflicts between, for example, the Ijaw and 
the Itsekiri, two ethnic groups who largely share the same religion and live mainly in the southern 
region. 
In her study, Østby (2008) took a group-level approach, but her analysis only included the two largest 
ethnic groups in a country. Although this is a significant step forward, including only the largest ethnic 
groups does not account for the complex multi-ethnic dynamics present in many societies. In Nigeria, 
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for example, there are three main ethnic groups (the Yoruba, Igbo, and Hausa), but also dozens of 
other smaller ethnic groups that periodically come into conflict with one another. In fact, out of 25 
dyads engaged in interethnic conflict in Nigeria between 1990 and 2014 that I identified in the Uppsala 
Conflict Database Program (www.ucdp.uu.se), only 14 involved the three main ethnic groups. Thus, an 
approach that focuses only on the largest groups would omit almost half of the conflicts in the country, 
such as the fighting between the Ijaw and Itsekiri. Additionally, since smaller ethnic groups are less 
likely to be vying for control of the state than larger ethnic groups, it is possible that the incentives for 
conflict differ between groups of different sizes. Fjelde and Østby (2014) account for this by comparing 
the wealth of the largest ethnic group in a region to that of the rest of the population within that 
region. However, this is an indirect measure of how economic inequality between groups can affect 
the chance of conflict between them. To gain better insight into this complexity, data including more 
than the largest ethnic groups are required. 
 
2.3 - Motivations or Opportunities? 
The inequality literature coalesces around two concepts that can potentially lead to conflict incidence: 
motivations and opportunities (Tilly, 1978; Gurr, 1993, 2000; Ellingsen, 2000;  Stewart, 2008). 
Motivation for conflict is created by within-group feelings of frustration and resentment, whereas 
opportunity for conflict is related to the capacity of the group to mobilize for collective action. The 
former stems from grievances that are caused by inequalities, discrimination, or defeat in prior 
conflicts. The latter derives from the ethnic group’s capacity to engage in violence relative to other 
groups. 
The concepts of motivation and opportunity are not mutually exclusive. In fact, inequalities are likely 
to work through both mechanisms, as disparities in resources that cause resentment between groups 
may also inhibit them from mounting a successful insurgence (Esteban and Ray, 2008). Without 
resources and organization, grievances can do little to challenge powerful defenders of the status quo. 
People will only mobilize for collective action when they have the resources and opportunity to do so, 
and even then, only if they believe it is in their interest (Tilly, 1978). 
That being said, to increase our understanding of the role of these mechanisms in conflict outbreak, it 
is important to discern between inequalities more strongly linked to motivations and those more 
strongly linked to opportunities. In this chapter, I do this by distinguishing between three types of 
inequalities: educational inequalities, economic inequalities, and population size inequalities. I posit 
that educational inequalities are more strongly associated with motivation, while economic and 
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population size inequalities are more strongly associated with opportunities. In the next section, these 
forms of inequality are discussed and hypotheses are formulated pertaining to their effect on conflict 
outbreak. 
 
2.3.1 - Educational Inequalities 
Stewart (2008) highlights the importance of inequalities in social access to public services. In this 
chapter, I focus on the differences in access to education, which is considered to be a major indicator 
of social inequality (Østby, 2008). Government investments in education have a direct and lasting 
positive impact on people’s lives and can help reduce the level of grievances in society (Aoki et al., 
2002). Education may reduce conflict risk by encouraging political participation (Hegre, 2003) and 
social cohesion (Thyne, 2006). At the same time, more education increases the future prospects of 
individuals and thus increases the opportunity costs for recruits in a potential conflict (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2004). 
If education is unfairly distributed, it can become a main vehicle for frustration in society (de Ferranti 
et al., 2004). Differences in levels of education—or in other social outcomes such as health and 
infrastructure—may be severely felt by disenfranchised groups, since these are considered public 
goods and services. Under ideal circumstances, education would be evenly distributed across society. 
However, in reality its allocation often depends on the political power balance in the country. Under 
Apartheid in South Africa, for example, the expenditure on education for white students was 14 times 
larger than it was for black students, and education was considered one of the main sources of 
grievance (Stewart, 2008). 
Given the importance of education for development and well-being and the expectation of equal 
provision, I assume that educational inequalities are linked to conflict motivation. Esteban et al. (2012), 
for instance, argue that intergroup differentiation matters when the payoffs are for the entire group 
and group identification may influence the policies chosen, thereby negatively impacting other groups. 
This suggests that the larger the educational inequalities between groups, the stronger the feelings of 
resentment, increasing the likelihood of conflict. The effect is likely to be even stronger as wealth levels 
rise. In such cases, groups may expect more provision of public services from the state. If their demands 
are not met, their wealth can provide funding for a rebellion. 
H1: If educational inequalities between ethnic groups are larger, the tendency of the group with 
less education to engage in ethnic conflict is higher. 
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2.3.2 - Economic Inequalities 
Although educational and economic inequalities may be correlated with each other, this does not 
necessarily mean they will have the same effect on conflict (Besançon, 2005; Østby, 2008). There are 
several reasons to believe that economic inequalities, which I measure through differences in the 
average levels of household asset wealth between groups, are less likely to be connected to conflict-
inducing grievances than educational inequalities. First, inequalities in assets between groups may be 
less noticeable than educational inequalities, because many of them remain within the confines of the 
household. For example, if a trader of a certain ethnicity visits a village of a different ethnic group 
where a larger share of people has televisions and fridges, he will only be able to observe this if he 
enters several houses in that village. However, he will be able to spot whether the village has a school 
or health centre, as well as discern to some extent the quality of the facility. 
Second, even when economic inequalities are visible, economic assets are private, so they could be 
attributed to individual welfare or productivity (vertical inequality) rather than group welfare. The 
trader will thus only observe that some households are better off, which is probably also the case for 
some households in his own community. If these differences are not perceived to fall across ethnic 
divisions, groups are unlikely to develop a sense of collective grievance. 
Third, private assets do not necessarily benefit the group as a whole, and therefore are less likely to 
be valued as much as public goods on the collective level. If we consider educational or economic gains 
as the prize an ethnic group fights for, education is a good that can be shared across the group at little 
to no cost, while economic prizes will become diluted depending on the size of the group. 
Fourth, even if economic inequalities are noticeable on a group level, they may be perceived to indicate 
lifestyle differences between groups. For example, nomadic Fula herdsmen in Sierra Leone are less 
likely to require the same household assets as Limba farmers. This does not necessarily represent a 
motivation for conflict but is rather a reflection of the different lifestyles of each group. 
Given that the motivation mechanism does not provide a straightforward argument for why economic 
inequalities lead to conflict, I posit that the opportunity mechanism might offer a better explanation 
for the relationship between economic inequalities and conflict. It is often assumed that higher levels 
of economic inequality will lead to more conflict; however, when disparities are large, disadvantaged 
groups may not have the resources to compete with the advantaged groups (Huber and Mayoral, 
2014). Wealthier groups are more capable of financing conflict, because they can better afford to pay 
their recruits and will have greater access to material resources (Østby, 2013). Both are necessary to 
organize and mobilize for collective action (Tilly, 1978; Olzak, 1994). As a result, poorer groups may think 
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twice about starting an open conflict when the disparities with other groups are high. Instead of engaging 
in violence, they may look for other ways to improve their situations. This leads to the prediction that, 
contrary to the common assumption that greater economic inequalities are likely to lead to conflict: 
H2: If economic inequalities between ethnic groups are larger, the tendency of the poorer group 
to engage in ethnic conflict is lower. 
 
2.3.3 – Population size inequalities 
When considering group differences in terms of relative capacity to engage in conflict, differences in 
population size between the groups may also be important. Horowitz (1985) contends that the closer 
the size of major ethnic groups, the greater the chance of domestic conflict or a coup d’état, as both 
parties believe they have an opportunity to win the conflict. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), on 
the other hand, argue that the propensity for conflict increases when a society is ethnically polarized, 
or divided into fewer and larger, equally sized groups. As ethnic identities are often manipulated by 
elites for their own political or financial objectives (Varshney, 2003), it makes sense that when there 
are fewer and larger groups, it would be easier for elites to mobilize for collective action. However, it 
remains to be seen whether such a situation actually is associated with more ethnic conflict. When 
differences in population among groups are larger, it should become riskier for the smaller group to 
engage in conflict. As a result, conflict risk may actually be lower.  Balcells et al. (2016), for example, 
find that similarly sized rival communities that are in contact with each other are more at risk of 
violence due to increased intergroup competition and threat perception. Ellingsen’s (2000) study 
tentatively supports this claim, finding that countries with non-dominant ethnic majorities are more 
prone to domestic conflict than countries with dominant ethnic majorities. This leads to the prediction 
that population size inequalities, like economic inequalities, are more closely associated with the 
opportunity mechanism and thus will have a negative effect on conflict incidence. 
H3: If population size differences between ethnic groups are larger, the tendency of the smaller 
group to engage in ethnic conflict is lower. 
 
2.4 – Data and Methods 
2.4.1 - Data 
To test the hypotheses, I construct the Ethnic Dyad Database including information on 1,548 dyads of 
290 ethnic groups living in 29 Sub-Saharan African countries (for a list of all groups, see Table A.2.1 in 
36 
 
the Appendix). The data used for constructing this database are derived from the Database Developing 
World (DDW) of the Global Data Lab (www.globaldatalab.org). There are 77 household surveys carried 
out between 1990 and 2014 as part of the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) program. DHS are 
large, nationally representative surveys that consist of a household survey, in which basic information 
is collected of all household members, and separate women’s and men’s surveys. I first construct an 
ethnic group database by aggregating data to the ethnic group level for all ethnic groups for which the 
required information is available in the surveys. Information on the ethnic group of household 
members is sometimes asked in the household survey and sometimes in the women’s or men’s 
surveys. The question most often used is “What is your ethnic group/tribe?” The respondent could 
choose from a number of predefined categories, or a category “Other” followed by “Specify.” Small 
ethnolinguistic tribes or subgroups for which only a few observations were available are categorized 
into larger clusters of ethnolinguistically similar groups. Smaller ethnic groups that do not fit within a 
cluster and contain less than 1 percent of the observations within a country are excluded from the 
analysis. 
The data included in the ethnic group database are used to form dyads of ethnic groups within each of 
the 29 countries. Each ethnic group is paired with all other ethnic groups within the same country, 
resulting in 1,548 ethnic dyads. Constructed in this way, the Ethnic Dyad Database contains 
characteristics of both ethnic groups within the dyad and variables indicating differences between the 
characteristics of the groups. On the basis of this database, an ethnic dyad panel dataset is constructed 
with yearly observations for the period 1990–2014. As the data are derived from household surveys, I 
only had information for the years when surveys were held. Five surveys are available for only one 
country, four surveys are available for seven countries, three surveys for another eight countries, two 
surveys for seven countries, and only one survey is available for six countries (see Table A.2.2 in the 
Appendix). To obtain information for the years for which no dataset is available, the values of the survey 
nearest in time before the observation year is used. For the years before the first survey, the values of 
the first survey is used. If no survey preceding a specific year is available, data are extrapolated from 
later surveys. Since values of later years might be influenced by the conflict, a control factor indicating 
this situation is added to the model. To test the robustness of this approach, the database is recreated 
with interpolated values for intervening years between surveys. Repeating the analyses with this 
dataset produces substantially similar results (see Table A.2.3 in the Appendix). 
Data for the dependent variable, ethnic conflict, are compiled from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
(UCDP), which contains intrastate conflict observations consisting of rebellions against the state, non-
state conflict, and one-sided violence against civilians (by state and/or non-state actors) in countries 
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in Sub-Saharan Africa for the period 1990–2014. The datasets used are the UCDP Dyadic Dataset v.1–
2015, UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset v. 2.5–2015, and UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset v 1.4–2015. 
According to UCDP, ethnic conflict is defined as violence that occurs between ethno-linguistic groups. 
For the purpose of this research, ethnic conflict includes (1) the use of armed force between two ethnic 
groups (Sundberg et al., 2012; Pettersson and Eck, 2018); or (2) the use of armed force by an organized 
ethnic group against civilians (Eck and Hultman, 2007); either case resulting in at least 25 conflict-
related casualties per year. The minimum threshold of 25 battle-related deaths allows for the inclusion 
of low-intensity conflict, while still separating group conflict from other types of low-intensity violence. 
I include an indicator for conflicts involving ethnic groups that are in power to distinguish between 
conflicts in which the state is involved and those where it is not. The period 1990–2014 was selected 
because of data availability. Additionally, by selecting conflicts starting from 1990 onwards, I can 
exclude ideological conflicts and external involvement from other countries during the Cold War. 
Using the UCDP data, I construct the dependent variable as a dummy variable taking the value 1 for 
years when a conflict is recorded within a specific dyad and 0 otherwise. In total, it consists of 731 
intrastate conflict incidence observations (the full list of conflict observations is included in Table A.2.4 
in the Appendix). Of the 29 countries included in this study, six (Benin, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Malawi, 
Namibia, and Zambia) did not have any observations of intra-state ethnic conflict during the years 
included in the analysis. Since I record the occurrence of conflict for each year as opposed to only the 
year that violence breaks out, I observe conflict incidence rather than onset. Although there may be a 
distinction between these incidence and onset, other studies have shown the difference to have no 
impact on their results (see Esteban et al., 2012). 
The actors involved in a conflict observation are coded according to the ethnic groups described in the 
UCDP database and cross-checked with other sources (Olson, 1996; Joshua Project, 2016; Simons and 
Fennig, 2017). Each conflict observation is matched to the corresponding ethnic dyad among which it 
took place. Ethnic groups within a dyad are treated equally, independent of who initiated the conflict. 
For multi-ethnic conflicts, all ethnic groups that play a substantial role within the conflict are included 
as a separate ethnicity. I focus on intrastate domestic conflict and do not include cross-border wars. 
Conflicts where the actors involved were foreign, where they could not be identified by ethnicity (e.g., 
the conflict in 2007 between the Black Axe/Bush Boys vs. Outlaws in Nigeria), or where they belonged 
to the same ethnic group (intra-Hutu violence in DR Congo) are excluded from the analysis. 
 
38 
 
2.4.2 - Methods 
To test the hypotheses, mixed-effects logistic regression analysis is used. I conduct a multilevel analysis 
to control for clustering due to the repeated measurement of the dyads over time and the nesting of 
observations within countries. I assess both the bivariate and multivariate associations between the 
independent and dependent variables. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether (1) or 
not (0) in a given year an ethnic conflict has taken place between the groups in a dyad. The major 
independent variables are based on (differences between) characteristics of the ethnic groups in the 
dyads. 
Educational inequality is measured through a variable indicating the difference in educational level 
between the groups. A group’s educational level is the mean years of schooling of adults aged 20–49 
in the group. Economic inequalities are measured in two ways—by the difference in groups’ wealth 
levels and the proportion of economic elites in a dyad. Group wealth is measured as the mean value 
of the households belonging to the group on the International Wealth Index (IWI), a comparable 
welfare index that is based on the household’s possession of consumer durables, quality of housing, 
and access to water and electricity (Smits and Steendijk, 2015). IWI scores run from 0 to 100, with 0 
representing households having none of the included durables and lowest-quality housing/public 
utilities and 100 representing households having all the durables, as well as highest-quality housing 
and utilities. For the proportion of economic elites, I calculate the percentage share working in higher 
(professional, managerial, technical) occupations within the group’s male workforce in the 20–49 age 
category. Ethnic group size is measured by the percentage of the country’s population that is a member 
of the group. Both the dyad’s average values (levels) and the differences (inequalities) between the 
two groups in regard to education, wealth, employment, and population are included in the analyses. 
Due to the presence of the mean values, the effects of the differences will indicate the relative 
inequalities for the respective indicator. 
As I wish to study conflict incidence, it is necessary to control for temporal dependence by including 
dummy variables that indicate whether conflict is recorded in any of the four years prior to the conflict 
observation year. This isolates the factors that lead to conflict incidence from factors that occur during 
conflict and may determine conflict escalation. Controls for conflicts more than four years prior were 
also tested but turned out not to be significant, so they are not included in the model. Differences in 
levels of urbanization between the groups and mean urbanization levels of the dyad are used as proxies 
to control for inter-group exposure and geographical concentration. The first control compares the 
difference in the percentage of population residing in urban compared to rural areas between ethnic 
groups, which can signal the level of exposure that groups have to each other. The second control 
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measures the average share of the ethnic groups in the dyad that lives in an urban area, which provides 
a crude indication of whether groups are concentrated or dispersed. 
Several controls for political factors are incorporated into the model. At the group dyad level, I include 
an indicator for whether (1) or not (0) one of the ethnic groups in the dyad was in power in that year. 
On the national level, I record the occurrence of regime change. A dummy is coded as 1 in years that 
elections, military interventions, or transitional governments are observed, and 0 otherwise. I further 
control for the country’s democracy level, using the national polity score (to what extent it is autocratic 
or democratic, on a scale of −10 to 10, where 10 represents the most democratic level of government) 
derived from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al., 2016). Finally, I control for the effect of the rule of 
law, taken from the World Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2011). This variable measures the 
extent to which people have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. This applies particularly 
to the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the courts, and the risk of crime 
and violence. Scores are on a country level and range on a scale from –2.5 to 2.5. As the World Bank 
first started recording governance indicators on a biannual basis in 1996, I use interpolation between 
years and extrapolation in the period 1990–1995. Missing values for the education, higher occupation, 
and regime change variables are addressed using the dummy variable adjustment procedure (Allison, 
2001). 
To study the bivariate effects of the independent variables, I estimate separate multilevel models for 
each coefficient. Given the intimate connection between the two components of the main 
independent variables (the difference component and the mean component), both are included 
simultaneously in the bivariate analyses. Given the strong effects of conflict incidence in the preceding 
years, the dummies controlling for this were also included in these analyses. In addition, dummy 
variables addressing missing values in the independent variables are included when necessary. To test 
for multicollinearity, I ran variation inflation factor (VIF) tests for the major independent variables. All 
VIF values were far below the critical threshold of 10 (Belsley et al., 1980), hence there seems to be no 
noteworthy multicollinearity among these variables. 
As the relationship between inequalities and conflict is not necessarily linear, I tested for nonlinear 
effects of the independent and control variables by adding quadratic terms to the model. I also tested 
for interaction effects among the major independent variables and between these variables and the 
control factors. Significant nonlinearities and interaction effects were included in the model. 
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2.5 - Results 
2.5.1 - Main 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.A. In the dataset, educational inequality ranges between 
0 and 8.9 years, and the mean educational difference between the groups within the dyads is 1.6 years. 
Average group education level is 4.6 years. The mean difference in wealth is 7.7 on the IWI scale, and 
the average wealth level of the groups is 22.0 on this scale (running from 0 to 100). The average elite 
share, represented by the proportion of ethnic group members in higher occupations, is 9.3 percent, 
and the average difference between groups in elite share is 6.2 percent. The mean ethnic group in a 
dyad represents 7.3 percent of the total population of a country, while the mean difference in 
population size percentage between the groups in a dyad is 8.1 percent. The average proportion of 
groups in a dyad living in an urban area is 30.4 percent, and the difference in urbanization between 
groups is on average 16.9 percent. 
Table 2.A - Descriptive statistics summary table for selected independent variables and ethnic conflict incidence in 
29 Sub-Saharan African countries, 1990–2014 
Variables Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Conflict incidence 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Educational inequality (years) 1.62 1.58 0 8.9 
Average education (years) 4.65 2.23 0.25 11.9 
Wealth inequality (IWI) 7.69 8.53 0 72.9 
Average wealth (IWI) 22.03 11.21 2.15 93.40 
Elite share inequality (%) 6.20 8.97 0.00 97.00 
Average elite share (%) 9.31 7.36 0.00 59.25 
Population size inequality (%) 8.08 10.64 0.00 87.03 
Average population size (%) 7.29 6.45 0.99* 43.87 
Control factors     
Difference in urbanization (%) 16.95 15.81 0.00 94.20 
Average urbanization (%) 30.35 16.85 0.50 93.15 
Conflict 1 year prior  0.02 0.13 0 1 
Conflict 2 years prior  0.01 0.08 0 1 
Conflict 3 years prior 0.01 0.08 0 1 
Conflict 4 years prior 0.00 0.07 0 1 
Regime change 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Level of democracy (polity) 1.07 4.70 –9 9 
Ethnic group in power 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Rule of law (WGI) –0.81 0.50 –2.13 0.35 
*Minimum cut-off value is set at 0.99%. Sources: Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program (UCDP). 
The national polity scores range from −9 to 9, with an average of 1.1. The observations for the rule of 
law vary on a scale from −2.1 to 0.3 and are on average −0.8. The dummy variables for the control 
factors indicate that in 17.7 percent of dyads one of the groups is in power and that in 18.5 percent of 
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the observation years a regime change took place. 
The results of the multilevel logistic regression analyses are presented in Table 2.B. Model 1 provides 
the coefficients for the bivariate relationships between the independent variables and ethnic conflict 
incidence, while Models 2 and 3 displays the coefficients for the multivariate relationships. Model 2 is 
the baseline model and Model 3 includes the interaction terms. Coefficients of the bivariate analyses 
were estimated in separate multilevel regression models, whereby the two components of the main 
independent variables (the difference component and the mean component) were estimated 
simultaneously. The number of dyad observations included in this analysis is 38,213, and the number 
of conflict-year observations is 731. The coefficients presented in the table are odds ratios, which are 
more easily interpretable than logit coefficients. 
The bivariate coefficients in Model 1 essentially tell the same story as the multivariate coefficients in 
Models 2 and 3. The same variables have significant coefficients, and the directions of the significant 
relationships are also similar. Most coefficients of the independent variables are slightly stronger in 
the multivariate models. This suggests that their effects are somewhat suppressed bivariately, due to 
the influence of confounding factors. Given that the coefficients are so similar, I will focus the 
discussion of the results on the multivariate outcomes in Models 2 and 3. 
Model 2 in Table 2.B shows that the effect of educational inequality is significantly positive. When the 
difference in average years of education between groups increases by one year, the odds of conflict 
are 41.5 percent higher, supporting H1. Larger differences in education may exacerbate the political 
and social tensions between groups and undermine the legitimacy of state institutions (Heyneman and 
Todoric-Bebic, 2000). The effect of the overall educational level is significantly negative. In Model 2, 
an increase of one year of education reduces the odds of conflict incidence by 21.5 percent. Higher 
education levels increase the capacity to solve conflicts through dialogue instead of fighting. More 
education also increases the possibilities for individual social mobility and raises the opportunity cost 
of rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). 
With respect to wealth inequality between groups, I find a significantly negative relationship with 
conflict risk. The odds of conflict in Model 2 are 6.6 percent lower when the wealth difference increases 
by one point on the IWI scale (0 to 100). There is no significant relationship between the average 
wealth level of the groups and conflict risk. Hence, the difference in wealth between groups is a better 
predictor of conflict than the absolute level. 
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Table 2.B - Multilevel logistic regression coefficients for bivariate and multivariate associations between selected 
independent variables and ethnic conflict incidence in 29 Sub-Saharan African countries, 1990–2014 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant  0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 
Educational inequality 1.165** (0.061) 1.415*** (0.099) 1.304*** (0.075) 
Average education 0.846** (0.052) 0.785* (0.079) 0.798* (0.083) 
Wealth inequality 0.973* (0.012) 0.934*** (0.017) 0.926*** (0.018) 
Average wealth 0.997 (0.011) 1.014 (0.020) 1.001 (0.021) 
Elite share inequality 0.972* (0.013) 0.963* (0.015) 0.967* (0.016) 
Average elite share 1.043*** (0.011) 1.063*** (0.014) 1.063*** (0.016) 
Population size inequality 0.964** (0.013) 0.966* (0.015) 0.963* (0.015) 
Average population size 1.251*** (0.055) 1.251*** (0.062) 1.263*** (0.064) 
Average population size2 0.997* (0.001) 0.997* (0.001) 0.997* (0.001) 
Control factors    
Urbanization inequality 0.994 (0.006) 1.011 (0.008) 1.014 (0.008) 
Average urbanization 0.990 (0.008) 1.000 (0.010) 0.993 (0.011) 
Conflict 1 year prior 27.445*** (4.511) 16.174*** (2.543) 14.488*** (2.296) 
Conflict 2 years prior 4.997*** (1.100) 3.327*** (0.719) 3.112*** (0.674) 
Conflict 3 years prior 3.395*** (0.875) 2.496*** (0.644) 2.361*** (0.612) 
Conflict 4 years prior 2.132* (0.679) 1.592 (0.511) 1.478 (0.475) 
Regime change 1.000 (0.000) 1.126 (0.157) 1.157 (0.161) 
Level of democracy 0.936*** (0.012) 0.941*** (0.016) 0.946** (0.017) 
Ethnic group in power 2.993*** (0.430) 3.413*** (0.533) 3.563*** (0.579) 
Rule of law 0.128*** (0.036) 0.178*** (0.057) 0.132*** (0.045) 
Interactions    
Educational inequality * average wealth   1.016*** (0.005) 
Average education * democracy level   1.023*** (0.007) 
Average elite share * rule of law   1.073** (0.025) 
Average urbanization * democracy level   0.998* (0.001) 
Average urbanization * ethnic group in power   1.023* (0.010) 
Population size inequality * democracy level   0.997* (0.001) 
Random-intercept parameters    
Country level  1.934*** (0.399) 1.995*** (0.412) 
Ethnic dyad level  1.890*** (0.164) 1.939*** (0.168) 
Omnibus test chi2 (DF)  722.01*** (23) 729.49*** (29) 
Observations 38,213 38,213 38,213 
Conflict-year combinations 731 731 731 
Coefficients are the log odds for the variables in the models and estimates for random-intercept parameters, with 
standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05 **p ≤ 0.01 ***p ≤ 0.001. In Model 1, coefficients were estimated for each 
variable separately, whereby both components of the major variables (inequality and mean) were estimated 
simultaneously. 
Regarding inequality in the share of the groups’ economic elites, the odds of conflict incidence are 3.7 
percent lower for each percentage point increase in the difference in proportion of ethnic group 
members in higher-level occupations. Ethnic groups with different levels of representation in the 
higher ranks of society thus seem less likely to compete for positions. If one group is mainly engaged in 
agriculture or manual work, while the other has a larger share of professional, managerial, and 
technical occupations, tensions are less likely to occur. The effect of the average level of participation 
in the economic elite on conflict risk is positive—a percentage increase in the joint elite share will 
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strengthen the odds of conflict occurring by 6.3 percent. This result is in line with the idea that conflict 
risk increases if the dyad’s elites must compete for positions. 
The relationship between inequality in population size and conflict is significantly negative. An increase 
of 1 percent in population size difference reduces the chance of conflict by 3.4 percent. Hence, the 
traditional idea that population size inequality leads to conflict is not confirmed by the findings. The 
combined population size of the groups has a significant nonlinear relationship with conflict (see Figure 
6). In dyads with a higher average population size, conflict risk is higher, but the strength of this 
association decreases as the average population size increases and plateaus when the average 
population size is about 40 percent. 
Figure 2.A - Predicted relationship between average population size and ethnic conflict incidence 
Concerning the control factors, I find insignificant coefficients for urbanization. The variables 
accounting for prior conflict in the preceding three years have significant positive effects. The odds of 
conflict increase 16, 3, and 2.5 times, respectively, when there was a conflict one, two, or three years 
prior to the year of observation. Hence, if the groups within a dyad have been involved in conflict 
recently, there is a high risk of conflict occurring again, although this effect wanes over time. The 
grievances experienced during conflicts in preceding years may easily create new tensions between the 
ethnic communities, which can spark further bouts of violence. The strong effect of the variable 
controlling for conflict in the preceding year is probably due to the fact that it captures uninterrupted 
conflict incidence. Control variables for conflict more than four years before the measurement year 
were not significant. 
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If one of the groups in the dyad is in power, the odds of conflict incidence are considerably higher. An 
explanation for this is that the groups might contest political power, which could mean that the risk of 
conflict depends on the political context (Besançon, 2005) and on the prize at stake (Esteban et al., 
2012). The democracy-level control variable shows that the national political context is also relevant. 
A one-point increase in the democracy level is associated with 5.9 percent lower odds of ethnic conflict. 
An increase by one point in the rule of law is associated with substantially (82.2 percent) lower odds 
of ethnic conflict. National regime change is not significantly related to ethnic conflict incidence. 
 
2.5.2 - Interactions 
Interaction analysis was performed to assess the possibility of the effects of the major independent 
variables being contingent on other factors. Model 3 in Table 2.B shows that in the interaction model 
the main effects of the independent variables do not alter much in strength and retain their 
significance. Among the main independent variables, only one significant interaction effect was found: 
a positive interaction between educational inequality and average wealth. This interaction suggests 
that educational inequality is a more salient indicator of potential conflict among wealthier groups than 
among poorer groups. 
There are several significant interactions between the political control variables and the main 
independent variables. National democracy level interacts positively with average education, and 
negatively with population size inequality and average urbanization. The first interaction indicates that 
joint educational level is more important for conflict reduction in societies that are less democratic. 
The second one suggests that a difference in population size between groups reduces conflict risk more 
strongly in societies that are more democratic. The third one indicates that in more democratic 
societies, conflict risk is additionally reduced between urbanized groups. Average urbanization also 
interacts positively with one of the groups being in power, suggesting that a struggle for power 
increases the risk of conflict in urban areas. Finally, I find a positive interaction between the average 
size of the elites and rule of law. This suggests that the rule of law is particularly important for reducing 
conflicts between groups with a relatively small share of elites. 
 
2.6 - Discussion 
In this chapter, I put forward the argument that educational, economic, and population size 
inequalities may have different effects on the incidence of ethnic conflict. I argue that inequalities 
which work primarily through the motivation mechanism, such as differences in education, are likely 
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to be conflict-enhancing. This follows the conventional argument that inequalities are grievance-
inducing, such that an increase in disparities will amplify feelings of injustice and subsequently lead 
groups to mobilize collectively against each other. For example, Langer (2008) highlights the ethnic 
disparities in the allocation of public investment, such as the gap in literacy rates between the Northern 
Mande and the Akan in Ivory Coast, as a source of communal tensions between the groups. However, 
when inequalities are more closely linked to the opportunity mechanism, such as with economic and 
population size inequalities, I argue that inequality should not necessarily be conflict-enhancing. 
Disparities in wealth and population size may make it difficult for disadvantaged groups to engage in 
rebellion and hence are negatively associated with conflict. In Rwanda, for instance, the Twa ethnic 
group is smaller and far poorer than either the Hutus or the Tutsis, yet—despite suffering from 
significant discrimination—they have not been involved in conflict. 
To test the hypotheses, I built a new Ethnic Dyad Database, composed of 1,548 ethnic dyads, 
representing 290 different ethnic groups in 29 Sub-Saharan African countries. Multilevel logistic 
regression results indicate that—in line with the expectations—higher levels of educational inequality 
are associated with increased risk of ethnic conflict. In contrast, higher levels of economic inequality 
and of differences in population size were associated with a lower risk of conflict incidence. 
These findings are important, as they indicate that there is no general effect of inequality on ethnic 
conflict. Instead, different kinds of inequalities appear to have different effects on conflict risk. To my 
knowledge, this is the first comprehensive cross-country study that finds divergent effects for 
horizontal inequalities on ethnic conflict. Opposing effects on conflict have been observed when 
examining different types of inequalities between individuals (Besançon, 2005), but not when 
inequalities between groups were studied (Østby, 2008). The results thus challenge a narrative in the 
literature that economic inequalities between groups will lead to conflict (Østby, 2013; Cederman et 
al., 2013). 
I also find that ethnic dyads with lower joint educational levels, ethnic dyads that together make up a 
larger share of the country’s population, and ethnic dyads with a larger joint share of economic elites 
are more likely to be involved in ethnic conflicts. A higher joint education level of the groups might 
increase the capacity to solve potential conflicts in more peaceful ways. It also raises the future 
prospects of individuals and thus the opportunity costs for potential rebel recruits (Collier and Hoeffler, 
2004). Larger populations and a higher joint proportion of elites might lead to stiffer competition for 
the available positions. Although the analysis is focused on dyads and does not account for the overall 
composition of ethnic groups in society or for within-group inequality, these results provide some 
evidence in support of the ethnic polarization theory: the larger and more similarly sized ethnic groups 
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are, the more likely the chance of conflict between them (Esteban et al., 2012; Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol, 2005). Finally, as expected, the risk of ethnic conflict is lower in societies with higher levels of 
democracy and rule of law, as well as when neither of the groups in the dyad is in power. 
Besides the direct effects of the independent variables, I also studied interaction effects. This analysis 
revealed that the effect of educational inequality depends on the joint wealth levels of the groups in 
the dyad, with the negative association between educational inequality and conflict risk being even 
stronger if the groups are wealthier. This finding suggests that the grievance effect created by 
educational inequalities may become more poignant as groups are wealthier and expect more 
provision of public services from the state. If their demands are not catered to, these groups’ wealth 
can provide them access to funding for rebellion, as was for example the case according to Humphreys 
and Mohamed (2005) with the wealthy Jola group in the Senegalese province of Casamance, which 
mobilized against the state because of what they perceived to be discriminatory policies in education 
and land allocation. 
I also found a positive interaction between the average education level and the level of democracy, 
suggesting that a higher joint educational level might be particularly important for conflict reduction 
in less democratic societies. Or, if educated individuals are more conformist to the state, as Wimmer 
et al. (2009) argue, groups with a high joint education level may be less likely to engage in conflict. The 
findings also showed that the negative association between population size differences and conflict is 
even stronger in more democratic countries. A possible explanation is that in more democratic 
societies minorities are more able to participate in the government and can represent their interests 
through conventional political channels and therefore have less incentive to resort to violence 
(Cederman et al., 2013). 
The heightened conflict risk when one of the groups is in power turns out to be particularly strong 
when the groups are more urbanized. A tense ethnopolitical environment coupled with power 
differences and proximity of groups might stimulate negative interethnic interactions. Northern 
Ireland provides a good example of this (Balcells et al., 2016). However, if a country moves toward a 
political system that is more democratic and allows better representation, an environment where 
interethnic trust can be cultivated may become more feasible, as is indicated by the finding of less 
conflict among urbanized groups in more democratic countries. A last important result of the 
interaction analysis is that the negative association between rule of law and conflict risk is weaker for 
groups with larger joint elites. Hence, competition among ethnic elites seems stronger in societies with 
better rule of law. 
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There are some limitations to the study that should be noted. First, a disadvantage of dyadic analysis 
is that it cannot include the effects of vertical (intragroup) inequalities—which may affect the group’s 
cohesiveness (Stewart, 2005)—or its ability to sustain a conflict (Huber and Mayoral, 2014), thus 
influencing the incentives for initially engaging in conflict (Kuhn and Weidmann, 2015). Second, with 
respect to the data, in some DHS surveys, ethnic groups did not have sufficient respondents. In order 
to have enough observations per group for the analysis, smaller ethnic groups had to be combined 
with others into larger ethnic clusters. This process inevitably led to some cases in which conflicts 
included ethnic groups that fell within the same ethnic cluster, and therefore could not be captured in 
the analysis. Nevertheless, the study is still a significant improvement over previous research, because 
it manages to incorporate far more ethnic groups than have been included before. It therefore provides 
a more granular analysis, which takes local conflicts between smaller groups into account. 
In future research, it would be important to study whether the motivation argument extends to other 
types of social inequalities, such as differences in healthcare and infrastructure. Additionally, the 
public-private element of the inequality should be considered in greater detail, since the  findings 
suggest that groups that are deprived from publicly administered resources are more likely to feel 
aggrieved than groups that are deprived from private resources. This could be done by, for example, 
studying inequalities in private and public employment more in depth once reliable disaggregated data 
on employment categories become available. Furthermore, it is possible that actual inequalities do not 
match up with perceived inequalities, due to potential bias stemming from personal background, lack 
of access, inaccurate media reporting, elite manipulation, or simple miscalculation (Langer and 
Mikami, 2013). According to Langer and Smedts (2013), people will often act according to their beliefs, 
as opposed to the actual facts. More investigation is thus needed on the role of “objective” inequalities 
versus perceptions of inequalities, in order to increase the understanding of the dynamics of this 
relationship. 
With respect to interactions between inequalities, Besançon (2005) speculated that rich ethnic groups 
who feel politically oppressed may have sufficient wealth to provide the opportunity for rebellion. A 
similar argument could apply for group size, since a larger population provides a larger pool of recruits 
to mobilize for collective action if the group feels politically disadvantaged, such as the Oromo in 
Ethiopia or the Hutus in Rwanda. More recently, Cederman et al. (2013) observed that ethnic groups 
who are both poorer than other groups in the country and politically excluded from power are more 
conflict prone. However, I discover no evidence for significant interactions between different types of 
inequalities and conflict. That being said, the scope of the analysis is limited to socioeconomic 
inequalities, and expanding the analysis to include the interactions between socioeconomic and 
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political inequalities is done in a systematic way in Chapter 3. 
 
2.7 - Conclusion 
In sum, the results indicate that the type of inequality matters when analyzing the likelihood of conflict 
occurrence. I argue that the direction of the effect depends on whether the inequality is most 
associated with motivation or with opportunity. Inequalities that are more closely linked to the 
motivation claim are presumed to be positively associated with conflict incidence. Alternatively, for 
inequalities that are more linked to opportunity arguments, the relationship with conflict is negative. 
The study improves upon earlier work by including all ethnic groups for which enough data were 
available and in taking ethnic dyads as the unit of analysis. Whereas earlier research only used 
disaggregated national data (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), focused only on the major ethnic groups 
(Østby, 2008), or used indirect measures, such as the difference with the national (Cederman et al., 
2013) or regional average (Fjelde and Østby, 2014), the  dyadic approach allows for the direct 
comparison of differences between most groups within a country. This offers the advantages that 
more richness is added to the findings and that the determinants of small-scale local conflicts are also 
captured. By directly measuring the socioeconomic characteristics of group members, the study is able 
to capture a more complex relationship between different types of horizontal inequalities and conflict 
outbreak. 
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2.8 – Appendix 
Table A.2.1 - List of ethnic group clusters derived from the Demographic and Health Surveys 
Portuguese Angola Bakongo North and South Congo DR Chewa Malawi Hutu Rwanda 
Khoisan Angola* Bas-Kasai and Kwilu-Kwngo Congo DR Tumbuka Malawi Tutsi Rwanda 
Mbundu Angola Cuvette central Congo DR Lomwe Malawi Twa Rwanda* 
Kongo Angola Ubangi and Itimbiri Congo DR Tonga Malawi Wolof Senegal 
Kwadi Angola* Uele Lake Albert Congo DR* Yao Malawi Fulani Senegal 
Kwanyama Angola Basele-K, Man. and Kivu Congo DR Sena Malawi* Serer Senegal 
Adja Benin Kasai, Katanga and Tanganika Congo DR Nkonde Malawi Mandinka/Malinke Senegal 
Bariba Benin Lunda Congo DR Ngoni Malawi* Jola Senegal 
Dendi Benin Pygmy Congo DR* Mang'anja/Nyanja Malawi Soninke Senegal 
Fon Benin Afar Ethiopia Lambya Malawi* Bambara Senegal 
Yoa/Lokpa Benin Amhara Ethiopia Ndali Malawi* Temne Sierra Leone 
Betamaribe Benin Guragie Ethiopia* Bambara Mali Mende Sierra Leone 
Peulh Benin Oromo Ethiopia Malinké Mali Fula Sierra Leone* 
Yoruba Benin Sidama Ethiopia* Peulh Mali Creole Sierra Leone 
Bobo Burkina Faso* Somalie Ethiopia Sarakolé/Soninké/Marka Mali Mandingo Sierra Leone* 
Dioula Burkina Faso* Tigray (Tigraway) Ethiopia Sonrai/Songhai Mali Loko Sierra Leone* 
Fulfulde/Peul Burkina Faso* Welaita Ethiopia* Dogon Mali Sherbro Sierra Leone* 
Gourmantché Burkina Faso* Nilotic Ethiopia Tamasheq/Tuareg Mali Limba Sierra Leone* 
Gourounsi Burkina Faso* Omotic Ethiopia Senoufo/Minianka Mali Kono Sierra Leone 
Lobi Burkina Faso* Fang Gabon Bobo Mali Black/African South Africa 
Mossi Burkina Fasso* Kota-Kele Gabon* Emakhuwa Mozambique* Colored South Africa 
Senufo Burkina Faso* Mbede-Teke Gabon Portuguese Mozambique* White South Africa 
Touareg (Bella) Burkina Faso* Myene Gabon Xichangana Mozambique* Asian/Indian South Africa 
Bissa Burkina Faso* Nzabi-Duma Gabon* Cisena Mozambique* Adja-Ewe Togo 
Dagara Burkina Faso* Okande-Tsogho Gabon* Elomwe Mozambique* Akposso/Akebou Togo* 
Dafing Burkina Faso* Shira-Punu/Vili Gabon Echuwabo Mozambique* Ana-Ife Togo* 
Samo Burkina Faso* Pygmee Gabon* Shona Mozambique Kabye/Tem Togo 
Hausa CAR* Akan Ghana Cinyungwe Mozambique* Para-Gourma/Akan Togo* 
Sara CAR Ga / Dangme Ghana Cibalke Mozambique* Acholi Uganda* 
Mbum CAR* Ewe Ghana Bitonga Mozambique* Alur Uganda* 
Gbaya CAR Guan Ghana* Cicewa Mozambique* Adhola Uganda* 
Mandjia CAR* Mole-Dagbani Ghana Ciyao Mozambique Bafumbira Uganda* 
Banda CAR* Grussi Ghana Cichopi Mozambique Baganda Uganda 
Ngbaka-Bantu CAR Gruma Ghana Cindau Mozambique Bagisu Uganda* 
Yakoma-Sango CAR Hausa Ghana* Shimakonde Mozambique Bagwere Uganda* 
Zande-Nzakara CAR* Dagarti Ghana* Chitewe Mozambique* Bakiga Uganda* 
Gorane Chad Mande Ghana* Xitswa Mozambique* Bakonjo Uganda* 
Arab Chad Sousou Guinea Xitsonga Mozambique Banyakole Uganda 
Ouaddai Chad Peulh Guinea Kimwane Mozambique* Banyarwanda Uganda* 
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Baguirmien Chad* Malinke Guinea Coti Mozambique* Banyole Uganda* 
Kanem-Bornou Chad* Kissi Guinea* Afrikaans Namibia Banyoro Uganda 
Fitri-Batha Chad* Toma Guinea* Damara/Nama Namibia Basoga Uganda 
Hadjarai Chad Guerze Guinea* English Namibia Batoro Uganda 
Lac Iro Chad* Kalenjin Kenya Herero Namibia Iteso Uganda 
Sara Chad Kamba Kenya Kavango languages Namibia Karimojong Uganda* 
Tandjile Chad* Kikuyu Kenya Caprivi languages Namibia Lango Uganda 
Peul Chad* Kisii Kenya Oshiwambo Namibia Lugbara Uganda* 
Mayo-Kebbi Chad* Luhya Kenya Tswana Namibia* Madi Uganda* 
Arab-
Choa/Peulh/Haoussa/Kanuri 
Cameroon 
Luo Kenya San Namibia Bemba Zambia 
Biu-Mandara Cameroon 
Cameroon* Maasai/Samburu Kenya* Arab Niger* Lala Zambia* 
Adamaoua-Oubangui 
Cameroon Meru/Embu Kenya* Djerma/Songhai Niger Bisa Zambia* 
Bantoïde South-West 
Cameroon Mijikenda/Swahili Kenya Gourmantché Niger* Ushi Zambia* 
Grassfields Cameroon Somali Kenya Haussa Niger Lamba Zambia* 
Bamilike/Bamoun Cameroon Taita/Taveta Kenya* Kanuri/Toubou Niger Tonga Zambia 
Côtier/Ngoe/Oroko 
Cameroon* Turkana Kenya* Mossi Niger* Lenje Zambia 
Beti/Bassa/Mbam Cameroon Kuria Kenya* Peul Niger* Luvale Zambia 
Kako/Meka/Pygmé Cameroon* Bassa Liberia* Touareg Niger Lunda Zambia 
Akan Ivory Coast Gbandi Liberia* Ibibio/Efik Nigeria* Mbunda Zambia* 
Kru Ivory Coast Belle Liberia* Bini/Edo/Urhobo Nigeria* Kaonde Zambia 
Mand (north) Ivory Coast Dey Liberia* Fulani Nigeria Lozi Zambia 
Mand (south) Ivory Coast Gio Liberia Hausa Nigeria Chewa Zambia 
Voltaic Ivory Coast Gola Liberia* Egbira/Igbira/Ibira Nigeria* Nsenga Zambia 
Burkina Faso Ivory Coast* Grebo Liberia* Igala/Igbala Nigeria* Ngoni Zambia 
Mali Ivory Coast* Kissi Liberia* Igbo Nigeria Mambwe Zambia* 
Kongo Congo Brazaville Kpelle Liberia* Ijaw/Izon Nigeria Namwanga Zambia* 
Eshira Congo Brazaville* Krahn Liberia Kanuri/Beriberi Nigeria* Tumbuka Zambia 
Duma Congo Brazaville* Kru Liberia* Nupe Nigeria* Black Zimbabwe 
Mbéré/Mbéti/Kélé Congo 
Brazaville* Loma Liberia* Ogoni Nigeria White Zimbabwe 
Téké Congo Brazaville Mandigo Liberia Tiv Nigeria Coloured Zimbabwe* 
M'bochi Congo Brazaville Mano Liberia Yoruba Nigeria Asian Zimbabwe* 
Sangha Congo Brazaville* Mende Liberia* Middle Belt Nigeria  
Kota Congo Brazaville* Sarpo Liberia* Annang Nigeria*  
Makaa Congo Brazaville* Vai Liberia*   
Oubanguiens Congo 
Brazaville* 
   
Pygmée Congo Brazaville*       
* Not included in the analysis for Chapter 3 due to lack of available EPR data for these ethnic groups. 
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Table A.2.2 - Demographic and Health Surveys included in panel data analysis 
Country Survey Years 
Angola 2011     
Benin 1996 2001 2006 2011  
Burkina Faso* 1993 1998 2003 2008  
Cameroon 1998 2004 2011   
Central African Republic 1994     
Chad 1997 2004    
Congo 2005 2011    
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 2007 2013 
   
Ivory Coast 1994 1999 2005 2011  
Ethiopia 2000 2005 2011   
Gabon 2000 2012    
Ghana 1998 2003 2008   
Guinea 1999 2005 2012   
Kenya 1993 1998 2003 2008  
Liberia 2007 2013    
Malawi 2000 2004 2010   
Mali 1995 2001 2006 2013  
Mozambique 1997 2003 2011   
Namibia 1992 2000 2006 2013  
Niger 1998 2006 2012   
Nigeria 1999 2003 2008 2013  
Rwanda 1992     
Senegal 1992 1997 2005 2011 2012 
Sierra Leone 2008 2013    
South Africa 1998     
Togo 1998     
Uganda 1995 2011    
Zambia 1996 2002 2007   
Zimbabwe 1994         
* Burkina Faso not included in the analysis for Chapter 3 due to lack of available EPR data for ethnic groups. 
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Table A.2.3 - Multilevel logistic regression coefficients for multivariate associations between selected independent 
variables and ethnic conflict incidence in Sub-Saharan African countries, 1990-2014 (interpolated data) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant  0.000*** (0.615) 0.000*** (0.638) 
Educational inequality 1.156** (0.053) 1.355*** (0.07) 1.252** (0.074) 
Average education 0.802*** (0.063) 0.720** (0.101) 0.738** (0.105) 
Wealth inequality 0.983 (0.013) 0.941** (0.018) 0.934*** (0.019) 
Average wealth 0.990 (0.011) 1.037 (0.02) 1.019 (0.021) 
Elite share inequality 0.970* (0.014) 0.958** (0.017) 0.963* (0.017) 
Average elite share 1.049*** (0.012) 1.073*** (0.014) 1.071*** (0.015) 
Population size inequality 0.968* (0.014) 0.969* (0.015) 0.965* (0.016) 
Average population size 1.241*** (0.044) 1.243*** (0.048) 1.256*** (0.05) 
Average population size2 0.997* (0.001) 0.997* (0.001) 0.997* (0.001) 
Control factors    
Urbanization inequality 0.999 (0.006) 1.014 (0.008) 1.017* (0.008) 
Average urbanization 0.984* (0.008) 0.990 (0.011) 0.985 (0.012) 
Conflict occurred 1 year prior 27.582*** (0.165) 16.894*** (0.158) 15.087*** (0.159) 
Conflict occurred 2 years prior 5.007*** (0.22) 3.476*** (0.217) 3.251*** (0.217) 
Conflict occurred 3 years prior 3.366*** (0.258) 2.596*** (0.259) 2.445** (0.259) 
Conflict occurred 4 years prior 2.108* (0.318) 1.643 (0.32) 1.531 (0.32) 
Regime change 0.988 (0.141) 1.097 (0.14) 1.124 (0.139) 
Level of democracy  0.938*** (0.012) 0.939*** (0.017) 0.944** (0.018) 
Ethnic group in power 2.996*** (0.144) 3.356*** (0.155) 3.502*** (0.161) 
Rule of law 0.128*** (0.284) 0.189*** (0.318) 0.144*** (0.343) 
Interactions    
Educational inequality * average wealth   1.015** (0.004) 
Average education * democracy level   1.020** (0.007) 
Average elite share * rule of law   1.076** (0.024) 
Average urbanization * democracy level   0.998* (0.001) 
Average urbanization * ethnic group in power   1.025** (0.01) 
Population size inequality * democracy level   0.997** (0.001) 
Random-intercept parameters    
COW  1.846*** (0.385) 1.941*** (0.403) 
Ethnic dyad  1.842*** (0.162) 1.892*** (0.165) 
Omnibus test Chi2 (DF)  726.12*** (23) 732.66*** (29) 
Observations 38,281 38,281 38,281 
Conflict-year combinations 731 731 731 
Coefficients are the log odds for the variables in the models and estimates for random-intercept parameters, with 
standard errors in parentheses. *p<.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001. For Model 1, coefficients were estimated for each 
variable separately, whereby both components of the major variables (inequality and mean) were estimated 
simultaneously. The number of observations in this analysis is slightly higher than in the dataset with extrapolated 
values because there are more observations for average population size above the minimum cut-off value (0.99%). 
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Table A.2.4 - List of ethnic conflicts derived from the UCDP database for 29 Sub-Saharan African countries, 1990-
2014 
Country Dyad ID Group A name Group B name Start End 
MLI 4320102 Bambara Mali Malinké Mali 2012 2012 
MLI 4320105 Bambara Mali Sonrai/Songhai Mali 2013 2014 
MLI 4320107 Bambara Mali Tamasheq/Tuareg Mali 1990 1994 
MLI 4320107 Bambara Mali Tamasheq/Tuareg Mali 2013 2014 
MLI 4320207 Malinké Mali Tamasheq/Tuareg Mali 2007 2009 
MLI 4320207 Malinké Mali Tamasheq/Tuareg Mali 2012 2012 
MLI 4320207 Malinké Mali Tamasheq/Tuareg Mali 2014 2014 
MLI 4320306 Peulh Mali Dogon Mali 2012 2012 
MLI 4320307 Peulh Mali Tamasheq/Tuareg Mali 1997 1997 
MLI 4320307 Peulh Mali Tamasheq/Tuareg Mali 2014 2014 
MLI 4320507 Sonrai/Songhai Mali Tamasheq/Tuareg Mali 1994 1994 
MLI 4320507 Sonrai/Songhai Mali Tamasheq/Tuareg Mali 2008 2008 
MLI 4320507 Sonrai/Songhai Mali Tamasheq/Tuareg Mali 2012 2012 
MLI 4320507 Sonrai/Songhai Mali Tamasheq/Tuareg Mali 2014 2014 
SEN 4330105 Wolof Senegal Jola Senegal 1990 1990 
SEN 4330105 Wolof Senegal Jola Senegal 1992 1993 
SEN 4330105 Wolof Senegal Jola Senegal 1995 1995 
SEN 4330105 Wolof Senegal Jola Senegal 1997 1998 
SEN 4330105 Wolof Senegal Jola Senegal 2000 2003 
SEN 4330105 Wolof Senegal Jola Senegal 2011 2011 
SEN 4330305 Serer Senegal Jola Senegal 1990 1990 
SEN 4330305 Serer Senegal Jola Senegal 1992 1993 
SEN 4330305 Serer Senegal Jola Senegal 1995 1995 
SEN 4330305 Serer Senegal Jola Senegal 1997 1998 
SEN 4330405 
Mandinka/Malinke 
Senegal Jola Senegal 1990 1990 
SEN 4330405 
Mandinka/Malinke 
Senegal Jola Senegal 1992 1993 
SEN 4330405 
Mandinka/Malinke 
Senegal Jola Senegal 1995 1995 
SEN 4330405 
Mandinka/Malinke 
Senegal Jola Senegal 1997 1998 
TGO 4610104 Adja-Ewe Togo Kabye/Tem Togo 1991 1991 
TGO 4610104 Adja-Ewe Togo Kabye/Tem Togo 1993 1993 
TGO 4610104 Adja-Ewe Togo Kabye/Tem Togo 2005 2005 
NER 4360208 Djerma/Songhai Niger Touareg Niger 1990 1992 
NER 4360405 Haussa Niger Kanuri/Toubou Niger 1995 1995 
NER 4360405 Haussa Niger Kanuri/Toubou Niger 1998 1998 
NER 4360408 Haussa Niger Touareg Niger 1994 1994 
NER 4360408 Haussa Niger Touareg Niger 1997 1997 
NER 4360508 Kanuri/Toubou Niger Touareg Niger 2007 2008 
NER 4360708 Peul Niger Touareg Niger 1997 1997 
CIV 4370103 Akan Ivory Coast Mand (north) Ivory Coast 2000 2000 
CIV 4370103 Akan Ivory Coast Mand (north) Ivory Coast 2011 2011 
CIV 4370105 Akan Ivory Coast Voltaic Ivory Coast 2011 2011 
CIV 4370106 Akan Ivory Coast Burkina Faso Ivory Coast 2011 2011 
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Country Dyad ID Group A name Group B name Start End 
CIV 4370203 Kru Ivory Coast Mand (north) Ivory Coast 2000 2000 
CIV 4370203 Kru Ivory Coast Mand (north) Ivory Coast 2002 2005 
CIV 4370203 Kru Ivory Coast Mand (north) Ivory Coast 2011 2011 
CIV 4370204 Kru Ivory Coast Mand (south) Ivory Coast 1993 1995 
CIV 4370204 Kru Ivory Coast Mand (south) Ivory Coast 2002 2003 
CIV 4370205 Kru Ivory Coast Voltaic Ivory Coast 2002 2005 
CIV 4370205 Kru Ivory Coast Voltaic Ivory Coast 2011 2011 
CIV 4370206 Kru Ivory Coast Burkina Faso Ivory Coast 2002 2004 
CIV 4370206 Kru Ivory Coast Burkina Faso Ivory Coast 2011 2011 
CIV 4370304 Mand (north) Ivory Coast Mand (south) Ivory Coast 2005 2005 
CIV 4370305 Mand (north) Ivory Coast Voltaic Ivory Coast 2002 2003 
GIN 4380104 Sousou Guinea Kissi Guinea 2000 2001 
GIN 4380203 Peulh Guinea Malinke Guinea 2009 2009 
GIN 4380206 Peulh Guinea Guerze Guinea 2009 2009 
GIN 4380306 Malinke Guinea Guerze Guinea 2011 2011 
GIN 4380306 Malinke Guinea Guerze Guinea 2013 2013 
LBR 4500510 Gio Liberia Krahn Liberia 1990 1996 
LBR 4500513 Gio Liberia Krahn Liberia 1999 2003 
LBR 4500514 Gio Liberia Mandigo Liberia 1990 1996 
LBR 4500514 Gio Liberia Mandigo Liberia 2000 2003 
LBR 4500910 Gio Liberia Mano Liberia 1990 1990 
LBR 4500913 Kpelle Liberia Krahn Liberia 1993 1993 
LBR 4500913 Kpelle Liberia Krahn Liberia 1993 1996 
LBR 4501012 Krahn Liberia Loma Liberia 1993 1993 
LBR 4501013 Krahn Liberia Mandigo Liberia 1994 1994 
LBR 4501013 Krahn Liberia Mandigo Liberia 1996 1996 
LBR 4501013 Krahn Liberia Mandigo Liberia 1999 1999 
LBR 4501014 Krahn Liberia Mano Liberia 1990 1996 
LBR 4501014 Krahn Liberia Mano Liberia 1999 2003 
LBR 4501213 Loma Liberia Mandigo Liberia 1993 1996 
LBR 4501314 Mandigo Liberia Mano Liberia 1990 1996 
LBR 4501314 Mandigo Liberia Mano Liberia 1999 2003 
SLE 4510102 Temne Sierra Leone Mende Sierra Leone 1991 2000 
SLE 4510104 Temne Sierra Leone Creole Sierra Leone 1992 1995 
SLE 4510105 Temne Sierra Leone Mandingo Sierra Leone 1996 2001 
SLE 4510108 Temne Sierra Leone Limba Sierra Leone 1991 1991 
SLE 4510108 Temne Sierra Leone Limba Sierra Leone 1997 1997 
SLE 4510204 Mende Sierra Leone Creole Sierra Leone 1995 1995 
SLE 4510205 Mende Sierra Leone Mandingo Sierra Leone 1998 1998 
SLE 4510206 Mende Sierra Leone Loko Sierra Leone 1995 1995 
SLE 4510208 Mende Sierra Leone Limba Sierra Leone 1997 1999 
SLE 4510209 Mende Sierra Leone Kono Sierra Leone 1991 2000 
SLE 4510409 Creole Sierra Leone Kono Sierra Leone 1992 1995 
SLE 4510509 Mandingo Sierra Leone Kono Sierra Leone 1996 2001 
SLE 4510809 Limba Sierra Leone Kono Sierra Leone 1991 1991 
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Country Dyad ID Group A name Group B name Start End 
SLE 4510809 Limba Sierra Leone Kono Sierra Leone 1997 1997 
GHA 4520407 Guan Ghana Gruma Ghana 1991 1992 
GHA 4520407 Guan Ghana Gruma Ghana 1994 1995 
GHA 4520507 Mole-Dagbani Ghana Gruma Ghana 1994 1995 
CMR 
4710103 
Arab-
Choa/Peulh/Haoussa/Ka
nuri Cameroon 
Adamaoua-Oubangui Cameroon 1992 1994 
CMR 
4710104 
Arab-
Choa/Peulh/Haoussa/Ka
nuri Cameroon 
Bantoïde South-West Cameroon 1991 1991 
CMR 
4710108 
Arab-
Choa/Peulh/Haoussa/Ka
nuri Cameroon 
Beti/Bassa/Mbam Cameroon 1994 1994 
CMR 4710506 Grassfields Cameroon Bamilike/Bamoun Cameroon 1998 1998 
NGA 4750208 Bini/Edo/Urhobo Nigeria Ijaw/Izon Nigeria 1997 1999 
NGA 4750208 Bini/Edo/Urhobo Nigeria Ijaw/Izon Nigeria 2003 2003 
NGA 4750213 Bini/Edo/Urhobo Nigeria Yoruba Nigeria 1999 1999 
NGA 4750307 Fulani Nigeria Igbo Nigeria 1991 1991 
NGA 4750307 Fulani Nigeria Igbo Nigeria 2006 2006 
NGA 4750308 Fulani Nigeria Ijaw/Izon Nigeria 2008 2008 
NGA 4750309 Fulani Nigeria Kanuri/Beriberi Nigeria 2009 2009 
NGA 4750312 Fulani Nigeria Tiv Nigeria 2011 2014 
NGA 4750313 Fulani Nigeria Yoruba Nigeria 2001 2004 
NGA 4750314 Fulani Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 1991 1992 
NGA 4750314 Fulani Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 1999 2002 
NGA 4750314 Fulani Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 2004 2004 
NGA 4750314 Fulani Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 2006 2006 
NGA 4750314 Fulani Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 2008 2008 
NGA 4750314 Fulani Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 2010 2014 
NGA 4750405 Hausa Nigeria Egbira/Igbira/Ibira Nigeria 2013 2013 
NGA 4750407 Hausa Nigeria Igbo Nigeria 1991 1991 
NGA 4750407 Hausa Nigeria Igbo Nigeria 2000 2001 
NGA 4750407 Hausa Nigeria Igbo Nigeria 2006 2006 
NGA 4750413 Hausa Nigeria Yoruba Nigeria 1998 1999 
NGA 4750413 Hausa Nigeria Yoruba Nigeria 2001 2004 
NGA 4750414 Hausa Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 1991 1992 
NGA 4750414 Hausa Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 1999 2002 
NGA 4750414 Hausa Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 2004 2004 
NGA 4750414 Hausa Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 2006 2006 
NGA 4750414 Hausa Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 2008 2008 
NGA 4750414 Hausa Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 2010 2010 
NGA 4750414 Hausa Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 2012 2013 
NGA 4750512 Egbira/Igbira/Ibira Nigeria Tiv Nigeria 2013 2013 
NGA 4750708 Igbo Nigeria Ijaw/Izon Nigeria 1999 1999 
NGA 4750710 Igbo Nigeria Nupe Nigeria 1990 1990 
NGA 4750712 Igbo Nigeria Tiv Nigeria 1998 1998 
NGA 4750713 Igbo Nigeria Yoruba Nigeria 2003 2004 
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Country Dyad ID Group A name Group B name Start End 
NGA 4750809 Ijaw/Izon Nigeria Kanuri/Beriberi Nigeria 1998 1998 
NGA 4750809 Ijaw/Izon Nigeria Kanuri/Beriberi Nigeria 2011 2014 
NGA 4750811 Ijaw/Izon Nigeria Ogoni Nigeria 1993 1994 
NGA 4750813 Ijaw/Izon Nigeria Yoruba Nigeria 1998 1999 
NGA 4750813 Ijaw/Izon Nigeria Yoruba Nigeria 2003 2004 
NGA 4750911 Kanuri/Beriberi Nigeria Ogoni Nigeria 1994 1994 
NGA 4750911 Kanuri/Beriberi Nigeria Ogoni Nigeria 1998 1998 
NGA 4750913 Kanuri/Beriberi Nigeria Yoruba Nigeria 2004 2004 
NGA 4750914 Kanuri/Beriberi Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 2011 2011 
NGA 4751113 Ogoni Nigeria Yoruba Nigeria 1999 1999 
NGA 4751214 Tiv Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 1991 1992 
NGA 4751214 Tiv Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 2001 2001 
CAF 4820204 Sara CAR Gbaya CAR 2002 2002 
CAF 4820204 Sara CAR Gbaya CAR 2006 2007 
CAF 4820204 Sara CAR Gbaya CAR 2012 2014 
CAF 4820208 Sara CAR Yakoma-Sango CAR 2001 2001 
CAF 4820208 Sara CAR Yakoma-Sango CAR 2013 2013 
CAF 4820408 Gbaya CAR Yakoma-Sango CAR 2011 2011 
CAF 4820408 Gbaya CAR Yakoma-Sango CAR 2014 2014 
TCD 4830102 Gorane Chad Arab Chad 1990 1990 
TCD 4830105 Gorane Chad Kanem-Bornou Chad 1990 1993 
TCD 4830105 Gorane Chad Kanem-Bornou Chad 1997 1997 
TCD 4830105 Gorane Chad Kanem-Bornou Chad 1999 2003 
TCD 4830105 Gorane Chad Kanem-Bornou Chad 2006 2009 
TCD 4830203 Arab Chad Ouaddai Chad 1999 1999 
TCD 4830203 Arab Chad Ouaddai Chad 2002 2002 
TCD 4830203 Arab Chad Ouaddai Chad 2004 2007 
TCD 4830205 Arab Chad Kanem-Bornou Chad 2005 2006 
TCD 4830205 Arab Chad Kanem-Bornou Chad 2008 2009 
TCD 4830305 Ouaddai Chad Kanem-Bornou Chad 1992 1994 
TCD 4830305 Ouaddai Chad Kanem-Bornou Chad 2005 2007 
TCD 4830305 Ouaddai Chad Kanem-Bornou Chad 2009 2010 
TCD 4830409 Baguirmien Chad Sara Chad 1994 1994 
TCD 4830507 Kanem-Bornou Chad Hadjarai Chad 1991 1991 
TCD 4830509 Kanem-Bornou Chad Sara Chad 1992 1994 
TCD 4830509 Kanem-Bornou Chad Sara Chad 1997 1997 
COG 4840106 Kongo Congo Brazaville M'bochi Congo Brazaville 1993 1993 
COG 4840106 Kongo Congo Brazaville M'bochi Congo Brazaville 1997 1999 
COG 4840106 Kongo Congo Brazaville M'bochi Congo Brazaville 2002 2002 
COD 4900105 
Bakongo North and 
South Congo DR Uele Lake Albert Congo DR 2007 2008 
COD 4900106 
Bakongo North and 
South Congo DR Basele-K, Man. and Kivu Congo DR 2007 2008 
COD 4900107 
Bakongo North and 
South Congo DR Kasai, Katanga and Tanganika Congo DR 2007 2008 
COD 4900305 
Cuvette central Congo 
DR Uele Lake Albert Congo DR 2002 2002 
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Country Dyad ID Group A name Group B name Start End 
COD 4900306 
Cuvette central Congo 
DR Uele Lake Albert Congo DR 2006 2006 
COD 4900307 
Cuvette central Congo 
DR Basele-K, Man. and Kivu Congo DR 1998 2002 
COD 4900307 
Cuvette central Congo 
DR Basele-K, Man. and Kivu Congo DR 2006 2006 
COD 4900307 
Cuvette central Congo 
DR Kasai, Katanga and Tanganika Congo DR 1998 2000 
COD 4900307 
Cuvette central Congo 
DR Kasai, Katanga and Tanganika Congo DR 2006 2006 
COD 4900406 
Ubangi and Itimbiri 
Congo DR Basele-K, Man. and Kivu Congo DR 1990 1997 
COD 4900506 
Uele Lake Albert Congo 
DR Basele-K, Man. and Kivu Congo DR 2002 2004 
COD 4900506 
Uele Lake Albert Congo 
DR Basele-K, Man. and Kivu Congo DR 2006 2009 
COD 4900506 
Uele Lake Albert Congo 
DR Basele-K, Man. and Kivu Congo DR 2012 2014 
COD 4900507 
Uele Lake Albert Congo 
DR Kasai, Katanga and Tanganika Congo DR 2013 2013 
COD 4900607 
Basele-K, Man. and Kivu 
Congo DR Kasai, Katanga and Tanganika Congo DR 1996 2000 
COD 4900607 
Basele-K, Man. and Kivu 
Congo DR Kasai, Katanga and Tanganika Congo DR 2002 2004 
COD 4900607 
Basele-K, Man. and Kivu 
Congo DR Kasai, Katanga and Tanganika Congo DR 2006 2009 
COD 4900607 
Basele-K, Man. and Kivu 
Congo DR Kasai, Katanga and Tanganika Congo DR 2012 2013 
UGA 5000105 Acholi Uganda Baganda Uganda 1990 1991 
UGA 5000105 Acholi Uganda Baganda Uganda 1994 1998 
UGA 5000105 Acholi Uganda Baganda Uganda 2000 2006 
UGA 5000105 Acholi Uganda Baganda Uganda 2008 2011 
UGA 5000105 Acholi Uganda Baganda Uganda 2013 2014 
UGA 5000110 Acholi Uganda Banyakole Uganda 1990 1991 
UGA 5000110 Acholi Uganda Banyakole Uganda 1994 1998 
UGA 5000110 Acholi Uganda Banyakole Uganda 2000 2006 
UGA 5000110 Acholi Uganda Banyakole Uganda 2008 2011 
UGA 5000110 Acholi Uganda Banyakole Uganda 2013 2014 
UGA 5000116 Acholi Uganda Iteso Uganda 1995 1995 
UGA 5000116 Acholi Uganda Iteso Uganda 2003 2007 
UGA 5000118 Acholi Uganda Lango Uganda 2003 2007 
UGA 5000205 Alur Uganda Baganda Uganda 1996 1996 
UGA 5000210 Alur Uganda Banyakole Uganda 1996 1996 
UGA 5000219 Alur Uganda Lugbara Uganda 1996 1996 
UGA 5000509 Baganda Uganda Bakonjo Uganda 1996 2002 
UGA 5000509 Baganda Uganda Bakonjo Uganda 2007 2007 
UGA 5000509 Baganda Uganda Bakonjo Uganda 2010 2011 
UGA 5000509 Baganda Uganda Bakonjo Uganda 2013 2014 
UGA 5000516 Baganda Uganda Iteso Uganda 1990 1992 
UGA 5000519 Baganda Uganda Lugbara Uganda 1996 1997 
UGA 5000520 Baganda Uganda Madi Uganda 1996 1997 
UGA 5000910 Bakonjo Uganda Banyakole Uganda 1996 2002 
UGA 5000910 Bakonjo Uganda Banyakole Uganda 2007 2007 
UGA 5000910 Bakonjo Uganda Banyakole Uganda 2010 2011 
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Country Dyad ID Group A name Group B name Start End 
UGA 5000910 Bakonjo Uganda Banyakole Uganda 2013 2014 
UGA 5001016 Banyakole Uganda Iteso Uganda 1990 1992 
UGA 5001019 Banyakole Uganda Lugbara Uganda 1996 1997 
UGA 5001020 Banyakole Uganda Madi Uganda 1996 1997 
UGA 5001617 Iteso Uganda Karimojong Uganda 1990 1990 
UGA 5001617 Iteso Uganda Karimojong Uganda 2001 2001 
UGA 5001920 Lugbara Uganda Madi Uganda 1996 1996 
KEN 5010103 Kalenjin Kenya Kikuyu Kenya 1992 1994 
KEN 5010103 Kalenjin Kenya Kikuyu Kenya 1998 1998 
KEN 5010103 Kalenjin Kenya Kikuyu Kenya 2007 2008 
KEN 5010104 Kalenjin Kenya Kisii Kenya 1992 1992 
KEN 5010104 Kalenjin Kenya Kisii Kenya 2008 2008 
KEN 5010105 Kalenjin Kenya Luhya Kenya 1992 1993 
KEN 5010106 Kalenjin Kenya Luo Kenya 1992 1992 
KEN 5010107 Kalenjin Kenya Masai Kenya 2006 2006 
KEN 5010107 Kalenjin Kenya Masai Kenya 2009 2009 
KEN 5010110 Kalenjin Kenya Somali Kenya 2011 2014 
KEN 5010112 Kalenjin Kenya Turkana Kenya 1996 1996 
KEN 5010112 Kalenjin Kenya Turkana Kenya 2006 2006 
KEN 5010112 Kalenjin Kenya Turkana Kenya 2008 2008 
KEN 5010112 Kalenjin Kenya Turkana Kenya 2014 2014 
KEN 5010210 Kamba Kenya Somali Kenya 2011 2014 
KEN 5010305 Kikuyu Kenya Luhya Kenya 2007 2009 
KEN 5010306 Kikuyu Kenya Luo Kenya 2007 2009 
KEN 5010307 Kikuyu Kenya Masai Kenya 1993 1993 
KEN 5010310 Kikuyu Kenya Somali Kenya 2011 2014 
KEN 5010407 Kisii Kenya Masai Kenya 1997 1997 
KEN 5010410 Kisii Kenya Somali Kenya 2011 2014 
KEN 5010510 Luhya Kenya Somali Kenya 2011 2014 
KEN 5010610 Luo Kenya Somali Kenya 2011 2014 
KEN 5010710 Masai Kenya Somali Kenya 2011 2014 
KEN 5010712 Masai Kenya Turkana Kenya 1996 1996 
KEN 5010712 Masai Kenya Turkana Kenya 1999 1999 
KEN 5010712 Masai Kenya Turkana Kenya 2008 2008 
KEN 5010810 Meru/Embu Kenya Somali Kenya 2011 2014 
KEN 5010910 Mijikenda/Swahili Kenya Somali Kenya 2011 2014 
KEN 5011011 Somali Kenya Taita/Taveta Kenya 2011 2014 
KEN 5011012 Somali Kenya Turkana Kenya 2011 2013 
KEN 5011013 Somali Kenya Kuria Kenya 2011 2014 
RWA 5170102 Hutu Rwanda Tutsi Rwanda 1990 2002 
RWA 5170102 Hutu Rwanda Tutsi Rwanda 2009 2012 
ETH 5300106 Afar Ethiopia Somalie Ethiopia 2002 2002 
ETH 5300107 Afar Ethiopia Tigray (Tigraway) Ethiopia 1996 1996 
ETH 5300203 Amhara Ethiopia Guragie Ethiopia 1990 1991 
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Country Dyad ID Group A name Group B name Start End 
ETH 5300204 Amhara Ethiopia Oromo Ethiopia 1990 1991 
ETH 5300204 Amhara Ethiopia Oromo Ethiopia 1999 2001 
ETH 5300205 Amhara Ethiopia Sidama Ethiopia 1990 1991 
ETH 5300206 Amhara Ethiopia Somalie Ethiopia 1991 1991 
ETH 5300207 Amhara Ethiopia Tigray (Tigraway) Ethiopia 1990 1991 
ETH 5300208 Amhara Ethiopia Welaita Ethiopia 1990 1991 
ETH 5300209 Amhara Ethiopia Nilotic Ethiopia 2003 2004 
ETH 5300210 Amhara Ethiopia Omotic Ethiopia 1990 1991 
ETH 5300304 Guragie Ethiopia Oromo Ethiopia 1990 1991 
ETH 5300405 Oromo Ethiopia Sidama Ethiopia 1990 1991 
ETH 5300406 Oromo Ethiopia Somalie Ethiopia 1991 1992 
ETH 5300406 Oromo Ethiopia Somalie Ethiopia 1998 1998 
ETH 5300406 Oromo Ethiopia Somalie Ethiopia 2000 2000 
ETH 5300406 Oromo Ethiopia Somalie Ethiopia 2003 2003 
ETH 5300406 Oromo Ethiopia Somalie Ethiopia 2005 2005 
ETH 5300407 Oromo Ethiopia Tigray (Tigraway) Ethiopia 1990 1992 
ETH 5300407 Oromo Ethiopia Tigray (Tigraway) Ethiopia 1994 1995 
ETH 5300407 Oromo Ethiopia Tigray (Tigraway) Ethiopia 1998 2013 
ETH 5300408 Oromo Ethiopia Welaita Ethiopia 1990 1991 
ETH 5300409 Oromo Ethiopia Nilotic Ethiopia 2001 2001 
ETH 5300409 Oromo Ethiopia Nilotic Ethiopia 2004 2004 
ETH 5300409 Oromo Ethiopia Nilotic Ethiopia 2008 2008 
ETH 5300410 Oromo Ethiopia Omotic Ethiopia 1990 1992 
ETH 5300410 Oromo Ethiopia Omotic Ethiopia 2006 2006 
ETH 5300410 Oromo Ethiopia Omotic Ethiopia 2008 2008 
ETH 5300410 Oromo Ethiopia Omotic Ethiopia 2013 2013 
ETH 5300607 Somalie Ethiopia Tigray (Tigraway) Ethiopia 1993 1994 
ETH 5300607 Somalie Ethiopia Tigray (Tigraway) Ethiopia 1996 1996 
ETH 5300607 Somalie Ethiopia Tigray (Tigraway) Ethiopia 1998 2014 
ETH 5300709 
Tigray (Tigraway) 
Ethiopia Nilotic Ethiopia 2004 2004 
ETH 5300910 Nilotic Ethiopia Omotic Ethiopia 1991 1991 
ETH 5300910 Nilotic Ethiopia Omotic Ethiopia 1993 1993 
ETH 5300910 Nilotic Ethiopia Omotic Ethiopia 1999 1999 
ETH 5300910 Nilotic Ethiopia Omotic Ethiopia 2002 2002 
ETH 5300910 Nilotic Ethiopia Omotic Ethiopia 2005 2005 
ETH 5300910 Nilotic Ethiopia Omotic Ethiopia 2009 2009 
AGO 5400304 Mbundu Angola Kongo Angola 1991 1991 
AGO 5400304 Mbundu Angola Kongo Angola 1994 1994 
AGO 5400304 Mbundu Angola Kongo Angola 1996 1998 
AGO 5400304 Mbundu Angola Kongo Angola 2002 2004 
AGO 5400304 Mbundu Angola Kongo Angola 2007 2007 
AGO 5400304 Mbundu Angola Kongo Angola 2009 2009 
MOZ 5410104 Emakhuwa Mozambique Cisena  Mozambique 1991 1991 
MOZ 5410107 Emakhuwa Mozambique Shona Mozambique 1991 1991 
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Country Dyad ID Group A name Group B name Start End 
MOZ 5410114 Emakhuwa Mozambique Cindau Mozambique 1991 1991 
MOZ 5410304 
Xichangana  
Mozambique Cisena  Mozambique 1990 1992 
MOZ 5410304 
Xichangana  
Mozambique Cisena  Mozambique 2013 2013 
MOZ 5410307 
Xichangana  
Mozambique Shona Mozambique 1990 1992 
MOZ 5410307 
Xichangana  
Mozambique Shona Mozambique 2013 2013 
MOZ 5410314 
Xichangana  
Mozambique Cindau Mozambique 1990 1992 
MOZ 5410314 
Xichangana  
Mozambique Cindau Mozambique 2013 2013 
MOZ 5410417 Cisena  Mozambique Xitswa Mozambique 1990 1992 
MOZ 5410417 Cisena  Mozambique Xitswa Mozambique 2013 2013 
MOZ 5410418 Cisena  Mozambique Xitsonga Mozambique 1990 1992 
MOZ 5410418 Cisena  Mozambique Xitsonga Mozambique 2013 2013 
MOZ 5410717 Shona Mozambique Xitswa Mozambique 1990 1992 
MOZ 5410717 Shona Mozambique Xitswa Mozambique 2013 2013 
MOZ 5410718 Shona Mozambique Xitsonga Mozambique 1990 1992 
MOZ 5411417 Cindau Mozambique Xitswa Mozambique 1990 1992 
MOZ 5411417 Cindau Mozambique Xitswa Mozambique 2013 2013 
MOZ 5411418 Cindau Mozambique Xitsonga Mozambique 1990 1992 
MOZ 5411418 Cindau Mozambique Xitsonga Mozambique 2013 2013 
ZWE 5520102 Black Zimbabwe White Zimbabwe 2008 2008 
ZAF 5600102 
Black/African South 
Africa Colored South Africa 1993 1993 
ZAF 5600103 
Black/African South 
Africa White South Africa 1990 1994 
ZAF 5600103 
Black/African South 
Africa White South Africa 1998 1998 
ZAF 5600203 Colored South Africa White South Africa 1990 1994 
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Chapter 3  
 
Political discrimination and 
ethnic conflict1 
 
 
  
 
1 This Chapter has been submitted to a peer-reviewed scientific journal. Earlier versions of this Chapter 
were presented at several conferences: Electoral Integrity Project / International Institute for Democracy 
and Electoral Assistance Workshop on Contentious Elections, Conflict and Regime Transitions (2016), 
International Peace Research Association International General Conference (2016), Political Studies 
Association Annual International Conference (2017) and European Political Science Association Annual 
Conference (2017).  
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Abstract 
The literature on political exclusion and conflict tends to treat grievance-based mechanisms with 
broad-brush strokes and does not differentiate between types of political exclusion. This study 
disaggregates politically-excluded groups into two subgroups: groups that experience political 
discrimination from the state, and groups without political power that are not explicitly discriminated 
against. I posit that discriminated groups are more likely to experience grievances and therefore are 
more prone to conflict than excluded groups that are not actively discriminated against. I further argue 
that the effect of discrimination on conflict is moderated by interactions with economic inequalities 
and the share of elites. Drawing from the Demographic and Health Surveys and Ethnic Power Relations 
dataset, I construct a database for 423 ethnic dyads in 28 Sub-Saharan African countries, in which I find 
that - among politically excluded groups - it is indeed discriminated groups that are responsible for 
most of the association between political exclusion and conflict. Groups that face active, intentional, 
and targeted discrimination by the state are significantly more likely to be involved in conflict than 
excluded groups who do not face explicit discrimination. Additionally, I find that discriminated groups 
who also experience economic inequalities are less likely to engage in conflict, whilst an increased 
presence of elites within discriminated groups can precipitate the chances of conflict. 
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3.1 - Introduction 
In his seminal study ‘Why Minorities Rebel’, Gurr (1993) posits that economic and political differences 
between groups can foster collective grievances. Gurr additionally argues that deeper grievances will 
only occur if the disadvantaged group has been forcibly discriminated against. The latter point has 
often been overlooked in empirical studies of political exclusion. Scholars frequently note the 
importance of discrimination in fostering collective grievances (Stewart, 2008; Wucherpfennig et al., 
2012), but do not distinguish discriminated groups from other politically excluded groups in empirical 
analysis (i.e., Wimmer et al., 2009; Cederman et al. 2011; Deiwiks et al., 2012)2. In this way, studies 
examining the relationship between political exclusion and conflict tend to rely more on arguments 
about relative deprivation than arguments about the repressive and discriminatory policies of states.  
In this chapter, I return to the discrimination aspect of Gurr’s original grievance argument. Rather than 
lumping all groups with no access to state power into one group, in the analysis I distinguish between 
two types of politically excluded groups: Discriminated groups are directly targeted by the state with 
discriminatory policies designed to exclude them from political power. Non-discriminated groups are 
also political-excluded from state power, but do not face overt political discrimination by the state. 
The central hypothesis to be tested in this study is that non-discriminated groups will have fewer 
grievances against the state and thus be less likely to engage in conflict with groups in power than 
those that face political discrimination.  
In addition, I examine the potential moderating effects of educational and economic inequalities, 
population size disparities, and the share of ethnic elites. I predict that discriminated groups that are 
poorer or smaller relative to the ethnic group in power are less likely to engage in conflict. On the other 
hand, discriminated ethnic groups with less access to education and a larger share of elites will be 
more likely to engage in conflict. As Tilly (1978) makes clear, the presence of grievances alone does not 
necessarily lead to conflict. Groups must not only be motivated to engage in conflict, but also must 
have the opportunity to do so.  
I test the hypotheses using dyadic data on socioeconomic inequalities from the Ethnic Dyad Database 
(EDD) (Alcorta et al., 2018), data on political access from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Vogt et 
al., 2015),3 and data on ethnic conflict incidence from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Allansson et 
 
2 A notable exception is Buhaug et al. (2014), who compare the largest discriminated group with the 
group in power. Cederman et al. (2010; 2013) differentiate between these two categories in preliminary 
analyses, but not when testing their hypotheses. 
3 In the EPR dataset ‘non-discriminated ‘groups are referred to as ‘powerless’ (Vogt et al., 2015). We 
opt to use the term non-discriminated in order to make clear that active discrimination by the state is the 
key difference between the two groups.  
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al., 2017; Sundberg et al., 2012; Eck and Hultman, 2007). In total, the EDD dataset includes 9,783 dyad 
year observations, incorporate 155 ethnic groups in 28 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Robust results 
from a multilevel regression model confirm the expectation that groups who face discrimination by 
the state designed to exclude them from political power are significantly more likely to be involved in 
conflict than groups who are excluded from power but do not face explicit political discrimination. In 
addition, I find that several conditions moderate the relationship between political discrimination and 
conflict. In particular, discriminated groups who are poorer relative to the group(s) in power are less 
likely to engage in conflict, whilst discriminated groups that have a larger share of elites are more likely 
to be engaged in conflict.  
This study contributes to the literature on political inequalities and ethnic conflict by providing more 
nuance to our understanding of when politically excluded groups are more likely to engage in conflict. 
First, it differentiates between groups that face active and intentional discrimination by the state and 
groups that are ‘merely’ politically excluded, finding that it is discrimination that is largely driving the 
established relationship between political exclusion and conflict. Second, it examines how the 
relationship between political discrimination and conflict is influenced by characteristics of the groups 
and the situation in which they are living using data at the ethnic group level. This approach provides 
more direct insight into the effects of relative deprivation than just measuring how conflict-prone a 
group is based on its overall position in society, and provides further insights into when discrimination 
is likely to result in violence. 
The rest of the chapter is divided into five sections. In section two, I examine the research that has 
been conducted on political exclusion and ethnic conflict thus far, and posit that explicit discrimination 
by the state is likely to be more grievance-inducing than exclusion alone. Additionally, I propose 
hypotheses for when discriminated groups face horizontal inequalities, and for the moderating role of 
elites. Section three presents the data and methodology used in this research. Section four provides 
the results of the empirical analysis. Section five discusses the relevance of the findings, and finally 
section six concludes with a summary of the study and its implications. 
 
3.2 - Political Inequality and Conflict 
There is a rich literature on the relationship between political inequalities and ethnic conflict. Political 
power provides groups with a channel through which to express their interests and address their 
grievances (Francois et al., 2015). If groups are politically represented at the state level, they should 
be able to better exercise and defend their political rights, as well as influence the distribution of public 
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goods and services (Cederman et al., 2013). However, groups in power may also be inclined to 
redistribute state wealth in a manner that is more favourable to their members (Burgess et al., 2015; 
Hodler and Raschky, 2014).  
When certain groups are politically excluded or have no access to state power, this difference in status 
with groups in power may be perceived as unfairness in the political system (Vogt et al., 2015, Wimmer, 
2002). Systemic exclusion of groups from power likely limits their ability to sustain or improve their 
rights and entitlements, as well as the possibility to build political alliances. If exclusion occurs along 
ethnic lines, excluded groups may also perceive this to be an infringement on their right to self-
determination (Horowitz, 1985).  
It is therefore not surprising that higher-levels of political inequalities are associated with higher-levels 
of conflict (Wimmer, 2009; Cederman et al., 2010; 2013). Under-representation in the police, military 
or government, or being blocked from access to state institutions is associated with feelings of a 
collective injustice, increasing the likelihood of conflict (Stewart, 2008; Wucherpfennig et al., 2012). 
Political exclusion and the absence of conventional paths to power may leave peripheral groups with 
little alternative than to challenge the rule of the centre through violence (Buhaug et al., 2008; Deiwiks 
et al., 2012).  
What are the precise mechanisms linking political exclusion to the increased risk of conflict? Thus far, 
scholars have largely explained the association between political inequalities and ethnic conflict by 
suggesting that political exclusion fosters grievances, which in turn motivate ethnic groups to engage 
in conflict (i.e., Cederman et al., 2010; 2013; Deiwiks et al., 2012). However, some forms of political 
exclusion may produce more grievances than others. For example, groups that represent a small 
proportion of the national population are often inherently marginalized in democratic processes, but 
this marginalization may not be overt or explicit. Geographic isolation or a nomadic lifestyle (i.e., the 
Himba in northern Namibia or the Tuareg across the Sahel) may also affect the ability, knowledge or 
desire of groups to be involved with the running of the state. Even groups who are socioeconomically 
relatively advantaged or represent a large share of the population may be politically excluded, if society 
is ethnically divided and the ruling party practices ethnic nepotism (Vanhanen, 1999).   
Although political exclusion may provide ethnic groups with the motivation to engage in conflict, it 
may at the same time inhibit the opportunities of the disadvantaged group to form political alliances 
and to allocate state resources towards its members, thereby reducing the group’s capacity to engage 
successfully in conflict (Esteban and Ray, 2008; Tilly, 1978). Research on the relationship between 
conflict and socioeconomic inequality suggests that horizontal inequalities can simultaneously 
encourage and discourage conflict – in other words they might both provide motivations for conflict, 
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but also limited opportunities (Besançon, 2005; Bara, 2014; Alcorta et al., 2018). Similarly, when it 
comes to political inequalities, political exclusion may motivate groups to engage in conflict, but 
decrease opportunities to engage in violence.  
 
3.2.1 - Discrimination versus political exclusion 
In this chapter, I distinguish between two types of ethnic groups facing political exclusion by the state. 
Discriminated excluded groups are directly targeted by the state with discriminatory policies designed 
to exclude them from political power. Non-discriminated excluded groups are also disconnected from 
state power, but do not face overt political discrimination by the state. Both kinds of groups face the 
opportunity constraint of having no political access, and therefore have limited political resources to 
mobilize for conflict. However, in addition to being excluded from political access, the discriminated 
groups are also subjected to repressive policies with the aim of depriving them of their political rights 
(Koos, 2014).  
According to Gurr (1993), group-level grievances are likely to be the strongest when groups face 
political discrimination, defined as active and intentional discriminatory state policies designed to 
exclude them from political power (Vogt et al., 2015): i.e., black South Africans during the Apartheid 
regime; Tutsis before and Hutus after the genocide in Rwanda; and the Tuaregs in Mali and Niger. 
Political discrimination by the state is likely to deteriorate the affected group’s relations with groups 
in power, as members of the disadvantaged group may nurture grievances and attribute the 
discriminatory policies to those in power (Gurr, 1993; Regan and Norton, 2005). According to Buhaug 
et al. (2014), the severity of this type of political exclusion might invoke an emotional response strong 
enough for affected groups to overcome the resulting power differentials (i.e., opportunity costs) and 
mobilize toward conflict.  
That political repression is likely to induce strong grievances is well acknowledged (Regan and Norton, 
2005; Walter, 2006). Nonetheless, empirically, discriminated and non-discriminated groups are often 
lumped into one category—even if the scholars distinguish between the two theoretically (i.e., 
Wimmer et al., 2009; Cederman et al., 2011; Deiwiks et al., 2012). There are a few notable exceptions: 
Cederman et al. (2010; 2013) disaggregated the effects on conflict for included and excluded groups. 
Both studies find that the conflict-inducing effects of subcategories of access to power are continuous, 
with a gradual increase in the likelihood on conflict the more excluded groups are. In addition,  Buhaug 
et al. (2014) specifically examine the effect of discriminated groups on conflict in their analysis. 
However, these studies do not directly compare discriminated groups to non-discriminated 
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(powerless) groups.   
Returning to Gurr’s (1993) argument that political repression is likely to induce the strongest 
grievances, I predicted that groups facing political discrimination will be more likely to engage in 
conflict than groups that are political excluded, but not discriminated against. In other words:  
H1: The likelihood of conflict incidence is higher when excluded ethnic groups face 
discrimination from ethnic groups in power. 
To give an example, in Ethiopia, both the Afar and the Beni-Shugal-Gumuz groups are politically 
excluded (Vogt et al., 2015). The Afar have limited access to political resources to utilize in their favour 
and have been historically subjected to discrimination by the state and by other groups (Yasin, 2008). 
The Beni-Shugal-Gumuz are also excluded from political power, but they have not recently suffered 
from overt political discrimination. Although both groups are relatively similar in size, the Afar have 
been involved in more conflicts in the last thirty years than the Beni-Shugal-Gumuz (Allansson et al., 
2017). 
 
3.2.2 - Moderators of the effect of political discrimination 
Our expectation is that discriminated excluded groups are, on average, more likely to engage in conflict 
than non-discriminated excluded groups. However, political discrimination is not the only conflict risk 
factor to consider. Horizontal inequalities that occur simultaneously outside of the political sphere, as 
well as the composition of the group, might alter discriminated groups’ balance of motivations and 
opportunities to engage in conflict. Accordingly, I also test the moderation effect of four factors: 
differences in wealth, education, population size, and share of the elites within the group.  
First, I predict that discriminated groups that are poorer and smaller relative to the ethnic group in 
power are less likely to engage in conflict: 
H2: Discriminated ethnic groups are less likely to engage in conflict, if they are poorer than the 
ethnic group in power. 
H3: Discriminated ethnic groups are less likely to engage in conflict, if they are smaller than the 
ethnic group in power. 
We expect that discriminated groups that are relatively poor or small are less likely to engage in conflict 
with wealthier/larger groups, because, although discriminated groups might have strong motivations 
to engage in conflict, opportunity costs are likely to be high (Balcells et al., 2016; Huber and Mayoral, 
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2014; Alcorta et al., 2018).4 Without sufficient organizational and material resources, aggrieved groups 
will be unable to rebel against the state (Tilly, 1978) as politically dominant groups maintain coercive 
control over them (Gurr, 1993). Poorer groups with less access to resources are less capable of 
financing conflict, whilst smaller groups have a smaller potential resource pool from which to draw 
rebel recruits (Cederman et al., 2010). Intergroup disparities in wealth and population size can also 
affect the groups’ calculation of their own capabilities relative to other groups (Østby, 2013).  
There is also the possibility that economic and population size disparities produce fewer collective 
grievances. Wealth measured in terms of income, assets and resources may be attributed to individual 
rather than collective welfare. As a result wealth disparities might be perceived as representing 
differences between individuals, productivity or livelihoods, rather than differences between groups 
(Alcorta et al., 2018). At the same time, differences in population size are natural to multi-ethnic 
societies and, on their own, are not necessarily likely to be perceived as unjust. If an ethnic group 
represents only a small portion of a country’s population, having no access to political power could be 
considered a reflection of their relative size. In contrast, ethnic groups that constitute a larger 
proportion of the national population, but are excluded from the national political system, are more 
likely to perceive themselves as being unfairly treated (Cederman et al., 2010; 2013). Discontent can 
be expected to be stronger for groups approaching economic equality or equal size, but suffering from 
political and educational inequalities (Besançon, 2005). The independence movement in Catalonia 
illustrates how inhabitants of wealthy regions that suffer from discriminatory policies may have strong 
incentives to mobilize collectively (Keating, 2009). There is also some empirical evidence that politically 
excluded groups who are economically relatively advantaged or who reside in oil-rich regions are more 
involved in conflict (Cederman et al., 2013; Asal et al., 2016).  
Second, I predict that discriminated ethnic groups with lower levels of education relative to the group 
in power are more likely to engage in conflict:   
H4: Discriminated ethnic groups are more likely to engage in conflict, if they are less educated 
than the ethnic group in power. 
Education is a public good which most citizens in a country expect to have some level of access to, 
 
4 Earlier studies such as Regan and Norton (2005) examine the relationship between economic 
inequalities and conflict previously found a positive relationship between the two variables. However, 
these studies measured economic inequalities and conflict on a national level, whereas ethnic conflict 
often occurs on a subnational level. More recent studies on the group level found a similar 
relationship, but compared the wealth level of the group to the national average, rather than 
specifically with the group in power (Cederman et al., 2011; 2013). When capturing economic 
inequalities between groups directly involved in conflict, scholars have found no relation between 
economic inequalities and conflict (Huber and Mayoral, 2014; Alcorta et al., 2018). 
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regardless of their background. More education decreases the chance of conflict by reducing 
grievances and stimulating economic development (Thyne, 2006), increasing the cost of rebel 
recruitment (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), reducing the size of the recruitment pool (Barakat and Urdal, 
2009), and increasing the opportunity costs of young people to join a rebellion (Urdal, 2006). However, 
educational opportunities can potentially have the opposite effect on conflict, if distributed unequally 
(de Ferranti et al., 2004). Given the expectation of a fair provision of public services, inequalities in 
education are often considered fundamentally unjust. Groups that are educationally disadvantaged 
are found to have a higher tendency to engage in conflict (Østby, 2008; Alcorta et al., 2018). For this 
reason, I predict that differences in education will strengthen the motivation of the discriminated 
group to engage in violence and thus increase the risk of conflict.  
Third, I predict that discriminated groups that have a larger share of elites are more likely to engage in 
conflict: 
H5: Discriminated ethnic groups are more likely to engage in conflict, if the share of elites in 
their group is larger. 
A key element tied to within-group inequalities is the influence and motivation of elites (Besançon, 
2005; Fearon and Laitin, 2000; Huber and Mayoral, 2014; Wilkinson, 2004).5 An increased presence of 
elites may amplify demands for an improved political/economic status and strengthen the ability of 
elites to mobilize a group toward collective action (Besançon, 2005). Particularly if groups are 
subjected to political discrimination, elites can play an important role in the buildup to conflict.6 When 
socioeconomic inequalities facilitate the mobilization of their constituencies (Langer, 2005), repression 
can lead ethnic elites to take up arms in order to force the state to listen to their demands (Cederman 
et al., 2013; Lacina, 2014). By blaming the plight of their ethnic community on other groups or depicting 
other groups as a threat to their socioeconomic or political status, elites may mobilize their ethnic 
group toward collective action. Due to the risk involved in violent action, the masses must have reasons 
for following elites (Varshney, 2003). This is easier to facilitate if the group faces repressive policies by 
the state, to which their grievances can be directed (Langer, 2005). The Ivory Coast is a good example 
- after the death of Houphouët-Boigny in 1993, the state imposed policies favouring the ethnicity of 
the ruling elite (baoulisation) and excluding northern groups from the government and the military. 
This overt political discrimination, together with the presence of socioeconomic horizontal inequalities 
and latent ethnic tensions between the north and the south, encouraged northern elites from different 
 
5 Daloz (2010) defines an elite as a selected and small group of citizens that controls a large amount of 
wealth and power. 
6 For this reason, Goldstone et al. (2010) argue that models examining elite relationships will have 
greater predictive power for conflict onset than those focused on economic resources. 
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groups to unite in opposition to the state and ultimately led to a coup d’état in 1999 (Langer, 2005). 
 
3.3 - Data and Methods 
3.3.1 - Data  
For the analyses, I use the Ethnic Dyad Database (EDD) with annual data for 155 ethnic groups within 
28 countries in sub-Saharan Africa for the period 1990-2013. The EDD is based on datasets from 73 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) which were derived from the Global Data Lab 
(www.globaldatalab.org). DHS are large, nationally representative household surveys, collecting data 
on socioeconomic, demographic, and health-related issues through oral interviews. Response rates 
are usually very high (in most cases above 90%).  
Ethnic identity was measured by asking respondents for their ethnic group or tribe. Respondents could 
select from several predefined categories, or specify their own if they classify as another. On the basis 
of the ethnic identity information, data from the surveys were aggregated to the ethnic group level. 
When ethnic groups in the survey were very small in size (less than 1% of the sample population), they 
were integrated into larger clusters of groups from the same ethno-linguistic family. The ethnic group 
cluster to which groups belonged to was identified with the help of a variety of databases (Joshua 
Project, 2016; Olson, 1996; Simons and Fennig, 2017). Small groups that could not be combined into 
larger categories were left out of the analysis, ending up with 155 out of the 180 ethnic groups 
originally identified (see Table A.2.1 for the list of 155 groups).  
The aggregated information at the ethnic group level from the different surveys was combined into an 
ethnic group panel dataset with annual observations from 1990 to 2013. Since the dataset was based 
on DHS data, observations were only available for years in which DHS surveys were conducted within 
the countries (for the list of included surveys see Table A.2.2). The values of the closest survey prior to 
the year of observation were utilized for years in which no dataset was available. When the year of 
observation came before the earliest available survey, the values of the earliest survey were 
extrapolated.  
The socioeconomic data in the EDD were merged together with annual political access data from the 
Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Vogt et al., 2015). The EPR dataset identifies politically relevant 
groups and includes annual data on their access to power on the national level by coding to which 
extent the representatives of ethnic groups held executive-level state power—from total control of 
the government to overt political discrimination. Information was available for 155 ethnic groups 
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within 28 countries. To construct the Ethnic Dyad Database, within each country, every dyadic 
combination of ethnic group was generated, for a total of 9,783 ethnic dyad year observations. This 
approach allows the socioeconomic and political features of ethnic groups within pairs to be 
compared. Measures are included to indicate the average and the disparity between group features in 
each dyad.  
Data on ethnic conflict incidence were derived from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).7 The 
database includes information on conflicts with at least 25 deaths in that year. It consists of 375 
intrastate conflict incidence observations in sub-Saharan African countries containing conflicts 
between insurgents and the government, conflicts between actors where the government is not 
involved, and violence perpetrated against civilians by insurgents or the government from the period 
1990 to 2013. The period of analysis chosen was due to the availability of reliable group-level data. 
Furthermore, by opting to leave out conflicts that occurred before 1990, it was possible to eliminate 
the possibility that the conflict would be associated to the Cold War, which occurred frequently during 
the 1970-1980s.  
 
3.3.2 - Research design 
To test the hypotheses, multilevel logistic regression analysis was performed with ethnic conflict 
incidence as dependent variable. To control for clustering of the dyads within countries and for the 
repeated measurement of dyads over time multilevel versions of the logistic regression model were 
used. The models were estimated with Stata Xtmelogit. 
Ethnic conflict incidence was measured by a dummy variable indicating whether (1) or not (0) a violent 
conflict occurred within a specific dyad in a given year. Ethnic groups were recorded as participants in 
conflicts, when they were prevalent in the UCDP conflict description. Conflict observations were linked 
to the dyad of the ethnic groups involved in the fighting. Cases with the involvement of foreign groups 
or intra-ethnic conflicts (both groups from the same cluster) were excluded from the analysis. Of the 
28 countries in this research, five did not contain cases of intrastate ethnic conflict (Benin, Gabon, 
Malawi, Namibia and Zambia). 
The variable political inequality derived from the Ethnic Power relations (EPR) dataset measures the 
level of access to state power of an ethnic group through their political representation at the central 
 
7 Specific datasets utilised include the UCDP Dyadic Dataset (Allansson et al., 2017), UCDP Non-State 
Conflict Dataset (Sundberg et al., 2012), and UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset (Eck and Hultman, 
2007). 
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regime level. It has three main categories: ‘excluded from power’, ‘power-sharing’, or ‘dominant’. The 
excluded from power category consists of two kinds of groups, those that are only excluded from 
power and those that besides being excluded from power are also politically discriminated, with 
discriminated meaning intentionally and directly targeted by the state through repressive policies. The 
focus of the analysis is on the difference between the two kinds of excluded groups – discriminated 
and non-discriminated – in risk of conflict with groups in power. To create the category ‘in power’ the 
categories of power-sharing and dominant groups are combined. Theoretically this makes sense, as 
my interest is in how political discrimination by the state—represented by either a coalition or a single 
group—affects the propensity for conflict. 
As control factors at the ethnic dyad level, I include within dyad differences in characteristics of the 
groups and the average values of those characteristics for the dyad. The characteristics are economic 
wealth, group size, education level, and elite share. Because the average values are included, the 
differences indicate the inequalities specifically in the characteristics within the dyad. This approach 
mirrors that of prior studies, such as Alcorta et al. (2018).To measure the economic wealth level of the 
groups, the average score on the International Wealth Index (IWI) of households belonging to the 
groups is taken. IWI measures economic welfare and access to resources according to a weighted 
combination of the household’s possession of consumer durables, housing characteristics and access 
to public utilities (Smits and Steendijk, 2015). IWI ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 represents households 
without assets and with public/housing utilities of the poorest quality, and 100 represents households 
with all assets recorded in the survey and with public/housing utilities of the highest quality. The size 
of an ethnic group is determined by calculating the share of people in the group relative to the total 
population. The education level of a group is represented by the average number of years of schooling 
received by respondents in the group that are within the 20-49 age category. The share of the group’s 
elites was measured by the group’s share of employed men aged 20-49 with higher occupations, such 
as technical, professional and managerial positions. Urbanization of a group is measured as the 
proportion of its members living in urban areas.  
At the national level, rule of law is included as control factor. This variable indicates to what extent 
people confide in and abide by the rules of society in which they live. In particular it reflects their views 
on the police, the courts, the quality of property rights, and contract enforcement, as well as on the 
likelihood of crime and violence occurring. The variable is derived from the World Governance 
Indicators (WGIs) and uses a scale that runs from -2.5 to 2.5 (Kaufmann et al.,2011). WGIs are only 
recorded from 1996 onwards, until 2002 on a bi-annual basis and since then yearly. Values for the 
missing years after 1996 are linearly interpolated. Values for the period 1990-1995 are linearly 
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extrapolated from 1996.  
To control for earlier conflicts within the dyad, four dummy variables are used which indicate whether 
(1) or not (0) there was a conflict in the four years preceding the year of measurement. By controlling 
for prior conflict, the indicators leading to conflict incidence are separated from circumstances that 
may arise during an existing conflict. I include four of these dummies, as the dummy for conflict five 
years preceding the focus year was found to be insignificant. I also include a dummy indicating the 
observations for which the data are extrapolated from surveys taken later than the observation year. 
Allison’s (2001) dummy variable adjustment procedure is used to address any values that were missing 
for education levels and share of elites. I tested for the possibility of nonlinear relationships by 
including quadratic terms for all interval-level variables in the models, but no indication of nonlinearity 
was found. I also test for multicollinearity by computing the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) statistic for 
all independent variables. The highest VIF value was 4.5, which is substantially below the critical 
threshold of 10. I therefore conclude that there is no multicollinearity in the data. 
 
3.3.3 - Modelling strategy 
We first estimate multilevel models for each independent and control variable to examine their 
bivariate relationship with ethnic conflict. In the bivariate analysis of the control variables (education, 
economic, etc.), the difference and the mean variables are both incorporated within the model 
because the two components are strong linked with each other. The controls for prior conflict are also 
integrated in the model because of the strong effects that preceding conflict exhibited on the 
relationship.  
Our multivariate analysis consists of four major steps. I first apply a simple division between groups 
that are excluded from power and groups that are in power (Model 1). This means that the following 
three categories of dyads can be distinguished: (1) excluded versus in power, (2) excluded versus 
excluded, and (3) in-power versus in-power. For each of these categories a dummy is prepared 
indicating whether (1) or not (0) a specific dyad is in the respective category. The aim of this step is to 
test whether the data replicate the findings of earlier research (Cederman et al., 2013); that the 
combination of excluded versus in power has the highest chance of ethnic conflict. In this analysis, the 
category excluded versus in power is taken as reference category. 
In the second step, I split up the excluded group into discriminated excluded groups and non-
discriminated excluded groups (Model 2). Subsequently, six categories of dyads are obtained: (1) 
discriminated excluded versus in power, (2) non-discriminated excluded versus in power, (3) 
74 
 
discriminated excluded versus discriminated excluded, (4) non-discriminated excluded versus non-
discriminated excluded, (5) discriminated excluded versus non-discriminated excluded, and (6) in 
power versus in power. Again for each of the categories a dummy variable is prepared. Taking the 
discriminated excluded groups as reference category, I test whether splitting up the excluded group 
into discriminated and non-discriminated may lead to a better explanation of the variation in within 
dyad conflict incidence. 
Given that this indeed turns out to be the case, in the third step (Model 3) I simplify things by replacing 
the six-category variable used in Step 2 by a simple two-category dummy variable that compares the 
combination discriminated excluded versus in power (1) with all other combinations combined into 
one category (0). As the omnibus test indicates that this simple model is a significant improvement 
over Model 2, this model is taken as starting point for the interaction analysis (Model 4), in which I 
study whether the heightened conflict risk of the discriminated versus in power combination is 
moderated by the characteristics of groups and the circumstances under which they live. 
 
3.4 - Results 
Table 3.A provides a summary of the descriptive statistics. In the EDD dataset, ethnic conflict occurs 
within 3.8% of the country/year observations. Dyads pairing excluded groups with groups in power 
account for 23.2% of the observations. Disaggregating this category, dyads pairing discriminated 
excluded groups with groups in power represent 8.1% of the observations, whilst dyads pairing non-
discriminated excluded groups versus groups in power correspond to 15.2% of the observations. 
Educational inequalities between groups averaged 1.6 years, and varies from 0 to 8.9 years. Ethnic 
groups receive 4.9 years of schooling on average. Wealth differences between groups average an IWI 
score of 8.8 (on a scale ranging from 0 to 100), and groups have a mean wealth level of 25.4 on this 
index. The difference between groups in the proportion of elites is on average 5.0%, and the mean 
share of elites within groups is 9.5%. Both the average population size of groups and the average 
difference between groups is 10.5% of the country’s total population. The mean difference between 
groups in urbanization is 16.9%, and the mean percentage of group population living in an urban 
environment is 34.1%. National values for the rule of law average -0.6 on and range from -2.1 to 0.3. 
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Table 3.A - Descriptive statistics summary table for selected independent variables and ethnic conflict incidence in 
28 Sub-Saharan African countries, 1990–2013 
Variables Mean/Odds Std. Deviation Min Max 
Conflict incidence 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Political configurations of dyads     
Excluded/in power (%) 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Discriminated/in power (%) 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Not discriminated/in power (%) 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Both excluded (%) 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Both discriminated (%) 0.01 0.11 0 1 
Both not discriminated (%) 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Discriminated/not discriminated (%) 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Both in power (%) 0.70 0.46 0 1 
Control factors     
Education inequality  1.65 1.67 0 8.90 
Average education  4.94 2.54 0.50 11.90 
Wealth inequality 8.81 10.54 0 72.90 
Average wealth  25.38 13.56 2.15 93.40 
Population size inequality (%) 10.46 11.92 0.01 86.47 
Average population size (%) 10.49 7.62 1.00* 43.87 
Elite share inequality (%) 5.05 6.74 0 64.70 
Average elite share (%) 9.46 7.45 0 52.35 
Difference in urbanization (%) 16.94 15.60 0 88.70 
Average urbanization (%) 34.09 16.44 3.20 93.15 
Conflict occurred 1 year prior  0.04 0.19 0 1 
Conflict occurred 2 years prior 0.02 0.13 0 1 
Conflict occurred 3 years prior  0.01 0.11  0 1 
Conflict occurred 4 years prior 0.01 0.10  0 1 
Rule of law (WGI) -0.63 0.54 -2.13 0.35 
*Minimum cut-off value is set at 0.99%. Sources: Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), Ethnic Power Relations 
Dataset (EPR) and Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). 
The following section reports the results from the analyses used to evaluate the effects of the 
independent variables on ethnic conflict. Coefficients for the bivariate relationships are presented in 
Table 3.B and those for the multivariate relationships are shown in Table 3.C. The coefficients are 
displayed as odds ratios, because they are easier to interpret than logit coefficients. The number of 
dyad observations included in the analyses is 9,783 and the number of conflict-year observations is 
375.  
In Table 3.B and 3.C, the separate levels of political access are represented by dummy variables for the 
group combinations. In accordance with the political exclusion literature, the bivariate coefficient for 
dyads pairing excluded and in power groups shows a strongly significant and positive correlation to 
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conflict, indicating that this dyadic combination is 2.3 times more likely than other combinations to 
fuel ethnic conflict. In the bivariate analysis with the subcategories of excluded groups split up, 
however, the coefficients demonstrate that most of the weight of the impact of political exclusion on 
conflict risk is carried by the strong effect of dyads with discriminated and in power groups (3.5 times 
more conflict-prone than other dyads). Dyads combining non-discriminated excluded groups and 
groups in power are not significantly associated with conflict. Of the control factors that are significant, 
educational inequalities and occurrence of conflict 1-4 years prior are positively associated with 
conflict, whereas average education and rule of law show negative associations. These findings are in 
line with Alcorta et al. (2018). 
Table 3.B - Multilevel logistic regression coefficients for bivariate associations between selected independent 
variables and ethnic conflict incidence in 28 Sub-Saharan African countries, 1990-2013 
Variables Bivariate Coefficients 
Political configurations of dyads  
Excluded/in power 2.296*** (0.410) 
Discriminated/in power 3.504*** (0.817) 
Not discriminated/in power 1.099 (0.226) 
Both excluded 0.731 (0.198) 
Both discriminated 1.075 (0.527) 
Both not discriminated 0.791 (0.326) 
Discriminated/not discriminated 0.566 (0.248) 
Both in power 0.452*** (0.086) 
Educational inequality 1.167* (0.071) 
Average education 0.833* (0.060) 
Wealth inequality 0.991 (0.013) 
Average wealth 0.982 (0.012) 
Population size inequality 0.993 (0.012) 
Average population size 1.031 (0.020) 
Elite share inequality 0.991 (0.020) 
Average elite share 1.025 (0.018) 
Control factors  
Urbanization inequality 0.994 (0.007) 
Average urbanization 1.002 (0.009) 
Rule of law 0.137*** (0.048) 
Conflict occurred 1 year prior 28.012*** (6.346) 
Conflict occurred 2 years prior 6.488*** (1.834) 
Conflict occurred 3 years prior 4.369*** (1.423) 
Conflict occurred 4 years prior 3.200*** (1.187) 
Observations 9,783 
Conflict-year combinations 375 
Coefficients are the log odds for the variables in the models and estimates for random-effects parameters, with 
standard errors in parentheses. *p<.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001. Models were estimated for each variable separately, 
whereby both components of the socioeconomic control variables (inequality and mean) were estimated 
simultaneously. 
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In Table 3.C, the multivariate multilevel coefficients are presented. Model 1 compares the different 
political configurations, using the combination of excluded groups (both discriminated and not 
discriminated) with groups in power as a reference. Compared to this reference group, the two other 
combinations have lower odds of engaging in conflict, but the difference is only statistically significant 
for the dyads in which both groups are in power. The insignificant result might be due to the fact that 
the number of observations for the dyad pairing discriminated groups together is rather small. Dyads 
with groups who are both in power are 55% less likely to engage in conflict than dyads where one 
group is in power and the other is excluded from power.  
In Model 2, I test whether splitting up the excluded groups into discriminated excluded groups and 
non-discriminated excluded groups leads to a better explanation of the variation in conflict incidence. 
This indeed turns out to be the case. I observe that in comparison with the combination of 
discriminated excluded groups versus groups in power (the reference category) all other dyadic 
combinations of ethnic groups have lower conflict risk. For all but one combination (two discriminated 
groups) the coefficients are significant and substantial. Most notably, dyads of non-discriminated 
excluded groups versus in power groups are 60% less conflict prone than dyads of discriminated and 
in-power groups. Hence it seems that it is the discriminated excluded groups, rather than non-
discriminated excluded groups, that are driving the positive relationship between political exclusion 
and conflict. This finding is in accordance with Hypothesis 1. 
In Model 3 the model is simplified and the effect of the discriminated/in-power dyad on conflict is 
isolated. Given that this Model 3 has a Chi2 value which is hardly different from that of Model 2, while 
using 4 degrees of freedom less, this Model 3 is preferable over Model 2. In Model 3, the coefficient 
of the dummy variable for the combination discriminated excluded and in power is highly significant 
and has a 3.22 times higher odds of conflict than all other possible dyads combined. 
To find out whether the heightened risk of conflict between discriminated excluded groups and groups 
in power is related to group characteristics and circumstances, an interaction analysis was performed, 
whereby interactions were tested with educational, economic and population size inequalities, as well 
as the average share of elites. In Model 4 these interaction coefficients are jointly included. The 
interaction effects with wealth inequalities between the groups and with the combined elite share of 
the groups were found to be significant. The negative interaction coefficient for wealth inequalities 
indicates that -- in line with hypothesis 3 -- the risk of conflict between discriminated excluded groups 
and groups in power is significantly reduced if wealth inequalities between the groups are higher. The 
interaction coefficient for average elite share is significantly positive. This indicates that conflict risk 
for discriminated and in-power group dyads is higher if the average share of elites in the dyad is larger, 
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as predicted by hypothesis 5. No evidence in favor of interactions predicted in hypotheses 2 and 4 was 
found. Hence, these results indicate that differences in access to education and in population size are 
not related to the difference in conflict risk between the discriminated versus in power combination 
and the other dyadic combinations of groups.    
Regarding the effects of the control factors in our models, Table 3 shows that educational inequalities 
between groups, average group size, and average elite share of groups are positively associated to 
conflict, whilst average group education and difference in the share of elites between groups are 
negatively associated. An increase of one year in average group education decreases the chance of 
conflict by around 20%. However, if the difference in years of schooling between the groups is one 
year larger, the risk of conflict is 29-36% higher. This might be explained by the public value of 
education, whose unfair distribution could potentially breed strong grievances within communities 
(Alcorta et al. 2018). With respect to the average group size, each one-percent increase in joint 
population size increases conflict risk by around 6 percent. When ethnic groups are larger, the risk that 
conflict occurs between them is higher. If the difference in the share of elites between groups increases 
by one percent, the chance of conflict decreases by about 5%. A one percent increase in joint elite 
share is associated with about a 7 percent higher conflict risk, and – as the interaction analysis shows 
– even more so for dyads with discriminated and in-power groups.  
The coefficients for the average level of education, wealth and urbanization, and the differences in 
wealth, elite share and urbanization, mostly follow those of Alcorta et al. (2018). However, they are all 
insignificant, probably because the sample size used in this analysis is much smaller. The control factors 
for conflict in preceding years are all significant, thus stressing the importance of including them in the 
model. I also tested an indicator for conflicts five years earlier, but its coefficient was not significant. 
Finally, the coefficient of rule of law is significant and strongly negative. For each one point increase 
on the five-points rule of law scale the odds of conflict is about 85 percent lower.  
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Table 3.C - Multilevel logistic regression coefficients for multivariate associations between selected independent 
variables and ethnic conflict incidence in 28 Sub-Saharan African countries, 1990-2013 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 0.002*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.003) 0.001*** (0.001) 0.001*** (0.001) 
Political configurations of dyads     
Excluded/in power Reference    
Discriminated/in power  Reference 3.228*** (0.828) 3.090*** (0.850) 
Not discriminated/in power  0.399** (0.124) Reference Reference 
Both excluded 0.572 (0.172)    
Both discriminated  0.574 (0.331) Reference Reference 
Both not discriminated  0.313* (0.154) Reference Reference 
Discriminated/not discriminated  0.240** (0.125) Reference Reference 
Both in power 0.447*** (0.094) 0.265*** (0.073) Reference Reference 
Educational inequality 1.361*** (0.122) 1.365*** (0.123) 1.355** (0.123) 1.289** (0.119) 
Average education 0.793* (0.084) 0.788* (0.084) 0.790* (0.084) 0.806* (0.087) 
Wealth inequality 0.967 (0.020) 0.967 (0.020) 0.967 (0.020) 0.985 (0.021) 
Average wealth 1.010 (0.022) 1.017 (0.022) 1.015 (0.022) 1.021 (0.022) 
Population size inequality 0.990 (0.015) 0.989 (0.015) 0.990 (0.015) 0.994 (0.016) 
Average population size 1.058* (0.027) 1.063* (0.027) 1.060* (0.027) 1.056* (0.027) 
Elite share inequality 0.951 (0.025) 0.945 (0.025) 0.948 (0.025) 0.941 (0.026) 
Average elite share 1.070** (0.023) 1.073*** (0.023) 1.071** (0.023) 1.053* (0.025) 
Control factors     
Urbanization inequality 0.999 (0.009) 0.998 (0.009) 0.998 (0.009) 0.997 (0.009) 
Average urbanization 1.004 (0.012) 1.001 (0.012) 1.002 (0.012) 1.002 (0.012) 
Conflict occurred 1 year prior 15.007*** (3.528) 13.849*** (3.247) 13.594*** (3.182) 12.607*** (2.881) 
Conflict occurred 2 years prior 4.028*** (1.163) 3.751*** (1.086) 3.705*** (1.070) 3.526*** (1.009) 
Conflict occurred 3 years prior 2.958** (0.999) 2.811** (0.952) 2.752** (0.931) 2.587** (0.872) 
Conflict occurred 4 years prior 2.341* (0.895) 2.287* (0.874) 2.262* (0.861) 2.145* (0.815) 
Rule of law 0.145*** (0.056) 0.164*** (0.062) 0.157*** (0.059) 0.132*** (0.050) 
Interactions     
Educational inequality * 
discriminated/in power    0.891 (0.137) 
Wealth inequality * 
discriminated/in power    0.920* (0.033) 
Population size inequality * 
discriminated/in power    0.985 (0.014) 
Average elite share * 
discriminated/in power    1.106** (0.036) 
Random-intercept parameters     
Country level 1.260*** (0.347) 1.150*** (0.347) 1.183*** (0.345) 1.091*** (0.338) 
Ethnic dyad level 1.183*** (0.200) 1.257*** (0.203) 1.265*** (0.208) 1.286*** (0.200) 
Omnibus test Chi2 (DF) 70.36 (19) 66.49 (22) 66.53 (18) 70.26 (22) 
Observations 9,783 9,783 9,783 9,783 
Conflict-year combinations 375 375 375 375 
Coefficients are the log odds for the variables in the models and estimates for random-effects parameters, with 
standard errors in parentheses. *p<.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001. 
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3.5 - Discussion 
By disaggregating political exclusion, I seek to determine whether discriminatory policies by the state 
designed to prevent a group from accessing political power provide a stronger incentive for conflict 
than political exclusion without explicit discrimination. This is accomplished through first distinguishing 
between discriminated and non-discriminated groups that fell within the excluded category of the EPR 
dataset, and then conducting a dyadic analysis comparing these groups with groups in power.  
In the first analysis, I replicated the findings of earlier group-level research (Cederman et al., 2013), 
which found politically-excluded groups to be more often associated with conflict than non-excluded 
groups. The analysis revealed that dyads of ethnic groups containing both in-power and excluded 
groups were significantly more conflict-prone than dyads where both groups are in power. Yet, when 
I subdivided the excluded groups into groups that are politically discriminated and groups that are not 
politically discriminated, it became apparent that it is the discriminated groups that predominantly 
drive this effect. Dyads incorporating excluded groups suffering from discrimination were significantly 
more prone to ethnic conflict than dyads with non-discriminated excluded groups. 
This finding supports the argument that discrimination by the state is a critical factor driving politically 
excluded ethnic groups toward conflict (Gurr, 1993; Walter, 2006). Explaining the result in the context 
of the motivation and opportunity mechanisms, I posit that exclusion from power may create 
incentives for conflict, but these are generally insufficient to overcome the opportunity constraints 
stemming from lack of political access. However, when political exclusion is associated with acts of 
discrimination and repression, group grievances could be severe enough to outweigh the limitations 
they face and spur the group on toward conflict (Brockett, 2005).  
We also find that economic inequalities and the average share of elites within the groups have 
significant moderating effects on the tendency of discriminated groups to engage in conflict, similarly 
to Alcorta et al. (2018). The risk of conflict between these groups and groups in power is significantly 
lower if there are wealth inequalities between the groups, and significantly higher if the share of elite 
positions occupied by members of both groups is higher. To understand how these interactions work, 
the findings need to be interpreted once more through their association with the conflict mechanisms. 
The direction of the first interaction suggests that inequalities between the groups may offset the 
positive effect of discrimination on conflict. I abide by Tilly’s argument (1978) that despite severe 
grievances, discriminated groups who are subjected to economic constraints relative to the other 
group often do not have the financial resources or organizational capacity to mount a rebellion against 
the group in power. The economic inequalities will therefore reinforce the coercive control of the 
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group in power over the discriminated group (Gurr, 1993).  
The positive association found between elite size and conflict outbreak highlights the pivotal role of 
ethnic entrepreneurs in a volatile political environment. In their jostle for dominance, elites seeking to 
advance their own interests can become an aggravating factor in the buildup to ethnic conflict. They 
might exploit their influence over other members of their community through indoctrination or 
providing financial incentives (Varshney, 2003). This role may be more critical when groups are 
discriminated, as the stronger resentment toward the state will make it more feasible for ethnic elites 
to blame groups in power for the predicament of their community. 
There are a couple of limitations to the study that should be considered when reflecting upon these 
findings. First, the dyadic approach means it is not possible to isolate the group within the dyad. This 
implies that I can observe the presence and size of an inequality but cannot draw conclusions regarding 
its direction (Neumayer and Plümper, 2010). However, since it is often very difficult to determine who 
instigated the violence in conflict data, the direction of an inequality generally does not provide much 
additional insight on conflict incentives. Drawing upon a comprehensive set of ethnic dyads, I can 
compare differences between all possible ethnic group combinations within a country rather than just 
with the national average. This allows me to more directly capture inequalities between ethnic groups 
and understand how they are linked to intergroup conflict, which is often dyadic in nature. 
Second, the data do not capture all the potential ethnic group conflicts during the period analysed. In 
order to be able to run the analyses, sometimes ethnic groups had to be combined into larger ethnic 
clusters because smaller ethnic groups were not consistent represented in the data across survey years 
(Nigeria for example has 400 ethnic groups). This means that conflicts between groups belonging to 
the same larger ethnic cluster could not be included. However, given the large number of ethnic groups 
distinguished in this database, the large majority of ethnic conflicts in the study period (88%) could be 
included in the analyses. Hence the information loss due to this issue is rather small.  
 
3.6 - Conclusion 
This study drew on the Ethnic Dyad Database, which contains 9,783 dyad year observations 
incorporating 155 ethnic groups for 28 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. This research contributes to 
the literature on political exclusion by comparing the effects of excluded groups that face 
discrimination by the state designed to exclude then from political power versus groups that are 
excluded from power but do not face explicit discrimination in the public sphere. By separating these 
subcategories, I find that political exclusion alone is not a sufficient predictor of conflict outbreak. 
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Instead, conflict seems to be linked to excluded groups that are targeted by the state with 
discriminatory policies designed to prevent them from accessing political power. Interaction analysis 
reveals that economic inequalities between groups and the proportion of elites within the group can 
moderate this relationship. Discriminated groups seem to be less inclined to engage in conflict with in-
power groups when there are large economic differences between them, whilst discriminated groups 
are more susceptible to conflict with groups in power when there is a larger presence of elites.  
Political inequalities represent a complex interaction of incentives and opportunities that to a certain 
extent appear to hold each other in the balance. I postulate that the acute political incentives for 
conflict generated by discriminatory policies may outweigh the political limitations excluded groups 
encounter when initiating a rebellion. Motivations for conflict can be further enflamed by elites who 
wield influence on the other members of their group and seek to advance their own interests through 
collective mobilization. However, even strong incentives will not be enough to lead ethnic groups into 
conflict if they face additional economic constraints relative to the group in power. In such cases, a 
group’s ability to successfully mobilize resources and finance a rebellion is limited.   
Scholars have theorized about different types of grievances that may spur conflict. These results reveal 
the specifics in the relationship between political inequalities and ethnic conflict, which are better 
understood by disaggregating the types of exclusion and assessing their impact on both underlying 
mechanisms. This not only allows us to test the strength of different grievance arguments, but also to 
examine how the balance between the motivation and opportunity mechanisms may shift depending 
on conditions that occur jointly with political inequalities. The findings may offer useful insights for 
policymakers. The decline of ethnic conflict has been explained by the recent trend of ethnic groups 
achieving better political access (Cederman et al., 2017a). Although this is a positive development 
which benefits society as a whole, policies aimed specifically toward the prevention of violence might 
be more effective in placing the onus on reducing discriminatory practices and curbing the role of 
ethnic elites. 
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3.7 - Appendix 
Table A.3.1 - List of ethnic conflicts derived from the UCDP database for 28 Sub-Saharan African countries, 1990-
2013 
Country Dyad ID Group A name Group B name Start End 
MLI 4320102 Bambara Mali Malinké Mali 2012 2012 
MLI 4320105 Bambara Mali Sonrai/Songhai Mali 2013 2013 
MLI 4320107 Bambara Mali Tamasheq/Tuareg Mali 1990 1994 
MLI 4320107 Bambara Mali Tamasheq/Tuareg Mali 2013 2013 
MLI 4320207 Malinké Mali Tamasheq/Tuareg Mali 2007 2009 
MLI 4320207 Malinké Mali Tamasheq/Tuareg Mali 2012 2012 
MLI 4320306 Peulh Mali Dogon Mali 2012 2012 
MLI 4320307 Peulh Mali Tamasheq/Tuareg Mali 1997 1997 
MLI 4320507 Sonrai/Songhai Mali Tamasheq/Tuareg Mali 1994 1994 
MLI 4320507 Sonrai/Songhai Mali Tamasheq/Tuareg Mali 2008 2008 
MLI 4320507 Sonrai/Songhai Mali Tamasheq/Tuareg Mali 2012 2012 
SEN 4330105 Wolof Senegal Jola Senegal 1990 1990 
SEN 4330105 Wolof Senegal Jola Senegal 1992 1993 
SEN 4330105 Wolof Senegal Jola Senegal 1995 1995 
SEN 4330105 Wolof Senegal Jola Senegal 1997 1998 
SEN 4330105 Wolof Senegal Jola Senegal 2000 2003 
SEN 4330105 Wolof Senegal Jola Senegal 2011 2011 
SEN 4330305 Serer Senegal Jola Senegal 1990 1990 
SEN 4330305 Serer Senegal Jola Senegal 1992 1993 
SEN 4330305 Serer Senegal Jola Senegal 1995 1995 
SEN 4330305 Serer Senegal Jola Senegal 1997 1998 
SEN 4330405 Mandinka/Malinke Senegal Jola Senegal 1992 1993 
SEN 4330405 Mandinka/Malinke Senegal Jola Senegal 1995 1995 
SEN 4330405 Mandinka/Malinke Senegal Jola Senegal 1997 1998 
TGO 4610104 Adja-Ewe Togo Kabye/Tem Togo 1991 1991 
TGO 4610104 Adja-Ewe Togo Kabye/Tem Togo 1993 1993 
TGO 4610104 Adja-Ewe Togo Kabye/Tem Togo 2005 2005 
NER 4360208 Djerma/Songhai Niger Touareg Niger 1990 1992 
NER 4360405 Haussa Niger Kanuri/Toubou Niger 1995 1995 
NER 4360405 Haussa Niger Kanuri/Toubou Niger 1998 1998 
NER 4360408 Haussa Niger Touareg Niger 1994 1994 
NER 4360408 Haussa Niger Touareg Niger 1997 1997 
NER 4360508 Kanuri/Toubou Niger Touareg Niger 2007 2008 
CIV 4370103 Akan Ivory Coast Mand (north) Ivory Coast 2000 2000 
CIV 4370103 Akan Ivory Coast Mand (north) Ivory Coast 2011 2011 
CIV 4370105 Akan Ivory Coast Voltaic Ivory Coast 2011 2011 
CIV 4370203 Kru Ivory Coast Mand (north) Ivory Coast 2000 2000 
CIV 4370203 Kru Ivory Coast Mand (north) Ivory Coast 2002 2005 
CIV 4370203 Kru Ivory Coast Mand (north) Ivory Coast 2011 2011 
CIV 4370204 Kru Ivory Coast Mand (south) Ivory Coast 1994 1995 
CIV 4370204 Kru Ivory Coast Mand (south) Ivory Coast 2002 2003 
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CIV 4370205 Kru Ivory Coast Voltaic Ivory Coast 2002 2005 
CIV 4370205 Kru Ivory Coast Voltaic Ivory Coast 2011 2011 
CIV 4370304 Mand (north) Ivory Coast Mand (south) Ivory Coast 2005 2005 
CIV 4370305 Mand (north) Ivory Coast Voltaic Ivory Coast 2002 2003 
GIN 4380203 Peulh Guinea Malinke Guinea 2009 2009 
LBR 4500513 Gio Liberia Krahn Liberia 1999 2003 
LBR 4500514 Gio Liberia Mandigo Liberia 2000 2003 
LBR 4501013 Krahn Liberia Mandigo Liberia 1999 1999 
LBR 4501014 Krahn Liberia Mano Liberia 1999 2003 
LBR 4501314 Mandigo Liberia Mano Liberia 1990 1996 
LBR 4501314 Mandigo Liberia Mano Liberia 1999 2003 
SLE 4510102 Temne Sierra Leone Mende Sierra Leone 1991 1992 
SLE 4510102 Temne Sierra Leone Mende Sierra Leone 1997 1997 
SLE 4510104 Temne Sierra Leone Creole Sierra Leone 1992 1992 
SLE 4510209 Mende Sierra Leone Kono Sierra Leone 1991 1992 
SLE 4510209 Mende Sierra Leone Kono Sierra Leone 1997 1997 
SLE 4510409 Creole Sierra Leone Kono Sierra Leone 1992 1992 
GHA 4520507 Mole-Dagbani Ghana Gruma Ghana 1994 1995 
CMR 4710103 
Arab-Choa/Peulh/Haoussa/Kanuri 
Cameroon Adamaoua-Oubangui Cameroon 1992 1994 
CMR 4710104 
Arab-Choa/Peulh/Haoussa/Kanuri 
Cameroon Bantoïde South-West Cameroon 1991 1991 
CMR 4710108 
Arab-Choa/Peulh/Haoussa/Kanuri 
Cameroon Beti/Bassa/Mbam Cameroon 1994 1994 
CMR 4710506 Grassfields Cameroon Bamilike/Bamoun Cameroon 1998 1998 
NGA 4750307 Fulani Nigeria Igbo Nigeria 1991 1991 
NGA 4750307 Fulani Nigeria Igbo Nigeria 2006 2006 
NGA 4750308 Fulani Nigeria Ijaw/Izon Nigeria 2008 2008 
NGA 4750312 Fulani Nigeria Tiv Nigeria 2011 2013 
NGA 4750313 Fulani Nigeria Yoruba Nigeria 2001 2004 
NGA 4750314 Fulani Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 1991 1992 
NGA 4750314 Fulani Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 1999 2002 
NGA 4750314 Fulani Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 2004 2004 
NGA 4750314 Fulani Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 2006 2006 
NGA 4750314 Fulani Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 2008 2008 
NGA 4750314 Fulani Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 2010 2013 
NGA 4750407 Hausa Nigeria Igbo Nigeria 1991 1991 
NGA 4750407 Hausa Nigeria Igbo Nigeria 2000 2001 
NGA 4750407 Hausa Nigeria Igbo Nigeria 2006 2006 
NGA 4750413 Hausa Nigeria Yoruba Nigeria 1998 1999 
NGA 4750413 Hausa Nigeria Yoruba Nigeria 2001 2004 
NGA 4750414 Hausa Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 1991 1992 
NGA 4750414 Hausa Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 1999 2002 
NGA 4750414 Hausa Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 2004 2004 
NGA 4750414 Hausa Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 2006 2006 
NGA 4750414 Hausa Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 2008 2008 
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NGA 4750414 Hausa Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 2010 2010 
NGA 4750414 Hausa Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 2012 2013 
NGA 4750708 Igbo Nigeria Ijaw/Izon Nigeria 1999 1999 
NGA 4750712 Igbo Nigeria Tiv Nigeria 1998 1998 
NGA 4750713 Igbo Nigeria Yoruba Nigeria 2003 2004 
NGA 4750811 Ijaw/Izon Nigeria Ogoni Nigeria 1993 1994 
NGA 4750813 Ijaw/Izon Nigeria Yoruba Nigeria 1998 1999 
NGA 4750813 Ijaw/Izon Nigeria Yoruba Nigeria 2003 2004 
NGA 4750911 Kanuri/Beriberi Nigeria Ogoni Nigeria 1994 1994 
NGA 4750911 Kanuri/Beriberi Nigeria Ogoni Nigeria 1998 1998 
NGA 4751113 Ogoni Nigeria Yoruba Nigeria 1999 1999 
NGA 4751214 Tiv Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 1991 1992 
NGA 4751214 Tiv Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 2001 2001 
CAF 4820204 Sara CAR Gbaya CAR 2002 2002 
CAF 4820204 Sara CAR Gbaya CAR 2006 2007 
CAF 4820204 Sara CAR Gbaya CAR 2012 2013 
CAF 4820208 Sara CAR Yakoma-Sango CAR 2001 2001 
CAF 4820208 Sara CAR Yakoma-Sango CAR 2013 2013 
CAF 4820408 Gbaya CAR Yakoma-Sango CAR 2011 2011 
TCD 4830102 Gorane Chad Arab Chad 1990 1990 
TCD 4830203 Arab Chad Ouaddai Chad 1999 1999 
TCD 4830203 Arab Chad Ouaddai Chad 2002 2002 
TCD 4830203 Arab Chad Ouaddai Chad 2004 2007 
COG 4840106 Kongo Congo Brazaville M'bochi Congo Brazaville 1993 1993 
COG 4840106 Kongo Congo Brazaville M'bochi Congo Brazaville 1997 1999 
COG 4840106 Kongo Congo Brazaville M'bochi Congo Brazaville 2002 2002 
COD 4900106 Bakongo North and South Congo DR Basele-K, Man. and Kivu Congo DR 2007 2008 
COD 4900107 Bakongo North and South Congo DR 
Kasai, Katanga and Tanganika 
Congo DR 2007 2008 
COD 4900307 Cuvette central Congo DR Basele-K, Man. and Kivu Congo DR 1998 2002 
COD 4900307 Cuvette central Congo DR Basele-K, Man. and Kivu Congo DR 2006 2006 
COD 4900307 Cuvette central Congo DR 
Kasai, Katanga and Tanganika 
Congo DR 1998 2000 
COD 4900307 Cuvette central Congo DR 
Kasai, Katanga and Tanganika 
Congo DR 2006 2006 
COD 4900406 Ubangi and Itimbiri Congo DR Basele-K, Man. and Kivu Congo DR 1990 1997 
COD 4900607 Basele-K, Man. and Kivu Congo DR 
Kasai, Katanga and Tanganika 
Congo DR 1996 2000 
COD 4900607 Basele-K, Man. and Kivu Congo DR 
Kasai, Katanga and Tanganika 
Congo DR 2002 2004 
COD 4900607 Basele-K, Man. and Kivu Congo DR 
Kasai, Katanga and Tanganika 
Congo DR 2006 2009 
COD 4900607 Basele-K, Man. and Kivu Congo DR 
Kasai, Katanga and Tanganika 
Congo DR 2012 2013 
UGA 5000516 Baganda Uganda Iteso Uganda 1990 1992 
UGA 5001016 Banyakole Uganda Iteso Uganda 1990 1992 
KEN 5010103 Kalenjin Kenya Kikuyu Kenya 1992 1994 
KEN 5010103 Kalenjin Kenya Kikuyu Kenya 1998 1998 
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KEN 5010103 Kalenjin Kenya Kikuyu Kenya 2007 2008 
KEN 5010104 Kalenjin Kenya Kisii Kenya 1992 1992 
KEN 5010104 Kalenjin Kenya Kisii Kenya 2008 2008 
KEN 5010105 Kalenjin Kenya Luhya Kenya 1992 1993 
KEN 5010106 Kalenjin Kenya Luo Kenya 1992 1992 
KEN 5010110 Kalenjin Kenya Somali Kenya 2011 2013 
KEN 5010210 Kamba Kenya Somali Kenya 2011 2013 
KEN 5010305 Kikuyu Kenya Luhya Kenya 2007 2009 
KEN 5010306 Kikuyu Kenya Luo Kenya 2007 2009 
KEN 5010310 Kikuyu Kenya Somali Kenya 2011 2013 
KEN 5010410 Kisii Kenya Somali Kenya 2011 2013 
KEN 5010510 Luhya Kenya Somali Kenya 2011 2013 
KEN 5010610 Luo Kenya Somali Kenya 2011 2013 
KEN 5010910 Mijikenda/Swahili Kenya Somali Kenya 2011 2013 
RWA 5170102 Hutu Rwanda Tutsi Rwanda 1990 2002 
RWA 5170102 Hutu Rwanda Tutsi Rwanda 2009 2012 
ETH 5300106 Afar Ethiopia Somalie Ethiopia 2002 2002 
ETH 5300107 Afar Ethiopia Tigray (Tigraway) Ethiopia 1996 1996 
ETH 5300204 Amhara Ethiopia Oromo Ethiopia 1990 1991 
ETH 5300204 Amhara Ethiopia Oromo Ethiopia 1999 2001 
ETH 5300206 Amhara Ethiopia Somalie Ethiopia 1991 1991 
ETH 5300207 Amhara Ethiopia Tigray (Tigraway) Ethiopia 1990 1991 
ETH 5300209 Amhara Ethiopia Nilotic Ethiopia 2003 2004 
ETH 5300406 Oromo Ethiopia Somalie Ethiopia 1991 1992 
ETH 5300406 Oromo Ethiopia Somalie Ethiopia 1998 1998 
ETH 5300406 Oromo Ethiopia Somalie Ethiopia 2000 2000 
ETH 5300406 Oromo Ethiopia Somalie Ethiopia 2003 2003 
ETH 5300406 Oromo Ethiopia Somalie Ethiopia 2005 2005 
ETH 5300407 Oromo Ethiopia Tigray (Tigraway) Ethiopia 1990 1992 
ETH 5300407 Oromo Ethiopia Tigray (Tigraway) Ethiopia 1994 1995 
ETH 5300407 Oromo Ethiopia Tigray (Tigraway) Ethiopia 1998 2013 
ETH 5300409 Oromo Ethiopia Nilotic Ethiopia 2001 2001 
ETH 5300409 Oromo Ethiopia Nilotic Ethiopia 2004 2004 
ETH 5300409 Oromo Ethiopia Nilotic Ethiopia 2008 2008 
ETH 5300410 Oromo Ethiopia Omotic Ethiopia 2006 2006 
ETH 5300410 Oromo Ethiopia Omotic Ethiopia 2008 2008 
ETH 5300410 Oromo Ethiopia Omotic Ethiopia 2013 2013 
ETH 5300607 Somalie Ethiopia Tigray (Tigraway) Ethiopia 1993 1994 
ETH 5300607 Somalie Ethiopia Tigray (Tigraway) Ethiopia 1996 1996 
ETH 5300607 Somalie Ethiopia Tigray (Tigraway) Ethiopia 1998 2013 
ETH 5300709 Tigray (Tigraway) Ethiopia Nilotic Ethiopia 2004 2004 
ETH 5300910 Nilotic Ethiopia Omotic Ethiopia 1999 1999 
ETH 5300910 Nilotic Ethiopia Omotic Ethiopia 2002 2002 
ETH 5300910 Nilotic Ethiopia Omotic Ethiopia 2005 2005 
ETH 5300910 Nilotic Ethiopia Omotic Ethiopia 2009 2009 
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AGO 5400304 Mbundu Angola Kongo Angola 1991 1991 
AGO 5400304 Mbundu Angola Kongo Angola 1994 1994 
AGO 5400304 Mbundu Angola Kongo Angola 1996 1998 
AGO 5400304 Mbundu Angola Kongo Angola 2002 2004 
AGO 5400304 Mbundu Angola Kongo Angola 2007 2007 
AGO 5400304 Mbundu Angola Kongo Angola 2009 2009 
MOZ 5410718 Shona Mozambique Xitsonga Mozambique 1990 1992 
MOZ 5411418 Cindau Mozambique Xitsonga Mozambique 1990 1992 
MOZ 5411418 Cindau Mozambique Xitsonga Mozambique 2013 2013 
ZWE 5520102 Black Zimbabwe White Zimbabwe 2008 2008 
ZAF 5600102 Black/African South Africa Colored South Africa 1993 1993 
ZAF 5600103 Black/African South Africa White South Africa 1990 1994 
ZAF 5600103 Black/African South Africa White South Africa 1998 1998 
ZAF 5600203 Colored South Africa White South Africa 1990 1994 
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Chapter 4  
 
The formation of collective 
grievances1 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
1 This Chapter has been submitted to a peer-reviewed scientific journal. Earlier versions of this 
Chapter were presented at several conferences: European Consortium for Political Research General 
Conference (2017), International Tricontinental Conference (2017), European Political Science 
Association Annual Conference (2018), and the Conference of Conflict Resolution and Peace 
Sciences (2018). 
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Abstract 
Although the discrepancy between objective and perceived inequalities has been recognized in the 
literature, most studies do not distinguish between objective measures and subjective experiences. 
This means that collective grievances that influence individuals’ decisions to mobilize for conflict are 
not captured well in previous analyses. In this chapter, I draw on data from the Afrobarometer surveys 
-- which include information on 79,914 individuals belonging to 239 ethnic groups living in 30 African 
countries -- to test a number of hypotheses about the relationship between individual and group 
characteristics and collective grievances. My results suggest that individual characteristics are as 
important, if not more important, than group characteristics in determining how individuals form their 
perceptions of collective grievances. In other words, perceptions are not just based on groups’ actual 
situation, but are to a large extent shaped by individuals’ backgrounds. In addition, my findings 
demonstrate that the salience of ethnic identity is intricately tied to how perceptions of collective 
grievances are formed. 
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4.1 - Introduction 
Scholars investigating the relationship between conflict and inequality often argue that group 
inequalities lead to intergroup conflict because of the collective grievances experienced by relatively 
deprived groups (Østby, 2008; Stewart, 2008; Cederman et al., 2013). With this claim they make two 
critical assumptions that are not yet well tested. First, they assume that observed group inequalities 
are connected with perceived group grievances. Second, despite acknowledging that the salience of 
identity and socioeconomic background can vary per individual, they treat groups as uniform and 
group identities as salient. This research addresses these two assumptions by investigating the 
relationship between group deprivation, ethnic identity, individual socioeconomic characteristics, and 
perceived collective grievances, asking the question: To what extent do individuals perceive relative 
deprivation as collective grievances at the individual level?  
To test a number of hypotheses about the relationships between individual and group characteristics 
and collective grievances, I draw on data from the Afrobarometer survey. Multilevel regression analysis 
is conducted on data for 79,914 individuals belonging to 239 ethnic groups and living in 30 African 
countries. The results indicate that respondents with a strong attachment to their ethnic identity, as 
well as those with less wealth or education, who are living in rural areas, younger, male, member of a 
community association and who get their news through newspapers are more likely to feel that their 
group is unfairly treated. Regarding characteristics of the groups, I find that when groups are smaller 
or poorer in comparison to other groups in the country, their members are more likely to perceive 
collective grievances. No significant effect is found for the size of the group’s elites or for deprivation 
in education. An additional interaction analysis makes clear that highly-educated individuals belonging 
to smaller groups as well as rich individuals belonging to groups with lower levels of education or with 
a larger share of elites are less likely to experience collective grievances.  
These empirical results indicate that both group and individual characteristics influence the 
perceptions of collective grievances among ethnic group members. The study thus makes a key 
contribution by finding that perceptions are not just based on groups’ actual situation but also shaped 
by individuals’ backgrounds. In addition, my findings demonstrate that the salience of ethnic identity 
is intricately tied to how perceptions of collective grievances are formed. 
The chapter is organized as follows. The first section describes how the conflict-inequality nexus 
literature has focused mainly on objective inequalities, discusses the shift towards a perceptions-based 
approach, and provides a theoretical framework to explain how perceived collective grievances are 
formed. This framework incorporates group inequalities, identity salience and socioeconomic 
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background factors. From this theoretical framework five hypotheses regarding the relationship 
between these factors and perceptions of collective grievances are derived. The second section 
describes the data and methodological approach used to analyze the theoretical model and test the 
hypotheses. The third section presents the findings for the relationship between the independent 
variables and perceived collective grievances, as well as the conditions under which individual and 
group characteristics can influence perceptions of collective grievances. The fourth section discusses 
the implications and limitations of these findings, and the fifth section briefly summarizes the study 
and includes some final thoughts.  
 
4.2 – The formation of collective grievances 
The relationship between inequalities and ethnic conflict is well established in the conflict literature, 
mainly showing that larger socioeconomic and political inequalities between groups will increase the 
chance of conflict occurring (Langer, 2005; Østby, 2008; Cederman et al., 2013). Inequalities between 
groups are theorized to generate collective grievances in relatively deprived groups, and these 
grievances provide motivation for political action and potentially conflict (Gurr, 1993; Stewart, 2008). 
This conflict mechanism is outlined in Robinson’s (1983) four-stage process regarding the development 
of consciousness of an inequality. The initial stage consists of individuals perceiving the existence of an 
inequality, which may be followed by a second stage where people experience inequality to be unfair 
or unjust. In the third stage, individuals realize that they can take action to address the inequalities, 
and in the fourth stage indeed action is undertaken to reduce the inequalities.2 Collective grievances 
are thus formed when relatively deprived group members become aware of existing inequalities and 
believe their group is entitled to more than what it obtains. 
Most empirical studies that investigate the relationship between inequalities and conflict examine 
group inequalities with ‘objective’ measures, such as differences between groups in education, in local 
economic activity, or in the number of assets and utilities that households have access to (Østby, 2008; 
Cederman et al., 2011; Cederman et al., 2013; Alcorta et al., 2018). However, the formation of 
grievances is not necessarily based on objective facts. Cederman et al. (2011, p. 481), for example, 
postulate that, “objective political and economic asymmetries can be transformed into grievances 
through a process of group comparison driven by collective emotions.” This argument implies that the 
formation of grievances hinges on individuals’ perceptions, which are subjective because they are 
coupled to individuals’ emotions. Since perceptions are not only based on objective comparisons, 
 
2 The final two stages refer to the opportunity mechanism and fall outside the scope of this chapter since 
the focus is solely on examining how grievances are generated. 
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decisions to engage in violence could potentially be founded on ‘erroneous’ assumptions about a 
situation (Stewart, 2010).  
Although the discrepancy between objective and perceived reality has been recognized in the 
literature, most studies do not distinguish empirically between objective measures and subjective 
experiences (Rustad, 2016). This means that the collective grievances that motivate individuals to 
mobilize for conflict are not captured well in these studies and we cannot be certain that the inferred 
causal chains from inequalities to conflict are valid (Basedau et al., 2017). Accordingly, there has been 
a recent push towards using subjective measures in conflict research (Langer et al., 2017). Langer and 
Smedts (2013) have indicated that there is a notable discrepancy between objective and subjective 
inequalities, and Rustad (2016) found that perceived inequalities are a more relevant indicator for 
support for violence than actual inequalities. Perceptions may strengthen the impact of group 
inequalities on people’s support for violence by amplifying or mitigating group grievances (Miodownik 
and Nir, 2016). In contrast, a study of religious groups finds a relationship between political 
discrimination and collective grievances, but not between collective grievances and conflict (Basedau 
et al., 2017). These findings indicate that the causal chain proposed in grievance-based arguments does 
not necessarily hold at different stages of Robinson’s (1983) process, and should be considered with 
care. 
Focusing on the initial stage of the process, there are several factors that may disrupt the link between 
inequalities and grievances. First, if there is a lack of awareness or access to information, if inequalities 
are invisible, or if multiple types of inequalities occur simultaneously, it can be difficult for individuals 
to accurately judge how deprived their groups are relative to other groups (Langer and Mikami, 2013). 
Without ‘objective’ knowledge to rely on, people often fall back on anecdotal evidence or personal 
experiences to form their judgement. Lack of information makes them also susceptible to bias and 
inaccuracies and vulnerable to being deliberately misled by others (Langer and Smedts, 2013). Not 
everyone will be aware of the presence or extent of group inequalities. For instance, Langer and Ukiwo 
(2008) found that whilst individuals from ethnic minorities in Ghana were able to perceive their 
condition accurately, members of the dominant ethnic group did not correctly perceive its objective 
political status. Misperceptions might mean that group inequalities do not always translate to 
collective grievances, and vice versa. 
Second, if the group is not cohesive or socially significant for its members, relative deprivation may not 
be experienced collectively (Stewart, 2005). In empirical research on inequalities and conflict, the 
recent focus on examining ‘horizontal’ - or group - inequalities means that groups are frequently taken 
as the unit of analysis. In these studies, group identities are usually assumed to be important for all 
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their members and individual socioeconomic characteristics are aggregated to the group level. 
Although it is necessary to treat groups as uniform to be able to observe group inequalities, not 
accounting for the variation between individuals within groups represents a major weakness in this 
approach. Individuals may differ substantially in socioeconomic status, age, gender, and how strongly 
they identify with their ethnic group (Taylor et al., 2010). Even if they can observe the existence of 
group inequalities, individual factors might influence their opinion on whether they perceive the 
relative deprivation of their group to be fair or unfair.  
In Figure 4.A, the factors that this study considers to influence the formation of collective grievances 
are categorized in the theoretical framework by group and individual context. These factors are 
explained in more detail in the following sections. 
Figure 4.A - Theoretical framework for determinants of perceived collective grievances 
     
 
4.2.1 – Group context 
According to Langer and Smedts (2013), the main factors determining how collective grievances are 
formed are the group characteristics shown in the upper-left box in Figure 4.A. These factors include 
relative group deprivation in education and wealth, the size of the population, and the share of elites 
within the group3. Although perceptions may differ from objective comparisons, they are usually based 
at least partially on the actual position of the group. Holmqvist (2012) found a weakly positive 
relationship between actual group ‘disadvantages’ and perceptions of inequality. Therefore, although 
 
3 Political discrimination (Chapter 3) is another important group characteristic, but was excluded from 
the analysis due to the lack of available Ethnic Power Relations data (Vogt et al., 2015) for groups in 
the Afrobarometer surveys. 
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collective 
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Group context
• Relative education deprivation
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a group’s advantage or disadvantage might be under or overreported, it is very unlikely that the 
information is erroneous to the extent that individuals are entirely oblivious of their group’s position 
in society and believe that position to be altogether different from reality.  
Differences in education and wealth are important socioeconomic inequalities between groups. 
Educational deprivation may induce perceptions of injustice because social services are assumed to be 
public goods, so people will expect them to  be fairly distributed (Østby, 2008). Moreover, inequalities 
in education services can be highly visible. In rural areas, ethnic groups are often clustered together in 
villages. If the state selectively provides social services to some communities but not others, 
communities that do not benefit and are exposed to others are likely to harbour a collective sense of 
injustice against the groups in power.  
Economic inequalities between groups are also expected to lead to conflict through the grievances 
they generate for relatively deprived groups (Stewart, 2008). However, the empirical findings on the 
relationship between economic inequalities and conflict have been mixed (Østby, 2008; Cederman et 
al., 2013; Huber and Mayoral, 2014; Alcorta et al., 2018). A potential reason for this may be that 
economic inequalities less likely lead to perceptions of unfair treatment because economic assets are 
not as visible as social goods and services (Alcorta et al., 2018). Most household assets are stored 
within the house, so are not as easily noticeable as public services like schools and health centres. 
When assets are visible they can be attributed to individual wealth rather than group wealth, since 
private goods do not usually benefit the community as a whole. Even when they are attributed to 
group wealth, it is possible that they are supposed to reflect lifestyle differences between groups. For 
this reason, no strong effects of economic deprivation on the perception of unfair treatment of one’s 
group is expected. 
The first hypothesis tests the general relationship between the two types of relative deprivation and 
perceived collective grievances:  
H1: The more deprived an ethnic group is in regard to education or wealth relative to other 
groups in the country, the more likely its members will report that their ethnic group is unfairly 
treated. 
Differences in size between ethnic groups are unlikely to trigger grievances as strongly as 
socioeconomic inequalities, because they can be seen as natural variations that are present in every 
society. However, there are instances when relative differences in population size might create feelings 
of resentment, such as when minority groups without much access to power are side-lined by state 
policies. The perception of unfair treatment might be all the more acute if marginalized groups are 
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relatively large but are not allocated the proportionate amount of resources or services they feel 
entitled to by the government. If politically excluded or discriminated groups are large in comparison 
to the groups in power, they are found to be more prone to conflict (Cederman et al., 2013; Buhaug et 
al., 2014). However, these cases are more likely to be the exception than the rule. Generally speaking, 
groups which are relatively smaller than other groups will be less represented in government because 
they have fewer votes, and consequently, political exclusion is likely to lead to the formation of 
collective grievances (Cederman et al., 2013). I therefore expect individuals from relatively smaller 
groups to perceive collective grievances more strongly: 
H2: The smaller an ethnic group is relative to other groups in the country, the more likely its 
members will report that their ethnic group is unfairly treated.  
An additional characteristic to consider is the role of elites within ethnic groups. Daloz (2010) defines 
elites as a small and selected group of citizens that controls relatively large amounts of wealth and 
power. Accordingly, they have been shown to wield a strong influence within their ethnic group 
(Fearon and Laitin, 2000; Huber and Mayoral, 2014). Elites might use this influence to advance their 
own economic and political interests by stirring up grievances and mobilizing their ethnic group 
towards collective action (Besançon, 2005). A positive association has been found between the share 
of elites in groups and the risk of ethnic conflict (Alcorta et al., forthcoming). The expectation is 
therefore that a larger percentage of elites within a group will increase the perception of collective 
grievances, because their influence on the group will be more solidified, increasing their ability to 
mobilize group members:  
H3: The larger the share of elites in an ethnic group, the more likely its members will report 
their group to be unfairly treated. 
 
4.2.2 – Individual context 
As shown in the lower-left box in Figure 4.A, the salience of individuals’ ethnic identity may directly 
and indirectly influence the extent to which individuals perceive inequalities between groups as 
collective grievances. The study of how social identities form and the impact they have on individual 
and group behaviour has a long tradition in social psychology (Robinson, 2014). Most theories start 
with the assumption that individuals are constantly categorizing other individuals into one of two 
categories: the in-group or out-group. Social categories are sets of people who are given a label, or 
labels, and who can be distinguished by two main features: (1) the rules of membership that decide 
who is considered a member of the category and; (2) the characteristics (beliefs, desires, moral 
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commitments, and physical attributes) thought to be typical of members of the category, or behaviours 
expected of them (Fearon and Laitin, 2000). Some of these characteristics are strongly fixed (skin 
colour, place of birth), whilst others are can potentially change over time (religion, class, language, 
etc.). These characteristics encompass personal and social traits, which can sometimes overlap. 
Individuals also may have some freedom of choice regarding which particular set of traits to highlight 
over others (Laitin, 1998).  
In the collective action literature, identities must have social significance in order for groups to perceive 
collective grievances and to mobilize. Horowitz (1985) contended that group members must share 
some identifiable attributes that have continuity over time, such as race, appearance, language or 
religion. Observable characteristics place some constraints on being able to switch between identities 
and facilitate collective experiences. Early experiments demonstrated that such categorization, even 
based on artificial and temporary distinctions, can strongly influence individuals’ perception and 
assessment of others, as well as cooperative behaviour (Billig and Tajfel, 1973). Cederman et al. (2011) 
connected the tendency of group members to make social comparisons between in-group and out-
group categories with the salience of group identity. When identity groups are used as the unit of 
measurement, empirical studies tend to assume that identities are rigid and uniform (Østby, 2008; 
Cederman et al., 2011).  
Scholars researching inequalities between groups (Langer, 2005; Huber and Mayoral, 2014; Kuhn and 
Weidmann, 2015) claim that identity can be used as a tool by elites for collective mobilization. Studies 
that take into account that identity salience may vary for individuals have found that, in societies with 
low ethnic polarization, the risk of conflict is higher when ethnic identity is salient (Bhavnani and 
Miodownik, 2009; Miodownik and Bhavnani, 2011). If individuals do not associate themselves with 
their ethnic group, or foster a national identity, they are less likely to regard the inequalities that they 
experience as injustices perpetrated against their group. It would then be more difficult for political 
leaders to mobilize the group towards collective action. For example, Hutus might feel more attached 
to their ethnic heritage than Xhosa, because the tribal subdivisions within the Xhosa are more 
prevalent than in the relatively homogeneous Hutu group. Moreover, the discrimination the Xhosa 
faced in South Africa during Apartheid was connected to their race rather than their ethnicity, so this 
experience may have strengthened their black identity over their ethnolinguistic identity. Therefore, 
one would expect Xhosa individuals to be less collectively aggrieved than Hutu individuals. Accordingly, 
for the salience of ethnic group identification, I formulate the following hypothesis:  
H4: Members of relatively deprived or smaller groups are more likely to report that their 
group is treated unfairly if they identify strongly with their ethnic group. 
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Studies have shown that individual socioeconomic factors are important in determining how 
grievances are formed, because individuals’ personal situation can affect how they perceive their own 
position in society (Langer and Smedts, 2013). For instance, in the Niger Delta, Oyefusi (2008) found 
that socioeconomic access and income are negatively related to personal grievances, whilst education, 
assets, and whether the individual belonged to the Ijaw ethnic group were positively related with 
personal grievances. The socioeconomic background of individuals does not only influence the 
formation of their own personal grievances, but may also distort individuals’ perceptions of their 
group’s position. Langer and Smedts (2013) suggest that if individuals’ socioeconomic situations are 
different from their ethnic group’s average, they are less likely to assess their group’s situation 
correctly. Their empirical study found a positive correlation between individuals’ (perceived) situation 
and their assessment of their ethnic group’s position relative to the rest of the country. In other words, 
individuals who are relatively advantaged or perceive themselves to be relatively socioeconomically 
advantaged are more likely to perceive their group to be relatively advantaged compared to other 
ethnic groups.  
If individuals’ own socioeconomic background influences how they view the relative status of their 
group, it is possible that their background will also affect the perception of group grievances. This 
relationship is illustrated in the lower-left box in Figure 4.A, with individual socioeconomic 
characteristics acting as moderators to the relationship between group characteristics and perceived 
collective grievances, as well as being independent indicators. For example, members of a 
disadvantaged ethnic group who are employed in well-paying jobs, who can afford abundant assets 
and who live in an affluent neighbourhood, might not perceive the relative deprivation of the group, 
and subsequently not share the group’s collective grievances. Members of a disadvantaged group who 
are more disadvantaged than the average may develop even stronger resentments, and by linking their 
misfortune to their group might (mis)perceive collective grievances. 
The variation in the education level of individuals in a group is another important reason to why 
perceptions of grievances may differ between individuals (Robinson, 1983). Access to education can 
provide a direct and positive impact on people’s lives by providing individuals with more opportunities 
(Aoki et al., 2002). Education also influences how individuals orient their values through both 
socialization and sorting processes (Wimmer, 2013). National education rewards behaviour and norms 
valued by the state, and individuals who do not conform are filtered out from institutions of higher 
education (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990). Since education is usually provided by the state, the system 
will often seek to construct a national identity in which individuals adhere to mainstream values 
(Wimmer, 2013), such as the nationalization policy implemented within the education system in 
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Botswana or the focus that Tanzania placed on a national history and language in the public school 
curriculum as part of its social integration approach (Wangwe, 2005; Dryden-Peterson and Mulimbi, 
2017). Hence, an increase in education is likely to reduce the likelihood that individuals perceive 
collective grievances, even when their ethnic groups are discriminated in objective terms. This leads 
us to hypothesize that socioeconomic backgrounds of individuals will distort their perceptions of 
collective grievances: 
H5: Members of relatively deprived or smaller groups are less likely to report that their ethnic 
group is treated unfairly if they are wealthier or more educated. 
 
4.3 – Data and Methods 
4.3.1 - Data 
To test the hypotheses, I use data for 30 African countries derived from rounds 5 and 6 of the 
Afrobarometer surveys (2012 and 2014). Afrobarometer collects data on public attitude on democracy, 
governance, economic conditions, and related issues in African countries. The combined dataset 
contains information on 79,914 respondents, using clustered, stratified, and area probability samples 
across multiple stages with random selection methods at every stage. Sampling was done with 
probability proportional to the district’s population in order to improve the chance of more populous 
geographical units being represented in the survey. Notably, the surveys include questions on ethnic 
identity, which allows for the aggregation of individual characteristics to the ethnic group level.  
Group-level data are created by aggregating the socioeconomic indicators of individuals to the ethnic 
group level. Ethnic identity was determined by asking what the respondent’s ethnic group or tribe was. 
The respondent was able to choose from a list of predefined categories, or select ‘other’ and fill in their 
own category. When ethnic groups contained only a small number of observations, they were 
incorporated into larger clusters of ethnolinguistically similar groups (Joshua Project, 2018; Olson, 
1996; Simons and Fennig, 2018).4 In total there are data for 239 ethnic groups (see Table A.4.1 in the 
Appendix for the full list). 
 
 4.3.2 - Methods 
The data are analysed with multilevel ordered logit regression analysis, using random effects to control 
for clustering of individuals within ethnic groups (Hox, 2010). To address the clustering within 
 
4 If small ethnic groups did not share any similarities with other groups and consisted of less than 1% 
of the observations in a country, they were left out of the analysis. 
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countries, country-level fixed effects dummies are included in the models. The first regression model 
represents the baseline model, containing main effects of explanatory variables. The second regression 
model includes the interaction effects of individual socioeconomic characteristics and identity 
variables. Only significant interactions are included in the model. 
For the dependent variable, a measure of perceived collective grievances is used, whereby respondents 
are asked how often they feel that the government treats their ethnic group unfairly. The categories 
of responses are: ‘never’ (0), ‘sometimes’ (1), ‘often’ (2) and ‘always’ (3). By examining the overall 
perceptions of collective grievances, I am able to examine the second stage of Robinson’s (1983) four-
stage process of inequality - whether individuals believe inequalities to be fair or unfair, or whether 
they nurture a grievance as a result of an inequality. Due to the ordinal nature of the dependent 
variable, ordered logit model are used for the analyses.  
The identity variable is based on a question on the relative importance of ethnic and national 
identification, and asks respondents “suppose that you had to choose between being a [respondent’s 
nationality] and being a [respondent’s ethnic group]. Which of these two groups do you feel most 
strongly attached to?” The possible responses were “only national” (0), “more national than ethnic” 
(1), “equally national and ethnic”(2), “more ethnic than national”(3), or “only ethnic” (4). Thus, the 
identity variable is a relative measure of national group identification versus ethnic group 
identification. 
The respondent’s educational level is measured on a nine-point scale ranging from no formal schooling 
to postgraduate education. Each category in the scale is recoded into an approximate number of 
accumulated years of schooling that the educational level would require. Individual wealth is measured 
by the International Wealth Index (IWI); an economic welfare index that is based on a weighted 
combination of consumer durables, housing characteristics and public utilities (Smits and Steendijk, 
2015). IWI scores run from 0 to 100, with 0 representing households which have none of the assets 
and lowest quality housing/public utilities and 100 representing households having all the included 
assets, as well as the highest quality housing and public utilities.   
To examine the effects of relative deprivation, indicators for the level of group deprivation in education 
and wealth are constructed. The individual characteristics described above are aggregated to the 
ethnic group and to the national level by computing the group and national mean. Group deprivation 
in education and wealth is determined by subtracting the group mean from the national mean for 
these variables. The resulting variables indicate to what extent groups are more or less educated or 
wealthier or poorer than the country average. The relative population size variable is also relative to 
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other groups in the country – it is determined by subtracting the size of the group from the mean group 
size of the country. For the size of the group’s elite, data are extracted from the respondents’ 
occupational level, which is only available for round 6. The proportion of individuals in each ethnic 
group working in high-skilled non-agricultural jobs is taken as their average share of elites.  
The analysis controls for several individual background characteristics, including the respondent’s 
gender (0 for male, 1 for female), age, and membership in formal associations (religious and 
community). Associational membership is measured with ordinal scales, consisting of non-member (0), 
inactive member (1), active member (2) and official leader (3) categories. Access to information is 
measured by urbanization of place of living and frequency of media consumption. The survey records 
whether the respondent resides in a rural (0), semi-rural (0.5) or urban area (1), which serves as a 
substitute to account for their exposure to other people outside of their community. This control is 
important because individuals who live in rural areas are usually more isolated than city dwellers and 
might not have sufficient access to information to form an accurate opinion on the relative status of 
their group. Controls for media consumption are included, measured by the frequency with which 
individuals receive their news from TV and from newspapers. Categories for this scale consist of never 
(0), less than once a month (1), a few times a month (2), a few times a week (3) and every day (4).  
Existing conflict might create incentives for individuals to engage in violence, so a dummy variable is 
included to control for whether an ethnic group has been involved in conflict in the five years prior to 
the observation of the first survey (2012). The observation is coded as 1 if the group is classified as 
being involved in conflict with at least 25 battle deaths in any of the years between 2007 and 2011, 
according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Eck et al., 2007; Sundberg et al., 2012; Allansson et 
al., 2017). Table A.4.2 in the Appendix presents the complete list of conflict observations. If the group 
has not engaged in conflict within that period, the observation is coded as 0. To control for missing 
values on the variables in the analysis, the dummy variable adjustment procedure is used (Allison, 
2001).  
 
4.4 - Results 
The variables used in the analysis are described in Table 4.A. Overall, most people in the sample do not 
report experiencing their group to be treated very unfairly by the government. The average is 0.64 on 
a scale of 0 to 3, with 0 representing individuals who never experience their group being treated 
unfairly and 3 representing individuals who always experience unfair treatment. On the individual 
level, most people identify more strongly with their national identity than their ethnic identity, with 
the identity variable averaging 1.24 on a range of 0 to 4. The average number of years of education is 
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7.03, and individuals have a mean wealth of 48.12 on the IWI scale (which ranges from 0-100). The 
average age of the respondent is 37.16 years, 38% of them lives in urban areas, and the sample is 
evenly split between men and women. Individuals are on average more engaged with religious groups 
(0.89) than with community groups (0.68), and more frequently watch TV (1.83) than they read the 
newspapers (0.97).  
With respect to group level variables, the educational levels of groups range from 5.43 years below to 
5.09 years above the national average. Group levels of wealth vary from -31.88 to +24.57 on the IWI 
scale relative to the country mean. The average ethnic group deviates from the average group size in 
the country by 509.04 people. The share of elites is on average 15.21% of the group, and the likelihood 
that an ethnic group has been involved in a violent conflict over the past five years is 19%. 
Table 4.A - Descriptive statistics summary table for selected independent and dependent variables in 30 African 
countries 
Variables Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Perceived collective grievances 0.64 0.94 0 3 
Individual     
Ethnic identity salience 1.24 1.17 0 4 
Education (years) 7.03 5.01 0 17 
Wealth (IWI) 48.12 26.20 0 100 
Group     
Education deprivation (years) -0.02 1.10 -5.43 5.09 
Wealth deprivation (IWI) -0.35 7.58 -31.88 24.57 
Small population size 509.04 783.62 -2748.80 945.75 
Average share of elites (%) 15.21 10.71 0 64.3 
Individual control factors     
Urbanized (%) 0.38 0.48 0 1 
Female (%) 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Age (years) 37.16 14.48 18 105 
Religious association 0.89 1.00 0 3 
Voluntary or community association 0.69 0.96 0 3 
TV 1.83 1.79 0 4 
Newspapers 0.97 1.40 0 4 
Group control factors     
Conflict in past five years (%) 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys Rounds 5 and 6 (2012 and 2014) 
The results for the regression analysis with perceived collective grievances as the dependent variable 
are presented in Table 4.B. Model 1 represents the results for the bivariate analysis, Model 2 is the 
baseline model for the multivariate analysis, and Model 3 includes the significant interaction effects 
between group characteristics, identity salience and individual socioeconomic indicators. Although the 
significance varies between the bivariate and multivariate analyses, the direction of the coefficients 
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for the main and control variables are mostly the same for the three models. The few exceptions are 
for individual education and urbanization, which are only significant in the bivariate model, and for 
getting news through newspapers, which is only significant for the multivariate models. Since the 
multivariate models provide a more complete analysis and most coefficients are consistent across the 
models, the rest of this section will concentrate on the multivariate analyses.  
The strongest effect in the model is for the salience of ethnic identity - individuals who identify strongly 
with their ethnic group are significantly more likely to perceive collective grievances. For the other 
variables on the individual level, I observe in bivariate model that an increase in the level of education 
has a negative and significant effect on individuals’ perception of collective grievances, although the 
coefficient loses its significance in the multivariate models. This is probably due to a high correlation 
between individual education and other independent variables, which once included in the model 
supplant the effect of education. An increase in wealth is significantly and negatively related to the 
perception regarding the treatment of the ethnic group by the government. Women and older 
individuals are less likely to feel their group is unfairly treated. Community group membership is 
positively associated with perceived collective grievances, whereas religious group membership has 
no significant relationship. Interestingly, the sources of news used by the respondents have opposite 
relationships with the perception of collective grievances. People who watch television more often are 
less likely to feel their group is unfairly treated, whereas people who get their news through 
newspapers more often express this viewpoint. Controls for urbanization and the involvement of the 
ethnic group in conflict in the past five years have no significant effect in any of the models.  
Regarding group level characteristics, it can be observed that members of groups that are relatively 
deprived in wealth or of relatively small groups tend to have significantly higher levels of collective 
grievances. This result is in line with the first and second hypothesis. Relative group deprivation in 
education and the share of elites in the group are not significantly associated with perceived collective 
grievances. Hence no direct support for the third and fourth hypothesis is found.  
Our interaction analysis (Model 3) reveals that in addition to its independent effect, the salience of 
ethnic identity is also an important moderating factor that conditions the effect of educational 
deprivation and population size. However, contrary to the prediction of the  fourth hypothesis, I find 
that in lowly educated and smaller groups a strong ethnic identity less easily leads to the perception 
of grievances. There is also a significant positive interaction between ethnic identity and the size of a 
group’s elite. This interaction links back to the third hypothesis, by indicating that individuals who 
strongly identify with their ethnic group might be more easily moved by their elites towards grievances.  
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Table 4.B - Multilevel ordered logit coefficients for bivariate and multivariate associations between selected 
independent variables and perceived collective grievances in 30 African countries 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Individual    
Ethnic identity salience 0.041*** (0.005) 0.414*** (0.013) 0.398*** (0.016) 
Education years -0.003*** (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) 
Wealth -0.002*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) 
Group    
Education deprivation 0.002 (0.009) -0.024 (0.021) -0.025 (0.021) 
Wealth deprivation 0.004* (0.002) 0.008** (0.003) 0.008** (0.003) 
Small population size 0.000** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 
Share of elites 0.040 (0.037) 0.048 (0.040) 0.037 (0.040) 
Individual control factors    
Urbanized -0.057*** (0.009) -0.016 (0.010) -0.017 (0.010) 
Female -0.033*** (0.008) -0.040*** (0.008) -0.038*** (0.008) 
Age -0.001* (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) 
Religious association 0.008 (0.004) 0.003 (0.004) 0.003 (0.004) 
Community association 0.019*** (0.004) 0.018*** (0.005) 0.018*** (0.005) 
TV -0.021*** (0.003) -0.013*** (0.003) -0.013*** (0.003) 
Newspapers -0.002 (0.003) 0.015*** (0.004) 0.015*** (0.004) 
Group control factors    
Conflict in past five years -0.014 (0.090) -0.012 (0.086) -0.006 (0.086) 
Interactions    
Ethnic identity salience * education deprivation   -0.049*** (0.012) 
Ethnic identity salience * wealth deprivation   N.S. 
Ethnic identity salience * small population size   -0.000* (0.000) 
Ethnic identity salience * average share of elites   0.005*** (0.001) 
Individual education * education deprivation   N.S. 
Individual education * wealth deprivation   N.S. 
Individual education * small population size   -0.000* (0.000) 
Individual education * average share of elites   N.S. 
Individual wealth  * education deprivation   -0.001** (0.000) 
Individual wealth * wealth deprivation   N.S. 
Individual wealth * small population size   N.S. 
Individual wealth * average share of elites   -0.002*** (0.001) 
Observations 79,914 79,914 79,914 
*p<.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effects country and missing dummies not 
reported. Model 1 represents the bivariate analysis, where each coefficient was estimated separately.  
The findings also provide some support for the fifth hypothesis, which posited that individuals 
belonging to smaller or socioeconomically deprived groups might less likely perceive their ethnic group 
to be treated unfairly if those individuals themselves are wealthier or more highly-educated. 
Specifically, I find that more highly-educated individuals from relatively small groups and wealthier 
individuals belonging to educationally deprived groups are less likely to perceive collective grievances. 
Finally, individuals in groups with a large share of elites are less likely to feel that their group is unfairly 
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treated if they are individually wealthy.  
 
4.5 - Discussion 
Most research studying the relationship between inequalities and conflict has used objectively 
observed data, when in fact subjective perceptions may be better predictors of violence (Rustad, 
2016). In order to gain insight into the link between objective measures and subjective perceptions, in 
this chapter I investigate how group and individual characteristics shape perceptions of collective 
grievances. Specifically, I examine how relative deprivation and the presence of elites on the group 
level, and the salience of identity and socioeconomic factors on the individual level, are associated 
with perceived unfair treatment by the state towards an individual’s ethnic group. Overall, the findings 
provide support for the claim that there is a positive relationship between objective observations and 
subjective perceptions (Holmqvist, 2012; Langer and Smedts, 2013; Basedau et al., 2017), as relative 
group deprivation tends to explain the existence of collective grievances to a certain extent. However, 
the findings also highlight the importance of individual characteristics in the formation of collective 
grievances, which might explain why the link between objective comparisons and subjective 
perceptions has not yet been conclusively established.  
Regarding the effects of relative group deprivation, this chapter presents some interesting findings. In 
the literature on inequalities and conflict, differences between groups are supposed to increase the 
risk of conflict through the grievances they generate within the deprived groups (Murshed and 
Tadjoeddin, 2009; Østby, 2013). In line with this argument, relative deprivation with regard to wealth, 
education or population size was expected to be positively associated with individuals’ perception of 
collective grievances. Our findings show that there is indeed a link between deprivation and 
grievances, but that this link is not straightforward. Individuals belonging to groups that are poorer or 
smaller than other groups in the country indeed do feel their group to be more unfairly treated by the 
government, but individuals belonging to groups with a relatively low educational level do not.  
Salience of ethnic identity is found to be one of the strongest contributing factors to perceived 
collective grievances. This finding empirically corroborates a core assumption in the literature that 
identities need to be salient in order for groups to have the motivation to mobilize (Horowitz, 1985; 
Stewart, 2008; Cederman et al., 2013). Identifying with the group means individuals are likely to care 
more about their group’s status, and this attachment can increase the perceived distances across 
ethnic groups (Sambanis and Shayo, 2013). The effect of identity salience is significant as an 
independent factor, which means that individuals who are strongly attached to their ethnic identity 
are more likely to feel their group is aggrieved than individuals who do not identify with their ethnic 
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identity, regardless of whether their group is actually deprived or not. Interestingly, salience of ethnic 
identity is less associated with grievances if the group is relatively small or has a low educational level. 
This might be due to the fact that individuals with a low educational level and members of small groups 
already tend to perceive collective grievances more strongly than others (as the main effects of these 
variables show), so that there is less room for identity to make a difference. At the same time, I find 
that the effect of identity is stronger in groups with a larger elite.  
Similarly to previous chapters, elites play a pivotal role. Interestingly, the effect of a large share of elites 
on individual perceptions of collective grievances is contingent on characteristics of the individual. In 
groups with a large share of elites, individuals who are strongly attached to their ethnic identity more 
easily tend to feel that their group is unfairly treated. This seems to suggest that elites are particularly 
able to manipulate the perceptions of the group members with strong attachments to their group. At 
the same timeit can be seen that wealthier individuals are less likely to feel their group is unfairly 
treated if they belong to a group with a large share of elites than in groups with a small elite. This might 
be due to the fact that individuals with a certain income have a higher chance of belonging to their 
groups elite if the size of the elite is larger. Since the results indicate that on its own, the share of elites 
has no relationship with collective grievances, the division between rich and poor within an ethnic 
group is an important one to make. This division is argued in earlier studies to be a central factor in 
understanding within-group incentives for conflict (Esteban and Ray, 2008; Huber and Mayoral, 2014), 
poverty might leave individuals vulnerable to manipulation by their own elites (Humphreys and  
Weinstein, 2008).  
Two important limitations should be noted. First, the Afrobarometers do not survey the same 
individuals over time, which means that it is not possible to control for potential endogeneity between 
ethnic identity and collective grievances. It is possible that ethnic identities not only shape collective 
grievances, but are themselves also constructed on the basis of collective experiences (such as a shared 
sense of deprivation or injustice). For example, Higashijima and Houle (2018) find that group 
inequalities strengthen ethnic identity, although they acknowledge that they suffer from the same 
limitations on being able to determine causality. However, the purpose of this chapter is not to 
determine in which direction the relationship goes, but rather to establish that the relationship exists. 
Whether group inequalities create ethnic identities or vice versa, it is important to note that the 
presence of both can increase the perceptions of unfair treatment against one’s ethnic group.  
Second, prior conflict between groups may influence their members’ perceptions of collective 
grievances (Cederman et al., 2013). In the analysis, I included a control for whether the group had been 
in conflict in the past five years. Nevertheless, this control only accounted for the presence of ethnic 
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conflict of that particular ethnic group, and does not consider other types of violence that may 
influence individual perceptions. If data becomes available that would allow for a better comparability 
across time, future research will be able to further explore the effects of conflict on grievances.  
 
 4.6 - Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to determine how individuals form collective grievances, in order to 
observe to what extent and in which ways subjective perceptions are derived from objective group 
comparisons. I postulated that the process is influenced by a combination of group and individual 
characteristics, namely relative deprivation and the influence of elites on the group level, and identity 
salience and socioeconomic background on the individual level. To test my arguments, I drew upon 
observations from 79,914 individuals across 30 countries from the Afrobarometer surveys.  
The study contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, to my knowledge, this is the first 
large-N empirical test of the motivation mechanism for ethnic groups in the conflict-inequality 
literature. The findings indicate that individuals in groups who are relatively deprived base their 
collective grievances more easily on differences in wealth and population size than on differences in 
education. This suggests that the causal chain between inequalities and grievances as theorized in the 
literature does not always apply. Second, perceptions of collective grievances are substantially 
influenced by individual characteristics, perhaps even more so than by group characteristics. This 
suggests that -- possibly due to a lack of correct information -- individuals tend to base their 
perceptions of the situation of their group in part on their own personal situation. Third, our analyses 
make clear that individuals’ attachment to their ethnic identity and their socioeconomic background 
are key factors in shaping collective grievances, both as independent factors and in combination with 
relative deprivation.  
The prominence of individual characteristics as explanatory factors might explain why the link 
between inequalities and grievances is less robust than expected on the basis of the literature 
(Østby, 2008; Cederman et al., 2013). To understand how people form grievances severe enough to 
mobilize towards conflict, scholars had moved towards the study of groups. But when objective 
measures are aggregated to the group level, groups become just a sum of their parts. Therefore, it is 
important to also account for variation in some important individual characteristics. The increased 
availability of public opinion data makes it possible for scholars to shift the focus towards 
perceptions-based indicators, and this study takes an initial but important step in this direction.  
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4.7 - Appendix 
Table A.4.1 - List of ethnic group clusters derived from the Afrobarometer Surveys 
Bambara Mali Temne Sierra Leone Acholi Uganda Shona Zimbabwe 
Malinké Mali Mende Sierra Leone Alur Uganda 
Chewa/Sena 
Zimbabwe 
Peulh Mali Fula Sierra Leone Adhola Uganda Tonga Zimbabwe 
Sarakolé/Soninké/
Marka Mali Creole Sierra Leone Baganda Uganda Ndebele Zimbabwe 
Sonrai/Songhai Mali Mandingo Sierra Leone Bagisu Uganda Chewa Malawi 
Dogon Mali Loko Sierra Leone Bagwere Uganda Tumbuka Malawi 
Tamasheq/Tuareg 
Mali Sherbro Sierra Leone Bakiga Uganda Lomwe Malawi 
Senoufo/Minianka 
Mali Limba Sierra Leone Bakonjo Uganda Tonga Malawi 
Bobo Mali Kono Sierra Leone 
Banyakole 
Uganda Yao Malawi 
Wolof Senegal Akan Ghana Banyoro Uganda Nkonde Malawi† 
Pular Senegal Ga/Dangbe Ghana Basoga Uganda Sena Malawi 
Serer Senegal Ewe/Anglo Ghana Batoro Uganda Ngoni Malawi 
Mandinka/Bambara 
Senegal Guan Ghana* Iteso Uganda Ndali Malawi† 
Soninke Senegal Dagomba Ghana 
Karimojong 
Uganda 
Manganka/Nyanja 
Malawi 
Diola Senegal Grussi Ghana Lango Uganda 
Black/African South 
Africa 
Adja Benin Gruma Ghana Lugbara Uganda Coloured South Africa 
Bariba Benin Hausa Ghana Madi Uganda White South Africa 
Dendi Benin Dagarti Ghana Kalenjin Kenya 
Asian/Indian South 
Africa 
Fon Benin Adja-Ewe Togo Kamba Kenya Afrikaans Namibia 
Yoa Benin Akposso/Akebou Togo Kikuyu Kenya 
Damara/Nama 
Namibia 
Ditamari Benin Ana-Ife Togo Kisii Kenya Herero Namibia 
Peulh Benin Kabye/Tem Togo Luhya Kenya 
Kavango languages 
Namibia 
Yoruba Benin Para-Gourma/Akan Togo Luo Kenya 
Caprivi languages 
Namibia 
Djerma/Songhai 
Niger 
Arab-
Choa/Peulh/Haoussa/Kanuri 
Cameroon 
Maasai/Samburu 
Kenya Oshiwambo Namibia 
Haussa Niger 
Biu-Mandara Cameroon 
Cameroon 
Meru/Embu 
Kenya Mokoena Lesotho 
Kanuri/Toubou 
Niger 
Adamaoua-Oubangui 
Cameroon Mijikenda Kenya Motaung Lesotho 
Peul Niger 
Bantoïde South-West 
Cameroon Somali Kenya 
Mohlakoana/Moteban
g Lesotho 
Touareg Niger Grassfields Cameroon Taita Kenya† Mofokeng Lesotho 
Sousou Guinea Bamilike/Bamoun Cameroon Turkana Kenya Mosiea Lesotho 
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Peulh Guinea Côtier/Ngoe/Oroko Cameroon Central Tanzania Motsoeneng Lesotho 
Malinke Guinea Beti/Bassa/Mbam Cameroon 
Central Lakes 
Tanzania Motloung Lesotho 
Kissi Guinea Ibibio/Efik Nigeria 
East Coastal 
Tanzania Mophuthi Lesotho* 
Toma Guinea Bini/Edo/Urhobo Nigeria Omotic Tanzania Lephuthing Lesotho 
Guerze Guinea* Fulani Nigeria 
Kikuyu/Kamba 
Tanzania† Mophuthi Lesotho 
Bobo Burkina Faso Hausa Nigeria Nguni Tanzania Motlokoa Lesotho 
Dioula Burkina Faso Egbira/Igbira/Ibira Nigeria 
Makua/Yao 
Tanzania Letebele Lesotho 
Fulfulde/Peul 
Burkina Faso Igala/Igbala Nigeria Nilotic Tanzania Lekholokoe Lesotho 
Gourmantché  
Burkina Faso Igbo Nigeria 
Central East 
Tanzania Lekhoakhoa Lesotho 
Gourounsi Burkina 
Faso Ijaw/Izon Nigeria Swahili Tanzania Mothepu Lesotho 
Lobi Burkina Faso Kanuri/Beriberi Nigeria 
Makonde 
Mozambique Mokhatla Lesotho 
Mossi Burkina Faso Nupe Nigeria Bemba Zambia Tswana Botswana 
Senufo Burkina Faso Tiv Nigeria Lala Zambia Basarwa Botswana 
Bissa Burkina Faso Yoruba Nigeria Bisa Zambia Kalanga Botswana 
Dagara Burkina Faso Middle Belt Nigeria Lamba Zambia Kgalagadi Botswana 
Dafing Burkina Faso Fang Gabon* Tonga Zambia Coastal Madagascar 
Samo Burkina Faso Kota-Kele Gabon* Lenje Zambia 
Highlanders 
Madagascar 
Bassa Liberia Mbede-Teke Gabon* Luvale Zambia 
Afro-Mauritian 
(Creole) Mauritius 
Gbandi Liberia Myene Gabon* Lunda Zambia Hindu Mauritius 
Belle Liberia* Nzabi-Duma Gabon* Kaonde Zambia Marathi Mauritius 
Dei Liberia* Okande-Tsogho Gabon* Lozi Zambia Muslim Mauritius 
Gio Liberia Shira-Punu/Vili Gabon* Chewa Zambia Tamil Mauritius 
Gola Liberia Emakhuwa Mozambique Nsenga Zambia Telegu Mauritius 
Grebo Liberia Changana Mozambique Ngoni Zambia Arab Morocco* 
Kissi Liberia Sena Mozambique 
Mambwe 
Zambia Rifi Morocco* 
Kpelle Liberia Elomwe Mozambique 
Namwanga 
Zambia Soussi Morocco* 
Krahn Liberia Chuabo Mozambique Tumbuka Zambia Chalh Morocco* 
Kru Liberia Cibalke Mozambique† Akan Ivory Coast Sahrahoui Morocco* 
Lorma Liberia Bitonga Mozambique Kru Ivory Coast Arab Algeria* 
Mandingo Liberia Nyanja Mozambique 
Mand (north) 
Ivory Coast Chaouli Algeria* 
Mano Liberia Chope Mozambique 
Mand (south) 
Ivory Coast Berber Algeria* 
Mende Liberia Ndau Mozambique 
Voltaic Ivory 
Coast Hutu Burundi 
Vai Liberia 
  
Tutsi Burundi 
* Only included in the analysis for Chapter 4, † only included in the analysis for Chapter 5.  
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Table A.4.2 - List of ethnic conflicts derived from the UCDP database for 30 Sub-Saharan African countries, 2007-
2011 
Country Dyad ID  Group A name Group B name Start End 
MLI 4320207  Malinké Mali Tamasheq/Tuareg Mali 2007 2009 
MLI 4320507  Sonrai/Songhai Mali Tamasheq/Tuareg Mali 2008 2008 
SEN 4330105  Wolof Senegal Jola Senegal 2011 2011 
NER 4360508  Kanuri/Toubou Niger Touareg Niger 2007 2008 
CIV 4370103  Akan Ivory Coast Mand (north) Ivory Coast 2011 2011 
CIV 4370105  Akan Ivory Coast Voltaic Ivory Coast 2011 2011 
CIV 4370106  Akan Ivory Coast Burkina Faso Ivory Coast 2011 2011 
CIV 4370203  Kru Ivory Coast Mand (north) Ivory Coast 2011 2011 
CIV 4370205  Kru Ivory Coast Voltaic Ivory Coast 2011 2011 
CIV 4370206  Kru Ivory Coast Burkina Faso Ivory Coast 2011 2011 
GIN 4380203  Peulh Guinea Malinke Guinea 2009 2009 
GIN 4380206  Peulh Guinea Guerze Guinea 2009 2009 
GIN 4380306  Malinke Guinea Guerze Guinea 2011 2011 
NGA 4750308  Fulani Nigeria Ijaw/Izon Nigeria 2008 2008 
NGA 4750309  Fulani Nigeria Kanuri/Beriberi Nigeria 2009 2009 
NGA 4750312  Fulani Nigeria Tiv Nigeria 2011 2011 
NGA 4750314  Fulani Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 2008 2008 
NGA 4750314  Fulani Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 2010 2011 
NGA 4750414  Hausa Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 2008 2008 
NGA 4750414  Hausa Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 2010 2010 
NGA 4750809  Ijaw/Izon Nigeria Kanuri/Beriberi Nigeria 2011 2011 
NGA 4750914  Kanuri/Beriberi Nigeria Middle Belt Nigeria 2011 2011 
UGA 5000105  Acholi Uganda Baganda Uganda 2008 2011 
UGA 5000110  Acholi Uganda Banyakole Uganda 2008 2011 
UGA 5000116  Acholi Uganda Iteso Uganda 2003 2007 
UGA 5000118  Acholi Uganda Lango Uganda 2003 2007 
UGA 5000509  Baganda Uganda Bakonjo Uganda 2007 2007 
UGA 5000509  Baganda Uganda Bakonjo Uganda 2010 2011 
UGA 5000910  Bakonjo Uganda Banyakole Uganda 2007 2007 
UGA 5000910  Bakonjo Uganda Banyakole Uganda 2010 2011 
KEN 5010103  Kalenjin Kenya Kikuyu Kenya 2007 2008 
KEN 5010104  Kalenjin Kenya Kisii Kenya 2008 2008 
KEN 5010107  Kalenjin Kenya Masai Kenya 2009 2009 
KEN 5010110  Kalenjin Kenya Somali Kenya 2011 2011 
KEN 5010112  Kalenjin Kenya Turkana Kenya 2008 2008 
KEN 5010210  Kamba Kenya Somali Kenya 2011 2011 
KEN 5010305  Kikuyu Kenya Luhya Kenya 2007 2009 
KEN 5010306  Kikuyu Kenya Luo Kenya 2007 2009 
KEN 5010310  Kikuyu Kenya Somali Kenya 2011 2011 
KEN 5010410  Kisii Kenya Somali Kenya 2011 2011 
KEN 5010510  Luhya Kenya Somali Kenya 2011 2011 
KEN 5010610  Luo Kenya Somali Kenya 2011 2011 
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Country Dyad ID  Group A name Group B name Start End 
KEN 5010710  Masai Kenya Somali Kenya 2011 2011 
KEN 5010712  Masai Kenya Turkana Kenya 2008 2008 
KEN 5010810  Meru/Embu Kenya Somali Kenya 2011 2011 
KEN 5010910  Mijikenda/Swahili Kenya Somali Kenya 2011 2011 
KEN 5011011  Somali Kenya Taita/Taveta Kenya 2011 2011 
KEN 5011012  Somali Kenya Turkana Kenya 2011 2011 
KEN 5011013  Somali Kenya Kuria Kenya 2011 2011 
BUI 5160102  Hutu Burundi Tutsi Burundi 2007 2008 
MAG 5800102  Coastal Madagascar Highlanders Madagascar 2009 2009 
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Chapter 5 
 
Social capital and violence1 
 
1 This Chapter has been submitted to a peer-reviewed scientific journal. An earlier version of this Chapter 
was presented at: Conference of Conflict Resolution and Peace Sciences (2018). 
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Abstract 
Social capital has been promoted in research and policy circles as a factor that helps to achieve social 
transformation and economic development. There is also, however, a potential ‘dark side’ to social 
capital. In this chapter, I investigate whether structural and cognitive social capital have different 
relationships with two measures of political violence: support for violence and participation in 
violence. Structural social capital in the form of associational membership allows an easier diffusion of 
grievances and facilitates collective mobilization. Cognitive social capital provides social cohesion 
within a community, with trust between neighbours -- particularized trust -- and a shared identity likely 
bringing people together. Connecting these arguments to political violence, I argue that higher levels 
of structural social capital will be associated to more support for and participation in violence, whilst  
higher levels of cognitive social capital will be associated to less support for and participation in 
violence. Using Afrobarometer data for 27 countries in Africa, I find that indicators of structural and 
cognitive social capital have contrasting relationships with self-reported data on support for and 
participation in violence. While particularized trust and national identity are negatively associated with 
violence, religious and community associational membership are positively associated with violence. 
In addition, I find that the strength of attachment to a social identity, regardless of it being ethnic or 
national, is an important indicator of violence. 
 
 
  
113 
 
5.1 - Introduction 
It is generally assumed that societies that have experienced high-levels of violence suffer from weak 
social capital (Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Cassar et al., 2013; Grosjean, 2014), and that a key part of 
achieving social transformation is to increase the density of social ties (Colletta and Cullen, 2000; de 
Luca and Verpoorten, 2015). This belief is widely held in policy circles. The World Development Report 
2011, for example, considers the destruction of social capital to be one of the costs of violence and 
advocates for community-driven development programs in order to reconstruct social capital and 
strengthen social cohesion, especially in areas affected by conflict (World Bank, 2011).  
There is also, however, a potential ‘dark side’ to social capital (McDougall and Banjade, 2015; 
Villalonga-Olives and Kawachi, 2017). Portes (1998) notes that increased social capital can lead to 
negative consequences, such as constraints on individual freedom, downward levelling norms,2 and 
the social exclusion of persons not perceived to be members of the community. Instead of increasing 
trust and social cohesion, social capital may contribute to violence. A study on social capital and 
adolescent behaviour, for example found that higher levels of participation in sports and club 
organizations actually increased tendencies towards fighting and the use of weapons (Wright and 
Fitzpatrick, 2006). Another study on social capital and violence amongst young men in Beirut found 
that different indicators of social capital have ambiguous relationships with violence (El Hajj et al., 
2011). This raises the question: how can the divergent effects of social capital on individual violence be 
explained?  
Recent research indicates that it is important to distinguish between the structural and cognitive 
dimensions of social capital when studying its relationship to violence (Dinesen et al., 2013; Hansen-
Nord et al., 2014; Vazquez-Rodriguez and Lombe, 2017). Structural social capital consists of social 
networks accompanied with procedures and regulations (Uphoff, 2000). Examples include 
membership in trade unions, religious groups and political organizations, to name a few. Cognitive 
social capital, on the other hand, refers to “shared norms, values, attitudes, and beliefs” (Dasgupta 
and Serageldin, 2000). For example, a national identity might encourage common normative beliefs, 
such as the freedom of speech in the United States or ‘liberté, egalité, fraternité’ in France. Similarly, 
members of religious groups will expect each other to adhere to their normative beliefs (Wimberley, 
1989).  
 
2 In some instances, group solidarity is formed through a collective experience of adversity or rebellion. 
Since social cohesion depends on this shared belief, in order to sustain itself, the norms of a 
disadvantaged group will be made to reinforce the status quo, and push successful individuals out 
(Portes, 1998). 
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Both forms of social capital are often interlinked and mutually reinforcing of each other (Uphoff and 
Wijayaratna, 2000). However, there is some evidence that these two types of social capital may have 
different effects on communal affectations of violence (Brune and Bossert, 2009). Case studies carried 
out in Guatemala (Dinesen et al., 2013) and Honduras (Hansen-Nord et al., 2014) on the link between 
social capital and exposure to violence revealed a negative relationship between cognitive social 
capital and violence but a positive relationship between structural social capital and violence.  
In this chapter, I investigate whether structural and cognitive social capital have opposite relationships 
with violence across 27 countries in Africa. I use cross-national, individual-level data from the 
Afrobarometer; a unique public opinion survey that allows the testing of the relationship of multiple 
social capital indicators with violence. In contrast to previous studies (eg. Dinesen et al., 2013, Kasara, 
2017), which focus only on exposure to violence, I compare both direct and indirect measures of 
violence by examining individual self-reported support and use of violence. I find that measures for 
structural social capital, consisting of associational membership in religious and community groups, 
are positively associated with violence. Indicators of cognitive social capital are a mixed bag, with 
particularized trust and national identity having a negative relationship but generalized trust and the 
strength of attachment to any social identity having a positive relationship with violence. 
The study contributes to the literature on social capital and violence in three ways. First, the research 
is innovative because it examines how social capital is related to reported perpetrators of violence, 
whereas most research in this field has focused on less direct measures, such as exposure to violence. 
Second, the research is focused on countries across Africa, a region which has been relatively 
underexplored in the social capital literature. Third, aside from the contrasting relationships that 
structural and cognitive relationships have with violence, I find that the salience of identity is strongly 
associated to violence, regardless of whether it is ethnic or national. Social identities are key to 
determining individual behaviour because they are intrinsic to people’s own personal identity and the 
bonds they create have a strong emotional significance. The more that individuals are attached to a 
social identity, the more likely they will be prepared to ‘defend’ it.  
The rest of this chapter is organized into five sections. The first section discusses the literature on the 
relationship between social capital and violence. In this section, I explore the dimensions of structural 
and cognitive social capital in more detail and propose hypotheses regarding their association to 
violence. The second section explains the sources of data and methodology used to conduct the 
analysis. The third section presents the empirical results of the bivariate and multivariate analysis, 
while the fourth section discusses the relevance and context of these findings. Finally, the fifth section 
summarizes the study and the implications of its findings. 
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5.2 - Social capital and violence 
In the social science literature, research on social capital, defined as the resources available to 
individuals and groups that arise from their formal and informal social networks (Putnam, 1993), has 
generally focused on the positive attributes of social capital, such as its potential to minimize the risk 
of crime and violence by changing patterns of behaviour and/or increasing security (Rosenfeld, 2001; 
Avdeenko and Gilligan, 2015; Hansen-Nord et al., 2016). Social capital is believed to decrease the costs 
of social transactions and strengthen communal ties (Lederman et al., 2002). Civic engagement and 
interpersonal trust are thought to have a mutually reinforcing relationship (Brehm and Rahn, 1997) 
and neighbourhood-based trust was found to be associated with lower rates of criminal violence 
(Sampson and Raudenbusch, 1999).  
However, social capital may also be conflict promoting,3 as it might actually encourage exclusionary 
behaviour (Portes, 1998). Strong ties between members of a group might bar others from access. 
Participation in groups or communities often requires members to conform with the group, increasing 
social control and potentially restricting personal freedoms and individual thinking. In the years 
preceding the Rwandan genocide, for example, one of the Hutu Ten Commandments stated that 
‘Hutus must be firm and vigilant against their common Tutsi enemy’ or would otherwise be considered 
as traitors themselves (Lemarchand, 1996). Finally, when group solidarity is based on a common 
negative experience, downward levelling norms might also play a role. For instance, Rubio (1997) 
blames ‘perverse’ social capital for the violence and criminality pervasiveness in Colombia, and Ostrom 
and Ahn (2009) argued that criminal organizations rely on the cohesive power of social capital in order 
to operate. 
As the literature suggests, the nature of the relationship between social capital and violence is 
ambiguous, which might explain why the empirical research on social capital and violence has found 
mixed results. For example, an early study on crime found that associational membership was 
positively associated with crime rates in some cases and negatively associated in others (Lederman et 
al., 2002). In his examination of Hindu-Muslim conflict in India, Varshney (2001) found that if 
associational membership was organized along intra-ethnic lines, it could exacerbate ethnic violence. 
When studying the effect of social capital on young men in Beirut, El Hajj et al. (2011) found that some 
social capital indicators, such as group membership, trust in people from the area, social support and 
 
3 The relationship between social capital and conflict has been theorized to work in both directions. 
Scholars have argued that conflict may erode or shape social capital into new forms (Deng, 2010; De 
Luca and Verpoorten, 2015; Cassar et al., 2013) and these new forms of social relations can potentially 
become the basis for further conflicts (Rohner et al., 2013; Schaub, 2014). This research is constrained 
to examining the ambiguous relationship between dimensions of social capital and violence. 
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the reciprocal exchange of non-material favours, were positively associated with physical fighting. 
Other social capital indicators, such as the relationship between social networks and fighting, had 
ambiguous effects.  
An explanation for the unclear relationship with violence is that social capital is a broad term that has 
been measured with a diverse raft of indicators. To understand the relationship social capital shares 
with violence more clearly, it is useful to examine two dimensions of social capital: the social network 
approach, (structural social capital) and the social cohesion approach (cognitive social capital) (Uphoff, 
2000). Structural social capital consists of social networks, both formal and informal, which are 
accompanied by procedures and rules. Examples of structured social capital include sports clubs, trade 
unions and religious organizations (de Silva et al., 2006; Bhavnani and Backer, 2007). Cognitive social 
capital refers to shared norms, values, attitudes, and beliefs (Krishna and Shrader, 2000). Commonly 
used indicators of cognitive social capital include trust among community members for obtaining credit 
(Dowla, 2006) or improving access to water (Bisung et al., 2014), and the adherence to a national 
identity (Langer et al., 2017). Both dimensions of social capital are often tied together, and can 
reinforce each other (Uphoff and Wijayaratna 2000). However, there is a clear difference between 
these dimensions. Structural social capital is considered to be the set of resources available to 
individuals through their access to social networks. Cognitive social capital, on the other hand, is 
regarded as an valuable asset for both the individual and the community because it measures the 
integration of the group and forms the basis for social bonds and collaboration.  
These dimensions have been found to have different effects (Brune and Bossert, 2009), with cognitive 
social capital related to an improvement in public health behaviour, whereas structural social capital 
was associated to increased collective action. When examining social capital in the context of exposure 
to violence in Latin American countries, scholars found that structural and cognitive social capital 
appear to have opposite associations with violence, with structural social capital increasing and 
cognitive social capital reducing the exposure to violence (Dinesen et al., 2013; Hansen-Nord et al., 
2014). The differences in these dimensions of social capital with respect to their relationship with 
violence are explained in more detail below. 
 
5.2.1 - Structural social capital 
The expectation is that there is a positive relationship between structural social capital and individual-
level violence. Structural social capital characterizes the social network approach to social capital 
because it refers to the resources accessible to people through formal and informal networks (Dinesen 
et al., 2013). This manifests through associational membership in formal and informal organizations, 
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or everyday civic engagement (de Silva et al., 2006). Varshney (2001) argues that associational life has 
a stronger influence on peace or violence than everyday civic engagement for two reasons. First, 
associational membership serves to organize communities and provides dedicated platforms for 
engagement. Second, associations often have objectives that go beyond daily interactions. This 
imparts in them a robustness that allows associations to withstand exogenous shocks and to have an 
influence on politics. The relationship with peace and violence, however, will depend on the ethnic 
dimension of the association: if associational membership is interethnic, it can provide a constraint 
against the polarization of communities, but if it is intra-ethnic, it will only reinforce the divisions within 
a society. 
The relationship between structural social capital and violence is also contingent on the purpose of the 
organization (Portes, 1998). Members of organizations may cooperate for benign or malicious reasons, 
such as the mafia, and even originally benign cooperative ventures can over time become a basis for 
organised violence (Schaub, 2014). The build-up of social capital within groups may have particularly 
negative consequences, if groups promote exclusionary practices based on hate and intolerance 
towards other groups (Fukuyama, 1999). Under such circumstances, individuals who might otherwise 
be peaceful citizens could be persuaded by other group members to adopt more violent behaviour (El 
Hajj et al., 2011).  
Several studies have found membership and cooperation within communal organizations to increase 
the risk of violence (Schaub, 2014; Dinesen et al., 2013; Hansen-Nord et al., 2014). Groups containing 
pro-social individuals who are willing to cooperate with each other are usually more capable of survival 
in inter-group conflict (Grosjean, 2014). Information on opportunities diffuses through the network so 
that better connected individuals will have access to more information and will obtain it faster 
(Shahabuddin McDoom, 2014).  
Factors such as the size of individuals’ networks can affect their participation in violent collective 
action, since the more connections a person has, the more opportunities for participation will be 
presented to them. Furthermore, people who are more actively engaged in the civic society through 
e.g. political activities, experience more “time at risk”, and are thus more exposed to violence 
compared to people who participate less in such community activities (Hansen-Nord et al., 2014). 
Active participation in civil society might also mean that individuals are targeted more by the 
authorities or other individuals because of their political engagement (Piquet Carneiro, 2000), which 
could increase the risk of them being involved in violent encounters. 
An important consideration is that associational membership is only likely to have an effect on 
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individuals, if their involvement in an organization is relatively frequent (Bhavnani and Backer, 2007). 
People who belong to an organization but do not participate often in its activities are not strongly 
subjected to its influence. The more active an individual is, the more likely they will be influenced by 
the organization, and the more predisposed they will be to engage in collective action for its cause. 
This relationship is mutual, as the individual is likely to assert their own values and interests – whether 
positive or negative - on others in the organization as their influence and participation grows. Elite 
manipulation theory stipulates that groups can be exploited by their leaders, who may use their power 
to mobilize the group in order to advance their own interests (Fearon and Laitin, 2000). Taking these 
arguments into account, the prediction is therefore that: 
H1: Individuals that self-report that they are members of religious groups and voluntary 
associations or community groups are more likely to support or use violence.  
 
5.2.2 - Cognitive social capital  
In contrast to structural social capital, I predict that cognitive social capital indicators of trust and 
adherence to national identity will be negatively related to violence. According to the social cohesion 
approach popularized by Coleman (1990) and Putnam (2000), cognitive social capital comprises the 
shared beliefs, values, trusts and norms between people that stimulate cooperation (Uphoff, 2000). In 
an effort to measure social cohesion, Langer et al. (2017) recently proposed an perceptions-based 
index incorporating three components: inequality, the level of trust and adherence to a national 
identity. Of these, trust and identity are most frequently used as indictors of cognitive social capital 
(de Silva et al., 2006; Mitchell and Bossert, 2007; El Hajj et al., 2011).  
Trust enables individuals to take risks in dealing with others, solve collective action problems, or act in 
ways that are contrary to self-interest (Levi, 1998). The concept of trust can be categorized into 
generalized trust, particularized trust, and strategic trust (Smith, 2010). Generalized and particularized 
trust refer to trust in society and trust in people within individuals’ direct environment, and both have 
a moral foundation because they require people to have faith in others (Uslaner, 2002). Strategic trust 
is more related to rational choice theory, as it refers to individuals’ expectations that others will act 
with their own best interests in mind (Hardin, 2002). This chapter shall focus mainly on the two types 
of moralistic trust, since these are the most commonly used measures of trust in social science research 
(Carpiano and Fitterer, 2014) and rational choice theories on trust do not often apply outside of 
prisoner dilemma settings (Abbott and Freeth, 2008).  
Generalized trust is defined as individuals’ evaluation of the trustworthiness of the average person in 
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society, and has been hypothesized to connect people in social spheres with people unlike themselves 
(Glanville and Paxton, 2007). This concept reflects more the individuals’ beliefs about the moral 
standing of their society than about any specific relationships (Sztompka, 1999). In the context of 
violence, higher levels of generalized trust are likely to reduce the risk of communal violence by 
mitigating any potential incentives for conflict between groups. Low generalized trust in society has 
the opposite effect and is associated with the potential for social conflict in countries (Delhey and 
Newton, 2005). When the level of trust between groups in a country is low, it is also easier for political 
leaders to obtain support for violent collective action (Kasara, 2017).  
Particularized trust concerns trust in networks of close relations (Uslaner, 2002), such as trust in family 
members, neighbours, or in-group members, and is considered to reflect the resources and 
relationships available in individuals’ close networks (de Silva et al., 2006). Particularized trust 
symbolizes the belief that specific people or groups are trustworthy, which might be especially relevant 
when individuals are only exposed to people from their own community; i.e., in rural areas. Despite 
particularized trust being more relational than generalized trust, empirical evidence on the 
relationship between particularized trust and conflict has found similar results as for generalized trust. 
Vial et al. (2010), for example, report higher rates of violence when trust between neighbours is low, 
and Cuesta and Alda (2012) find a negative relationship between interpersonal trust and victimization 
in communities. An increase in either particularized or generalized trust is therefore expected to be 
correlated to a decrease in violence because it strengthens the relationship of mutual protection within 
a community, which forms the premise for the second hypothesis: 
H2: Individuals that self-report higher levels of particularized and generalized trust are less 
likely to use violence.  
Putnam (2000) argued that overarching identities are required to restore social capital in America. A 
shared sense of belonging can promote social cohesion (Holtug, 2017). The formation of a national 
identity functions as a form of social cohesion by superseding divisions between sub-national 
identities, such as ethnicity (Charnysh et al., 2015). Examining social identification and conflict, 
Sambanis and Shayo (2013) find that when individuals identify more with the nation than with their 
ethnic group, the chance of conflict is reduced.  
In states where the conditions fail to foster a national identity – and make ethnic identity relatively 
more salient – the lack of solidarity within the national community and the more salient ethno-political 
cleavages in society are also likely to increase the risk of social fragmentation, exclusion and 
oppression, which may potentially degenerate into conflict between individuals and groups. The case 
of Rwanda illustrates the complex and important role of social cohesion with respect to violence. The 
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interethnic conflict between Hutus and Tutsis in 1994 destroyed the social fabric of society, whilst 
simultaneously strengthening the intra-Hutu bonds that helped make the genocide possible (Colletta 
and Cullen, 2000). In its aftermath, Rwandan policymakers have pursued policies of nation-building 
and de-ethnicisation with the aim of achieving social cohesion (Purdeková, 2008). Consequently, the 
following hypothesis tests for the theorized inverse relationship between the formation of a national 
identity and violence. 
H3a: Individuals who self-report that they identify with the nation state are less likely to support 
and use violence. 
In addition, the salience of individuals’ social identity can determine how strongly they share the norms 
and beliefs of their community, and how much they perceive the collective grievances experienced by 
their particular group to be for themselves (Wimberley, 1989; Langer et al., 2017). Ethnic conflict is 
thought to be spurred on by collective grievances, but only if members of a disadvantaged group 
identify strongly with it (Stewart, 2008). Strength of identity might also be an important factor that 
affects the perceptions of collective grievances and potentially the risk of violence (Charnysh et al., 
2015). Individuals’ perception of their fate being dependent on the nation fate has been shown to 
increase along with the strength of their behavioural identification with the nation (Robinson, 2016).  
Overlapping identities can mitigate the relationship by diluting the extent that individuals value their 
association to one particular identity. This would signify that when grievances are not shared by the 
group’s members, it will be more difficult to mobilize an individual towards (violent) collective action 
in support of the group or country. The following hypothesis examines whether the salience of identity 
is related to violence: 
H3b: Individuals who self-report that they more strongly identify with either the nation state 
or their ethnic group are more likely to support and use violence. 
 
5.3 - Data and Methods 
5.3.1 - Data 
To test the predictions, I utilize cross-sectional data for 40,455 individuals living in 27 African countries 
derived from the fifth round of the Afrobarometer surveys, held in 2012. This survey provides 
information on public opinions in African countries on issues such as democracy, governance and 
economic conditions (Afrobarometer, 2012). For the survey, a sample of 1200 or 2400 randomly 
selected individuals were interviewed in each country. Sampling is conducted at all stages with the 
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probability comparable to population size of the district so that larger and more populated 
geographical regions have a greater probability of being selected in the sample. The surveys reduce 
the likelihood that distinctive ethnic groups are left out of the sample by stratifying the sample 
according to the subnational area. The fifth round of surveys is utilized because it is the only round 
which discerns between ethnic identities and includes variables on support for and the use of violence.  
To examine the relationship between social capital and violence, I employ both an indirect and direct 
measure: support for violence and use of violence. The first variable measures the reported attitude 
towards violence. Respondents are read two statements: “Statement 1 - the use of violence is never 
justified in [respondent’s country] politics today” and “Statement 2 – In this country, it is sometimes 
necessary to use violence in support of a just cause”, and subsequently asked with which statement 
they agree more. Answers are on a five-point scale, ranging from agreeing entirely with the first 
statement to agreeing with entirely with the second statement, and the midway point being ‘agreeing 
with neither’. This measure is an indirect indicator of violence since it does not consider actual or 
prospective behaviour. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that respondents who approve of violence are 
more likely to use violence than those who cannot justify its use. Collective attitudes of a society might 
discourage violent behaviour through the norms that people observe and internalize. In contrast, a 
lack of social standards could facilitate rebel recruitment and violent behaviour within a community. 
This is found to be the case in Sub-Saharan Africa, where regions with high levels of popular acceptance 
of violence have higher levels of conflict (Linke et al., 2015).  
Most measures of violence in studies on social capital tend to be indirect (Schaub, 2014; Kasara, 2017; 
Dinesen et al., 2013; Hansen-Nord et al., 2014). Quite uniquely, the Afrobarometer survey also 
provides a direct indicator, which consists of the reported participation of the respondents in political 
violence by asking them whether they have personally engaged in the use of force or violence for a 
political cause. Responses are structured to capture the frequency of individuals’ actions in the 
following order – never (0), never but would if they had the chance (1), once or twice (2), several times 
(3), and often (4). This variable gauges individuals’ violent behaviour by asking the respondent to report 
whether they have used violence for a political cause. Because of the social stigma against violence 
(Table 5.A shows that almost 81% of the respondents in the survey do not support the use of violence), 
it is possible that the reported use of violence is under-reported.  
Structural social capital is measured through the membership of individuals in two types of formal 
associations: members of religious groups (outside of regular worship services) and members of 
voluntary association or community groups. Respondents can select one of four possible responses on 
an ordinal scale including non-member (0), inactive member (1), active member (2), and official leader 
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(3). Given that these categories do not correspond to a linear scale, they were also transformed into 
sets of dummy variables, with a separate dummy for each category.  
Cognitive social capital is measured through several indicators for trust and shared identity. Two 
indicators for trust are included: particularized trust and generalized trust. The particularized trust 
variable measures whether respondents do not trust their neighbours (0), whether they trust them 
just a little (1), somewhat (2) or a lot (3). The generalized trust variable is dichotomous measuring trust 
in society in general. Particularized trust provides a more direct and accurate measurement of how 
trust functions as social capital within individuals’ direct environment, whereas generalized trust is an 
‘‘affective orientation’’ towards others that indicates their level of tolerance (Rudolph and Popp, 
2010).  
The measure for identity is gauged by asking the respondents whether they were more strongly 
attached to their own ethnic group or their nationality. Thus, the variable represents a spectrum, with 
identification to the nation state on one end and identification with the ethnic group on the other. To 
examine the socially cohesive effect of a shared identity and the importance of identity salience, The 
measure is split up into two variables: national identity and identity salience. National identity is 
measured by whether the respondent feels mainly or only ethnic (0), equally ethnic and national (1), 
or mainly or only national (2). Identity salience indicates the strength of the attachment individuals 
have to their identity, be it ethnic or national. The variable is categorised as 0 if the respondent does 
not feel more attached to one or the other, 1 if they feel more attached to their ethnic or the national 
identity, and 2 if they feel only ethnic or only national.  
Several control variables were included at both the individual and group level. At the individual level, 
I control for age, education and wealth level, whether the individual lives in a rural (0), semi-rural (0.5) 
or urban environment (1), and the effect of perceived collective grievances with a measure of 
perceived unfair treatment against respondents’ ethnic group on a scale of 0 (never) to 3 (always). 
Education is measured in terms of years of schooling received, and the measure for wealth ranges from 
0 till 100, based on an index from assets, housing characteristics and public utilities (Smits and 
Steendijk, 2015).  
At the group level I incorporate several controls for socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of 
ethnic groups. The group-level controls are created by aggregating data to the group level for all ethnic 
groups that were available in the survey. Ethnic groups for which only a few observations were 
available (less than 1%) are incorporated into larger ethnolinguistically similar clusters, or omitted from 
the analysis (the complete list is included in Table A.4.1 of the Appendix in Chapter 4. Relative 
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deprivation in education and wealth is measured by subtracting the national averages of these 
variables from the ethnic group averages. Small population sizes are obtained by calculating the 
relative difference in size of the ethnic group with the country average. Finally, using UCDP data I 
include a dichotomous variable to control for whether the respondent’s ethnic group has been 
involved in conflict in the five years prior to the survey (2007-2011).  The conflicts in this time period 
were derived from the list of conflicts in Table A.4.2 of the Appendix of Chapter 4. 
 
5.3.2 - Methods 
To test the hypotheses, I employ an ordered logistic multilevel regression analysis. Two-level versions 
of the models are used to address the nesting of respondents within ethnic groups. Clustering at 
national level is taken into account by including fixed-effects country dummies in all models. Separate 
models are estimated for the two dependent variables, support for and the use of violence. The choice 
for ordered logit models is due to the nature of the dependent variables, which are ordered but the 
differences in categories cannot be clearly distinguished linearly. Separate models with dummies are 
used to test for specific effects of the different categories in the structural social capital variables. I test 
for nonlinearity of the individual-level variables by including quadratic terms in the models and keeping 
them in case of significant nonlinearity. 
Missing values on the variables are addressed by utilizing the dummy variable adjustment procedure 
(Allison, 2001). As a robustness test, I study effects of previous conflicts by including a dummy variable 
indicating whether the ethnic group of the respondent was involved in ethnic conflict in the last five 
years. This information is derived from the Armed Conflict, One-Sided and Non-State datasets from 
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Sundberg et al., 2012; Eck et al., 2007; Allansson et al., 2017).  
 
5.4 - Results 
The descriptive summary in Table 5.A provides details on the variables included in the analysis. On 
average, most individuals agree with the statement that violence is never justified (47%). Overall there 
are far more people willing to justify violence than those that actually commit acts of violence. The 
number of individuals that report having committed acts of violence is quite low, consisting of just 3% 
of the respondents. This is not surprising given the stigma that most of society has against the use of 
violence; a belief which is illustrated by the lack of support for violence in the first outcome variable 
(only 19% justify its use under certain circumstances).  
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Table 5.A - Descriptive statistics summary table for selected independent and dependent variables in 27 African 
countries  
Variables Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Violence     
Support for violence 1.02 1.28 0 4 
Agree very strongly with Statement 1 (%) 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Agree with Statement 1 (%) 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Agree with neither statement (%) 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Agree with Statement 2 (%) 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Agree very strongly with Statement 2 (%) 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Used force or violence for a political cause 0.15 0.54 0 4 
Never (%) 0.90 0.30 0 1 
Never, but would consider (%) 0.07 0.25 0 1 
A few times (%) 0.02 0.12 0 1 
Sometimes (%) 0.01 0.01 0 1 
Often (%) 0.01 0.01 0 1 
Structural social capital     
Religious association 0.90 1.00 0 3 
Non-member (%) 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Inactive member (%) 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Active member (%) 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Leader (%) 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Voluntary or community association 0.69 0.97 0 3 
Non-member (%) 0.62 0.49 0 1 
Inactive member (%) 0.14 0.34 0 1 
Active member (%) 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Leader (%) 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Cognitive social capital     
Particularized trust  1.79 1.01 0 3 
Not at all (%) 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Just a little (%) 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Somewhat (%) 0.33 0.47 0 1 
A lot (%) 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Generalized trust 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Identity salience 1.03 0.92 0 2 
Weak (%) 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Intermediate (%) 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Strong (%) 0.44 0.50 0 1 
National identity 2.38 0.67 0 2 
Ethnic (%) 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Both (%) 0.40 0.49 0 1 
National (%) 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Individual control factors     
Perceived collective grievances 0.64 0.94 0 3 
Never (%) 0.61 0.49 0 1 
Sometimes (%) 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Often (%) 0.10 0.31 0 1 
Always (%) 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Education (years) 6.74 4.92 0 17 
Wealth (IWI) 48.03 24.98 0 100 
Urbanized (%) 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Female (%) 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Age (years) 37.05 14.51 18 105 
Group control factors     
Education deprivation (years) 0.05 1.20 -6.47 4.96 
Wealth deprivation (IWI) 0.28 8.51 -27.50 42.85 
Small population size -308.32 395.59 -1473 403.80 
Conflict in past five years (%) 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Source: Afrobarometer Surveys Round 5. Response categories provided in italics. For the variable on support for 
violence, Statement 1 is: “the use of violence is never justified in [respondent’s country] politics today” and 
Statement 2 s:– “In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause.” 
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Measures of structural social capital indicate that more individuals are members of religious groups 
than community groups. Individuals are about equally likely to be part of religious associations as not, 
with 50% being members, of which 28% self-classify as an active member and 6% as a leader. On 
average, respondents tend to be less involved in community associations, with only 38% reporting that 
they are a member, of which only 19% self-classify as an active member and 6% as a leader.  
For the measures of cognitive social capital, trust in one’s neighbour is quite high, while generalized 
trust is low. On average, individuals report that they are quite trusting of their neighbours; 62% trust 
their neighbours somewhat and 30% trust them a lot. However, only 19% of the respondents agree 
that most people in society can be trusted, with the large majority believing that one must be very 
careful (81%). Responses to the national identity variable suggest that almost half of the respondents 
(49%) identify themselves more nationally than ethnically, while responses to the identity salience 
variable suggest that the results for salience of identity (to either the nation or their ethnic group) are 
polarized, with 40% having a weak attachment  and 44% having a strong attachment to their identity.  
With respect to the control variables, most individuals have never perceived any form of unfair 
treatment towards their ethnic group (61%), whereas about 18% experience frequent or consistent 
unfair treatment. On average, respondents have received 6.7 years of education and have a wealth 
score of 48 on the 100-point IWI scale. Respondents live mainly in rural areas (only 36% are urbanized), 
are equally likely to be male or female (50%), and are on average 37 years old. The descriptive statistics 
for the group level controls illustrate that education deprivation ranges from 6.5 years below to 5 years 
above the national average, whilst wealth deprivation varies from -27.5 to 42.9 on the IWI scale. Group 
sizes range from 1473 people fewer than the country mean to 403.8 more than the country mean in 
the sample population. 19% of groups have been involved in conflict over the past five years. 
The results of the bivariate regression analyses are presented in Table 5.B and the multivariate 
regression models are presented in Table 5.C. In Table 5.B, Model 1 represents the analysis with the 
reported support for violence as the outcome variable, whilst Model 2 presents the regression results 
for the reported use of violence as the outcome variable. Models 3 and 4 in Table 5.C display the 
regression coefficients for both dependent variables relating to the baseline model, whilst Models 5 
and 6 introduce dummy variables for the subcategories in the associational membership indicators, 
using non-members of religious and communal associations as the reference categories.  
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Table 5.B - Multilevel ordered logit coefficients for bivariate associations between selected independent variables 
and support for and use of violence in 27 African countries 
Variables Support for violence Use of violence 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Structural social capital   
Religious membership -0.001 (0.006) 0.062*** (0.007) 
Non-member Reference Reference 
Inactive member 0.051** (0.016) 0.176*** (0.018) 
Active member -0.010 (0.014) 0.036*** (0.016) 
Leader -0.005 (0.024) 0.015*** (0.027) 
Community membership 0.021*** (0.006) 0.113*** (0.007) 
Non-member Reference Reference 
Inactive member 0.035* (0.016) 0.217*** (0.019) 
Active member 0.053*** (0.015) 0.229*** (0.017) 
Leader 0.039 (0.024) 0.311*** (0.026) 
Cognitive social capital   
Particularized trust -0.030*** (0.006) -0.026*** (0.007) 
Generalized trust -0.014 (0.014) 0.055** (0.016) 
Identity salience 0.041*** (0.007) 0.051*** (0.009) 
National identity -0.028** (0.010) -0.020 (0.012) 
Individual control factors   
Perceived collective grievances 0.148*** (0.019) 0.104*** (0.022) 
Perceived collective grievances -0.036*** (0.007) -0.010 (0.008) 
Education 0.003** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
Wealth 0.002* (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 
Wealth2 -0.000* (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) 
Urbanization -0.021 (0.012) -0.025 (0.014) 
Female -0.025* (0.011) -0.086*** (0.013) 
Age -0.003*** (0.000) -0.002*** (0.000) 
Group control factors   
Education deprivation 0.013 (0.011) -0.004 (0.011) 
Wealth deprivation 0.003 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 
Small population size -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
Conflict in past five years 0.061 (0.059) -0.053 (0.061) 
*p<.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Fixed-effects country and missing dummies not 
reported. Models were estimated for each variable separately, but for both structural social capital variables all 
subcategories were estimated simultaneously, with non-members as the reference category. 
In the bivariate analysis in Table 5.B, the coefficients may vary in strength between the models, but 
the significant effects on indirect and direct violence variables do not contradict each other. For the 
first structural social capital variable, religious membership is significantly and positively related to the 
reported use of violence in Model 2. Looking separately at the categories of this variable, I observe in 
Model 1 that inactive members are significantly more likely than non-members to both support 
violence, but active members and leaders show no significant difference in support. All members of 
religious groups are significantly more likely to use violence than non-members, although this positive 
effect varies in strength across members, with active members being reportedly most likely to use 
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violence. For the second structural social capital variable on community association I see that overall 
membership is positively correlated to the support for and use of violence in both models. Splitting the 
variable up into categories, I observe in Model 1 that inactive and active members are significantly 
more likely to support violence than non-members. All members of community associations are 
significantly more prone to using violence than non-members, with increasing likelihood the more 
active members are, and communal leaders being the most violent (Model 2). 
Cognitive social capital indicators are all significant in the bivariate models, except for generalized trust 
in Model 1 and national identity in Model 2. Particularized trust is negatively correlated with support 
for and the use of violence, whereas generalized trust has a positive effect on the use of violence in 
Model 2. Identity salience is positively correlated to both outcome variables, with national identity 
being negatively associated only to support for violence. Control variables such as higher perceived 
collective grievances, wealth and education are positively correlated to the outcome variables, 
although the large quadratic term for perceived collective grievances suggests an inverted-U 
relationship with support for violence. The models in Table 5.B show that women and older people are 
less likely support violence or use force, whilst urbanization and group involvement in ethnic conflict 
in the past five years have no significant relationship with either variable. All socioeconomic 
characteristics on the group level were insignificant for both dependent variables.  
Turning to the multivariate analysis in Table 5.C, the relationships with the direct and indirect forms of 
violence exhibit a similar consistency as in the bivariate analysis. Model 4 shows that religious 
membership is significantly and positively correlated with the use of violence. When I look more in 
detail at the subcategories in Models 5 and 6, I observe that, in line with the bivariate analysis, inactive 
members of religious groups are significantly more likely to support and use violence than non-
members. Active members and leaders of these groups are also more likely than non-members to use 
violence, although this effect is weaker. Community membership has a positive correlation with both 
outcome variables in Models 3 and 4. In Model 5, active members and leaders of community groups 
are significantly more likely to justify violence than non-members, whilst in Model 6, it is evident that 
each stepwise increase in participation is progressively more associated to the use of violence, with 
community leaders being the most violent category. Overall, the coefficients for both the associational 
membership variables provide strong support for the first hypothesis, which posits that being a self-
reported member of a religious or community association will be positively associated with the use of 
violence.  
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Table 5.C - Multilevel ordered logit coefficients for multivariate associations between selected independent variables 
and support for and use of violence in 27 African countries 
Variables Support for violence Use of violence Support for violence Use of violence 
  3 4 5 6 
Structural social capital     
Religious membership -0.006 (0.006) 0.030*** (0.007)   
Non-member   Reference Reference 
Inactive member   0.046** (0.016) 0.130*** (0.019) 
Active member   -0.025 (0.014) 0.065*** (0.017) 
Leader   -0.000 (0.024) 0.061* (0.028) 
Community membership 0.028*** (0.006) 0.107*** (0.007)   
Non-member   Reference Reference 
Inactive member   0.028 (0.017) 0.181*** (0.019) 
Active member   0.070*** (0.015) 0.215*** (0.018) 
Leader   0.057* (0.025) 0.304*** (0.028) 
Cognitive social capital     
Particularized trust -0.027*** (0.006) -0.035*** (0.007) -0.028*** (0.006) -0.035*** (0.007) 
Generalized trust 0.007 (0.015) 0.077*** (0.017) 0.006 (0.015) 0.076*** (0.017) 
Identity salience 0.040*** (0.007) 0.048*** (0.009) 0.040*** (0.007) 0.047*** (0.009) 
National identity -0.019 (0.010) -0.009 (0.012) -0.019* (0.010) -0.009 (0.012) 
Individual controls     
Perceived collective grievances 0.144*** (0.019) 0.102*** (0.022) 0.143*** (0.019) 0.101*** (0.022) 
Perceived collective grievances -0.036*** (0.007) -0.011 (0.008) -0.035*** (0.007) -0.010 (0.008) 
Education -0.001 (0.001) -0.006*** (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.006*** (0.002) 
Wealth 0.001 (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 
Wealth2 -0.000 (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) 
Urbanized 0.020 (0.014) -0.015 (0.017) 0.021 (0.014) -0.013 (0.017) 
Female -0.032** (0.011) -0.089*** (0.013) -0.032** (0.011) -0.093*** (0.013) 
Age -0.003*** (0.000) -0.004*** (0.000) -0.003*** (0.000) -0.004*** (0.000) 
Group controls     
Education deprivation 0.004 (0.015) -0.009 (0.016) 0.004 (0.015) -0.007 (0.016) 
Wealth deprivation 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 
Small population size -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
Conflict in past 5 years 0.028 (0.061) -0.042 (0.064) 0.028 (0.062) -0.039 (0.064) 
Observations 40308 40455 40308 40455 
*p<.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effects country and missing dummies not 
reported. For structural social capital variables, non-members are used as the reference category. 
With respect to indicators of cognitive social capital, the results are more nuanced. I find a negative 
relationship between particularized trust and both support for and the use of violence in all model 
specifications. However, this is not the case for generalized trust, which is positively and significantly 
associated to the use of violence in Model 4 and 6, but has no significant effect on support for violence 
in Models 3 and 5. Particularized trust is the most consistent result, providing strong support for the 
second hypothesis on self-reported trust measures being negatively associated with violence. 
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The national identity variable does not offer strong evidence for H3a in Table 5.C. Although the 
direction of the national identity coefficients is negative, similarly to the bivariate models, the effect is 
only significant for the full model with respect to the support for violence (Model 5). I find support for 
the hypothesis on identity salience (H3b), as identity salience is highly significant in Models 3-6, and 
positively associated to both violence variables. The support for and use of violence increases the more 
attached individuals are to their identity. Because the national identity variable is mainly insignificant 
in Models 3, 4 and 6, the effect of identity salience in these instances is irrespective of whether it is 
ethnic or national. When both identities overlap and the respondent does not have strong sentiment 
for either type, both their support for and use of violence decrease significantly.  
Figure 5.A - Predicted relationship between perceived collective grievances and violence 
 
Regarding the control variables, perceived collective grievances has a strong and positive association 
throughout all model specifications in Table 5.C, and its relationship with both violence variables is 
illustrated in Figure 5.A. The more that individuals perceive their group to be unfairly treated, the more 
likely they will engage in violence. The relationship between perceived collective grievances and 
support for violence is nonlinear, with the effect peaking when individuals feel their groups is often 
discriminated, but decreasing when individuals feel their group is always discriminated. In Models 4 
and 6 of Table 5.C, an increase in education is negatively correlated whilst an increase in wealth is 
positively correlated to the use of violence, with the effect of wealth increasing exponentially for each 
additional point increase on the IWI scale (ranging from 0 to 100). The relationship for education in the 
multivariate regression differs in direction to the bivariate analysis, likely because the social capital and 
other socioeconomic controls capture some of the effect of confounding factors. All the controls for 
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age, gender, urbanization and prior conflict in the multivariate models have similar effects as those in 
the bivariate models. Finally, I find no significant relationships between relative deprivation  or 
differences in size and reported violence.  
 
5.5 - Discussion  
The aim of this chapter was to explore the relationship between social capital and violence by 
differentiating between the structural and cognitive components of social capital and empirically 
testing their association with individuals’ reported attitudes towards violence and their use of violence. 
The results show a strong positive relationship between structural social capital and violence, as more 
active membership in religious and community associations increased the risk of violence. The results 
were consistent for both forms of reported violence, and were generally in line with prior research (El 
Hajj et al., 2011; Dinesen et al., 2013; Hansen-Nord et al., 2014).  
Access to organized networks is theorized to provide individuals more opportunities to engage in 
collective action, and any grievances experienced by group members may be quickly diffused through 
the network. This might especially be the case when leaders wield their influence within groups 
(Fearon and Laitin, 2000). De Figueiredo and Weingast’s study (1999) provides a possible explanation 
for the violent behavior of community leaders. In their model of ethnic war, ethnic “entrepreneurs” 
might utilize violence to instill fear in other members of their ethnic group in order to manipulate and 
mobilize them into conflicts that benefit their own material interests and political aspirations. 
Interestingly, although religious leaders are not significantly more likely to approve of violence than 
non-members, both religious and community leaders are more likely to engage in violence, which is a 
discouraging sign of religious leaders not practicing what they preach. 
The evidence for a negative association between cognitive social capital and violence is less strong, as 
I obtain contradictory results for the trust variables and insignificant effects for national identity. The 
negative correlation between particularized trust and violence corresponds to the hypothesis on 
cognitive social capital, as well as prior research on trust on the neighbourhood level (Vial et al., 2010; 
Dinesen et al., 2013). In contrast to expectations and results of other studies (Delhey and Newton, 
2005; Kasara, 2017), I find a positive association between generalized trust and reported violence. 
However, this result is less consistent across the models than that for the particularized trust variable, 
which was significant for both support for and the use of violence. 
This inconsistency has been noted in other studies as well. Beugelsdijk (2006), for example, asserts 
that macro measures of trust are less fine-grained or elaborate than micro measures, as they may be 
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capturing an abstract confidence in society and its institutions rather than trust in people. Research 
comparing generalized and particularized trust finds that trust in neighbours is more strongly 
connected to community-based social capital than trust in ‘others’. As Aghajanian (2016) points out, 
groups might trust their own members but not members of others outside of their immediate 
community, so measures of general trust may not be very robust indicators of social capital. 
Furthermore, by asking whether the respondent trusts in ‘most’ people, the generalized trust question 
can be interpreted differently by each individual. This is known as the trust radius problem, and varies 
significantly across countries, making cross-country comparison difficult (Delhey et al., 2011). 
Nevertheless, the result for the generalized trust variable remains quite puzzling and deserves more 
attention in further research.  
The other important finding in this study is that how closely individuals associate with their identity is 
an important indicator of their support for and participation in violence. This finding is notable because 
identity salience has been found to determine the degree to which individuals adhere to the normative 
expectations of their group (Wimberley, 1989; Langer et al., 2017). The strength of attachment to one’s 
identity may determine how intensely individuals perceive collective grievances, and therefore how 
easily they may be mobilized towards violent collective action. The effect of identity salience appears 
to be contingent on individuals’ identity being national only with respect to support for violence, in 
contrast to previous findings that find a direct relationship with violence (Sambanis and Shayo, 2013; 
Charnysh et al., 2015).  
One explanation for why there is no direct link between the type of identity and participation in 
violence could be found in the nature of the violence itself. Identity conflicts are not always between 
competing identities on the ethnic level, but may also be a struggle between the ethnic and the 
national. For example, secessionist conflicts often occur between members of an ethnic group/region 
and the government, such as the Tuareg conflict in Mali or the Biafra rebellion in Nigeria. Supporters 
of the government involved in counter-protests or other forms of violence are likely to associate 
themselves with their national identity, rather than their ethnic group. This strong attachment to their 
national identity and the fear that this identity would be under threat has often led groups to engage 
in protest, for example the anti-independence Catalans in Spain or the nationalist rallies in the USA. 
Another factor could be that when there is a dominant ethnic group in the country, the ‘national’ 
identity is appropriated by that group, such as the Tswana in Botswana or the Han in China. Members 
of these groups will perceive their ethnic identity to be synonymous with the national identity due to 
their monopoly on power and society in general (Staerklé et al., 2010). They view an attack against 
their ethnic group as an attack against the nation. This means that the variable comparing ethnic 
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identity and national identity could actually be capturing the ethnic identity for both minority and 
majority groups in a country.  
The story drawn from the control variables is that the types of individuals most prone to violent 
attitudes and behaviour are young, uneducated men. This is consistent with the findings of cross-
national research on youth bulges and conflict (Urdal, 2006). Measures of relative deprivation in 
education and wealth are mostly insignificant, despite evidence for the Sub-Saharan African region 
suggesting that socioeconomic and political factors are salient indicators of conflict (Alcorta et al., 
2018). However, perceived collective grievances are found to be significantly and positively correlated 
to violence both measures of violence. Although this highlights the motivation mechanism linking 
collective grievances with conflict described in the earlier chapters, the results suggest that perceived 
collective grievances in fact matter more than objective comparisons in motivating individuals to 
engage in violence, in line with more recent studies (Rustad, 2016; Miodownik and Nir, 2016). 
Given that only cross-sectional data were available, these results cannot be interpreted in causal 
terms. The study’s main aim is to determine the relationship between social capital and violence, 
however it frames the hypotheses in the direction of social capital influencing conflict. The logic behind 
this reasoning is that social capital can be viewed as the social relations through which groups may 
mobilize towards conflict (Schaub, 2014). Nevertheless, the inability to make causal inferences means 
that this relationship could function in either direction. The literature on social capital suggests that 
the opposite direction is also possible. For instance, violence might foment discord and reduce trust 
between members within a community, subsequently reducing the level of cognitive social capital 
(McIlwaine and Moser, 2001; de Luca and Verpoorten, 2015), although the literature examining the 
effects of conflict questions whether conflict actually has an erosive effect (Deng, 2010; Goodhand et 
al., 2000; Cassar et al., 2013). The causal relationship might run both ways in an endogenous 
relationship – high levels of structural social capital could raise the risk of violence breaking out, and 
high levels of violence over time might lead to the erosion or alteration of social capital (Rohner et al., 
2013; Schaub, 2014; Ingelaere and Verpoorten, 2016). In the multivariate analysis this effect is 
controlled for with the dummy on whether the group has been involved in conflict in the past. 
However, it is limited to the group level and does not capture any individual-level violence or 
(inter)national conflict which may affect the respondent. Further research integrating conflict events 
data with the Afrobarometer surveys might be able to incorporate more robust controls for prior 
conflict.  
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5.6 - Conclusion 
In this study I drew on 40,455 individual level observations from 27 different countries in round five of 
the Afrobarometer Surveys. This research contributes to the literature on the ‘dark side’ of social 
capital by examining the relationship between two dimensions of social capital -- structural and 
cognitive -- and violence. Prior research disaggregating social capital by its different dimensions 
(Dinesen et al., 2013; Hansen-Nord et al., 2014) was limited to examining passive violence by 
measuring the respondents’ exposure to violence, whereas this research expands on their findings by 
analyzing individuals’ support for and use of violence. I find a positive relationship between structural 
social capital and violence, whilst cognitive social capital and conflict are mostly negatively related. 
These findings highlight the importance of disaggregating social capital by its cognitive and structural 
dimensions in order to understand its relationship with violence. Additionally, I find that identity 
salience is a relevant factor in determining both attitudes towards violence and violent behaviour. 
Policymakers looking to curtail violence within their communities should take note of the complex 
effects that strengthening civil society and social identities may have, and consider a multifaceted 
approach.   
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Chapter 6  
 
Conclusion 
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6.1 - Introduction 
In the quest to understand why ethnic conflict occurs, scholars of conflict studies have identified 
horizontal inequalities as a key determinant. However, findings on the relationship between horizontal 
inequalities and conflict have not always been consistent, with the literature disagreeing on the use of 
motivation- or opportunity-based arguments to explain this link. What most scholars have failed to 
account for empirically is the simultaneous presence of both mechanisms. This gap in the literature 
has created a demand for research that systematically investigates the relationship between horizontal 
inequalities and conflict while integrating both arguments (motivation and opportunity) into one 
theoretical framework. In this thesis, such an approach was employed throughout the first two 
empirical chapters for social, economic, population size, and political inequalities. In these chapters, 
the effects of horizontal inequalities on ethnic conflict were studied both independently and in unison, 
with moderating factors at the national and subnational level also taken into account.  
In the other two empirical chapters of the thesis, I focused on how group and individual characteristics 
influence perceptions and decisions at the individual level. My original ambition was to investigate 
whether relative deprivation worked through the theorized mechanisms by examining their effect on 
the formation of collective grievances and violence. However, the critical role of perceptions and 
identity salience in determining collective grievances in Chapter 4 led me to consider whether there 
are other not easily observable factors that might influence people’s behaviour. One ‘hidden’ factor 
was social capital. In the theory it has mainly been considered as a protective factor against violence, 
but due to its role in mobilizing communities it could also have substantial influence on commencing 
violence. Chapter 5 therefore sought to explore the relationship of different social capital indicators 
with violent affectations and behaviour.  
In the following section, I provide an overview of the thesis’ research questions and provide a summary 
of the results per question. This is followed by a discussion of the major findings and the contribution 
of my research to the literature on conflict. Next, I reflect on the limitations of the study and offer 
suggestions for further research. I finish with concluding remarks that highlight the main takeaways of 
this thesis.  
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6.2 – Summary of results 
Table 6.A - Significant results for multivariate associations between selected independent variables and ethnic 
conflict incidence, perceived collective grievances and reported violence.  
RQ Dependent variable Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 
1 Ethnic conflict  
Educational inequality + + 
Wealth inequality - - 
Population size inequality - - 
Educational inequality * average wealth   + 
Average education * democracy level   + 
Average elite share * rule of law   + 
Average urbanization * democracy level   - 
Average urbanization * ethnic group in power   + 
Population size inequality * democracy level   - 
2 Ethnic conflict  
Discriminated/in power Reference + 
Not discriminated/in power - Reference 
Both discriminated O Reference 
Both not discriminated - Reference 
Discriminated/not discriminated - Reference 
Both in power - Reference 
Educational inequality * discriminated/in power   O 
Wealth inequality * discriminated/in power   - 
Population size inequality * discriminated/in power   N.S. 
Average elite share * discriminated/in power   + 
3 Perceived collective grievances 
Ethnic Identity + + 
Education years O O 
Wealth - - 
Education deprivation O O 
Wealth deprivation + + 
Small population size + + 
Share of elites O O 
Ethnic identity * education deprivation   - 
Ethnic identity * small population size   - 
Ethnic identity * average share of elites   + 
Individual education * small population size   - 
Individual wealth  * education deprivation   - 
Individual wealth * average share of elites   - 
4 Violence 
Religious membership O + 
Community membership + + 
Particularized trust - - 
Generalized trust O + 
Identity salience + + 
National identity O* O  
Perceived discrimination + + 
Education deprivation O O 
Wealth deprivation O O 
Small population size O O 
The models included represent selected multivariate analyses conducted in the theses. A positive/negative sign 
represents a significantly higher/lower likelihood of ethnic conflict/perceived discrimination/violence. Insignificant 
effects are marked with an ‘O’. *Coefficient is significantly positive in the bivariate model and the model with 
subcategories for structural social capital variables.  
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Table 6.A provides an overview of the analyses that were conducted in the empirical chapters to 
address the research questions of this thesis. To keep the table concise, only the two main multivariate 
models were included per question. For RQs 1-3, Model 1 represents the full model and Model 2 
represents the interaction model. For RQ 4, the baseline models from Table 5.C are included. Here, 
Model 1 represents the analysis with reported support for violence as dependent variable, and Model 
2 represents the analysis with reported use of violence as dependent variable. 
 
Socioeconomic inequalities and ethnic conflict 
RQ1  In which way and to what extent do educational, economic and population size inequalities 
between ethnic groups influence the risk of conflict incidence between the groups?   
In Chapter 2, I examined the relationships of educational, economic and population size inequalities 
between groups with conflict incidence in the context of motivation and opportunity mechanisms. I 
hypothesized that by inducing strong grievances, educational inequalities are more likely to incentivize 
disadvantaged ethnic group members to engage in conflict, in spite of the limited opportunities that 
educational inequalities might represent. I did not expect economic and population inequalities to lead 
to ethnic conflict because the grievances formed are unlikely to outweigh the limited opportunities for 
conflict.  
To test these hypotheses, I performed a multilevel logistic regression analysis on socioeconomic panel 
data derived from the DHS surveys, using ethnic group dyads as the unit of analysis. The results from 
the analysis on this ‘Ethnic Dyad Database’ are shown in the RQ1 section of Table 6.A. The first model 
indicates that educational inequalities are positively associated with ethnic conflict incidence, whereas 
economic and population size inequalities are negatively associated with ethnic conflict incidence. I 
also investigate the interactions of horizontal inequalities with economic and political context factors 
at the group and national level in the second model. The main findings here show the association 
between educational inequalities and conflict is stronger when the groups in the dyad are jointly 
wealthier. In addition, a higher joint educational level for groups is associated with less conflict, 
particularly under more autocratic regimes.  
 
Political discrimination and ethnic conflict 
RQ2  To what extent and under which conditions is the effect of political exclusion on ethnic conflict 
attributable to political discrimination against ethnic groups?  
The literature has found overwhelming evidence for a positive relationship between political 
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inequalities and ethnic conflict, but tends to merge the effects of political exclusion and discrimination 
together. Chapter 3 focused on discerning between discriminated and non-discriminated excluded 
groups, and investigating whether these groups had a different likelihood of engaging in conflict. I 
hypothesized that discriminated groups will be more likely to engage in conflict than non-discriminated 
groups because the stronger grievances that members of discriminated groups nurture are likely to 
outweigh the opportunity constraints that they face. Furthermore, I assumed that socioeconomic 
horizontal inequalities and the share of elites might moderate the relationship between discrimination 
and conflict by altering the balance between the motivation and opportunity mechanisms. 
To test these hypotheses, a multilevel logistic regression analysis is conducted using panel data from 
the Ethnic Dyad Database. Additional political data from the EPR database is integrated into the 
existing dataset. The results show that discriminated groups are the driving force for the positive 
association between political exclusion and conflict. The first model for RQ2 in Table 6.A shows that 
when political exclusion is split up into subcategories, dyads containing discriminated groups and 
groups in power are significantly more likely to engage in conflict than any other dyad. In fact, the 
analysis in Chapter 3 shows that excluded groups who face active, intentional, and targeted 
discrimination by the state are more than twice as likely to be involved in conflict than excluded groups 
who do not face explicit discrimination. The second model presents the effects of moderating 
conditions on the relationship between political discrimination and conflict. Discriminated groups that 
simultaneously experience economic inequalities are less likely to be engaged in conflict. An increased 
share of elites within discriminated groups could precipitate the chances of the groups being involved 
in conflict. 
 
The formation of collective grievances 
RQ3  To what extent and under which conditions do individuals perceive relative group deprivation 
as collective grievances? 
In the previous Chapters, the relationship between group inequalities and conflict is theorized to 
function in part through the motivation mechanism, which suggests that members of groups that are 
relatively deprived may harbour collective grievances against more advantaged groups. Although this 
mechanism is well established in the conflict-inequality literature, the claim that relative deprivation 
of ethnic groups will be perceived as group grievances by its members has yet to be empirically tested. 
To address this question, Chapter 4 examined how group characteristics, such as relative group 
deprivation and the share of elites, are related to individual perceptions of collective grievances. 
Furthermore, it investigated how individual characteristics, such as an individual’s salience of identity 
and socioeconomic background, may moderate the relationship between group characteristics and 
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collective grievances. 
For the analysis shown in RQ3 of Table 6.A, multilevel ordered logit regressions are run on cross-
sectional data taken from rounds 5 and 6 of the Afrobarometer surveys, with individuals taken as the 
unit of analysis. In the first model I find some support for the theorized link between relative group 
deprivation and collective grievances. Individuals from groups who are relatively deprived or who have 
a relatively small population size are more likely to perceive collective grievances, but individuals from 
groups relatively deprived in education or with a large share of elites are not significantly more likely 
to feel aggrieved. The analysis highlights the importance of individual characteristics in the formation 
of grievances, as individuals who are poor or are strongly attached to their ethnicity are more likely to 
perceive collective grievances. The second model indicates that individual characteristics also have a 
strong moderating effect on the relationship between group characteristics and perceived collective 
grievances. Individuals whose ethnic identity is salient are less likely to feel that their group is unfairly 
treated if their ethnic group is relatively deprived in education or wealth, but are more likely to feel 
their group is unfairly treated if their group contains a larger share of elites. Finally, highly-educated 
individuals belonging to smaller groups and rich individuals belonging to less educated groups or 
groups with a large share of elites are less likely to experience collective grievances. 
 
Social capital and violence 
RQ4  In which ways are the cognitive and structural dimensions of social capital associated to the 
reported support for and use of political violence?  
Research on the determinants of conflict has thus far paid little attention to the impact of intangible 
factors. Chapter 5 turned the attention toward social capital, an important element within 
communities that has been found to have an ambiguous relationship with violence. In this chapter, I 
distinguished between two dimensions of social capital, investigating their relationship with self-
reported support of and propensity for violence. In the context of the theoretical framework, structural 
social capital is theorized to allow easier diffusion of grievances and facilitate more opportunities for 
collective mobilization. Cognitive social capital is assumed to bring a community closer together, which 
is likely to reduce divisions and grievances.  
As with the previous analysis, to address RQ4 a multilevel ordered logit regression analysis is 
performed on round 5 of the Afrobarometer surveys. The results in Table 6.A show that structural and 
cognitive social capital are to some extent oppositely related with indicators of violence. The structural 
social capital indicators of religious and community association membership are mostly positively 
correlated with attitudes towards violence and with violent behaviour. The exception is for the 
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relationship between religious association membership and support for violence, although the more 
detailed analysis in Chapter 5 shows that the relationship is significant for inactive members of religious 
associations. For cognitive social capital indicators, the relationship is more complex. Particularized 
trust is consistently negatively correlated with support for and use of violence. However, generalized 
trust is insignificant for support for violence, and positively associated with the use of violence. The 
salience of identity is positively correlated with either form of violence and the attachment to a 
national identity has no  effect on the support for violence, although this coefficient is found to be 
positive in other model specifications in Chapter 5. In addition, the dependent variable in RQ3, 
perceived collective grievances, is positively associated with both measures of violence. 
 
6.3 – Discussion 
In summary, the results in Chapters 2 and 3 show that inequalities between groups are indeed related 
to conflict, but not necessarily in the manner that has been recognized in the literature thus far. On 
the one hand, educational and political inequalities between groups are positively associated with 
conflict, with political discrimination being a particularly strong indicator. On the other hand, economic 
and population size inequalities between groups are negatively associated with conflict. Furthermore, 
the effects of group inequalities can vary depending on group characteristics and the national 
environment, such as the proportion of elites within the group, or the level of democracy and the rule 
of law in the country.  
The role of elites is also emphasized throughout the thesis. An increase in elite share is shown to have 
an independent positive effect on the risk of conflict incidence in Chapters 2 and 3, and it can also 
exacerbate tensions in dyads where one group suffers from discrimination and the other is in power. 
The results for Chapter 4 show that elites can generate stronger collective grievances for individuals 
who closely identify with their ethnic group. Finally, the role of elites is also evident in Chapter 5 where 
the relationship between leaders of associations and violence is also shown to be mostly positive, 
especially for community organizations. The findings throughout the chapters underline the key role 
that elites have in influencing group sentiment and mobilizing its members. If elites have nefarious 
purposes and members of their group are strongly attached to their ethnic identity, elites will be able 
to manipulate their ethnic group towards engaging in conflict. 
The salience of identity is a critical element underpinning the research throughout this thesis. The 
group-level analysis in the first two empirical chapters assumed ethnic identity to be salient for ethnic 
group members. Group characteristics would be expected to be important for individuals who identify 
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with their group. When taking into account in the last two empirical chapters that the salience of 
identity varies per individual , it is possible to observe that individual characteristics have a substantial 
influence on perceptions and decision-making. Group characteristics are therefore less important if we 
consider individuals who have a national identity, or multiple social identities. Although individuals’ 
social identity will always form an integral part of their personal identity, in a globalized world where 
individuals across countries are interconnected on different levels, traditional forms of identity may 
gradually lose their importance and new identities may take their place. It is vital that research based 
on social identities keeps this in mind.  
The relationship between group characteristics and conflict is theorized to work through the 
motivation and opportunity mechanisms. However, when examining whether the motivation 
mechanism functions on the individual level, I do not find the expected relationship for all group 
characteristics and collective grievances. Members of small groups or groups relatively deprived in 
wealth are more likely to feel their group is treated unfairly. However, the coefficient is not significant 
for relative group deprivation in education, and when individuals consider their ethnic identity to be 
salient, the effect of education deprivation on perceived collective grievances is negative. The finding 
for relative deprivation in education raises questions about the motivation mechanism linking 
horizontal inequalities and conflict (Stewart, 2008; Cederman et al., 2013; Alcorta et al., 2018).  
There could be several explanations for the discrepancy in results for the relationship between relative 
deprivation and collective grievances. One reason could be that the chapters do not analyse the same 
concepts. Chapter 4 operationalizes inequalities as the extent to which groups deviate from the 
national average, which is a general indicator of inequalities that makes it possible to identify whether 
they are relatively advantaged or deprived. Chapters 2 and 3 use a dyadic analysis to compare 
inequalities between groups. This means the analysis in these chapters cannot examine the ‘direction’ 
of the inequality, but does allow for a direct comparison between the two groups in question. 
Furthermore, the dependent variable used in this study specifically refers to unfair treatment by the 
government, which is not necessarily related to the collective grievances that may be generated from 
horizontal inequalities between two ethnic groups if neither of these are in power. Nevertheless, even 
if the government may not be responsible for the disparities between groups,  the incumbent could be 
blamed for the deprivation that the group members face (Giugni and Grasso, 2017).  
We must also consider the possibility that the link between inequalities and grievances might not 
always hold, and that the real world is more complicated than our theoretical models are able to 
account for. The conflict mechanism has been used extensively in the literature (Gurr, 1993; Stewart, 
2008; Østby, 2013) and in this thesis to explain group incentives for conflict, but the line of reasoning 
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behind it was based on data that could be objectively measured. However, recent studies showing that 
perceived inequalities outweigh actual inequalities in the decision to engage in violence suggest that 
scholars have to reconsider their reliance on ‘objective’ data and move towards understanding 
people’s perceptions (Rustad, 2016). Indeed, the research conducted in this thesis underscores this 
paradigm shift, as in Chapter 5 perceived collective grievances are found to influence individuals’ 
decisions to engage in violence far more than objective measures of relative deprivation. Furthermore, 
the findings in Chapter 4 indicate that individual characteristics are as, if not more important, than 
group characteristics in determining collective grievances. At the individual level, group deprivation is 
to some extent a source of grievance, but identity salience is a driving factor in the relationship. 
As has previously been argued in this thesis, motivations are not sufficient for group members to 
engage in conflict – opportunities must also be present. Robinson (1983) pointed out that recognizing 
inequalities and determining whether they are fair or unfair are only the first stages of the process in 
the relationship between inequalities and conflict. The final stages consist of individuals recognising 
they have the ability to address these differences, and subsequently undertaking action. Both 
motivation and opportunity mechanisms are incorporated in the final analysis in Chapter 5. Here we 
observe that perceived collective grievances and identity salience can motivate individuals to 
participate in violence, and structural social capital in the form of associational membership can 
provide individuals with access to platforms through which grievances can be diffused and collective 
mobilization can be stimulated. Group characteristics have no significant effect in these models, but 
individual characteristics are significantly and positively related to the reported support for and use of 
violence. 
 
6.4 - Contribution to research 
This thesis contributes to the conflict literature in several impactful ways. First of all, the results suggest 
the need to disaggregate key theoretical concepts. By dissecting the various types of horizontal 
inequalities, we are able to distinguish the effects on conflict more clearly. My results show ethnic 
group members might perceive and react to educational inequalities differently than to economic, 
population size, or political inequalities. Some resources are public whilst others are private, and some 
resources are more visible than others. How such inequalities are experienced on the collective level 
can determine how group members perceive relative deprivation. With respect to political inequalities, 
it stands to reason that for groups that are excluded from power, politically discriminated groups are 
more likely to be involved in conflict, because they are more directly impacted than groups who only 
lack representation in the national government. And it is not so surprising to discover that indicators 
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of social capital have opposing effects on violence. While some aspects of social capital create social 
cohesion within communities, others provide opportunities for individuals to engage in collective 
action—including violent collective action. Yet, these assertions are only possible to verify when 
breaking down the concepts involved and meticulously examining the relationship between their 
different components and conflict. 
Second, this research contributes methodologically by utilizing different units of analysis. In the past, 
research on inequalities and conflict was conducted on the national level (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; 
Besançon, 2005). These studies were incapable of capturing the dynamics of conflict that often occur 
on the subnational level, and this shortcoming is what led to the study of horizontal inequalities in the 
first place (Stewart, 2008). The first two empirical chapters in the thesis improve upon earlier work on 
horizontal inequalities by including all ethnic groups for which enough information was available and 
by using ethnic dyads as the unit of analysis. Whereas other scholars focused only on the major ethnic 
groups (Østby, 2008), or used indirect measures, such as the difference with the national or regional 
average (Cederman et al., 2013; Fjelde and Østby, 2014). This dyadic approach allows us to directly 
compare differences between most groups within a country. This offers the advantage that more 
richness is added to the findings and that the determinants of small-scale local conflicts are also 
captured. By directly measuring the socioeconomic characteristics of group members, this study is able 
to capture a more complex relationship between different types of horizontal inequalities and conflict 
outbreak.  
Third, the thesis creates a framework linking the ethnic group level to the individual level, and 
examines in the final two empirical chapters how the different levels intertwine to influence grievances 
and conflict. The assumption that groups are unitary actors is convenient when conducting empirical 
research at the group level, but is not completely accurate. Groups are not uniform; instead, they 
consist of a collection of individuals whose perceptions, opinions, and beliefs may diverge. It would 
behove us as scholars to take into account individual variation for characteristics such as 
socioeconomic background and identity salience when analysing the effects of group characteristics 
on conflict. By doing so, this research emphasizes the importance of individual characteristics in 
influencing a person’s decision to engage in violence.   
Fourth, this research makes inroads into studying the relationship between intangible characteristics 
and conflict. As was mentioned in the introduction, concepts such as perceived grievances, identity 
salience and social capital could be considered the ‘dark matter’ of conflict studies. Traditionally 
scholars have not been able to observe these phenomena, but they acknowledge their existence and 
influence on conflict (Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Stewart, 2008). With the increasing availability of 
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household surveys, the field is gradually integrating these previously hidden characteristics into formal 
conflict analysis models. Adopting this approach has allowed this thesis to test for the presence of the 
motivation mechanism, shed a new light on the role of identity in conflict, and examine the direct 
relationship between social capital and violent behaviour. The further we explore these new avenues 
of research, the more old theories can be reassessed and new ones can be developed. Much like dark 
matter, we find that the intangible characteristics of perceptions, identity salience, and social capital 
have a more prominent function in shaping conflict than was previously understood. 
 
6.5 - Limitations and recommendations for future research 
As in every research, this thesis has its share of limitations. Returning to the theoretical framework in 
Figure 1.B, in this thesis I was able to test the motivation mechanism extensively, but for the 
opportunity mechanism I was constrained to examining wealth differences between groups and 
structural social capital. Information on opportunities is difficult to obtain because, to the author’s 
knowledge, only the Minorities at Risk Organizational Behaviour (MAROB) database covers the 
support, resources and strategies that ethnic organizations have at their disposal (Wilkenfeld et al., 
2011). However, this dataset is limited to the Middle East and North Africa, and was only collected till 
2004, so it does not overlap well with the geographical coverage of the data used in this research.1 The 
Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) 2.0 dataset (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013) 
provides limited coverage of organizational resources for actors in some African countries, but 
coverage ends in 2006 and actors are not coded by their ethnicity. Without more data on how 
inequalities and individual factors might influence the opportunities of groups to engage in conflict, 
for the moment examining the role of the opportunity mechanism in conflict is limited to the current 
analysis. 
It is also important to discuss the spatial controls for ethnic dyads. In the first two empirical chapters, 
(differences in) urbanization levels of ethnic groups were used to control for geographic concentration 
of ethnic groups. These are proxy variables and provide only a rough approximation of how or where 
ethnic groups are geographically located. There have been recent advances in geocoding for both the 
DHS and EPR data (ICF, 1990-2014; Wucherpfennig et al., 2011),2 which would allow for the mapping 
of ethnic groups according to the region they inhabit and could be matched to the location of conflict 
events in the UCDP databases. However, the coverage is not as extensive as for non-geocoded data. 
 
1 Morocco and Algeria are included in the MAROB dataset, but the coverage in the Afrobarometer 
surveys only starts in 2005. 
2 Geographic Information Systems (GIS) for DHS (ICF, 2018) and GeoEPR for the EPR dataset 
(Wucherpfennig et al., 2011). 
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As coverage improves over time, future research integrating these spatial controls would provide a 
strong robustness check for the analyses.  
Another constraint was also one of its strengths: multiple sources of data. The thesis draws on multiple 
data sources including: Demographic and Health Surveys, Ethnic Power Relations Dataset, World 
Governance Indicators, and Afrobarometer data. While this allows me to incorporate individual, group 
and national characteristics, such as different types of group inequalities and individual perceptions, 
into one model, there are also drawbacks of merging datasets. The ethnic groups in the DHS and EPR 
databases are not identical, so merging the political data with the socioeconomic data in Chapter 3 
generated missing cases and substantially reduced the number of observations. This meant that the 
power of the DHS dataset was not fully utilized in this analysis. Despite containing fewer observations, 
the findings for political inequalities are still robust.  
In addition, the Afrobarometer database has its limitations. Since the survey design has changed 
substantially over the years, the questions used for this research are only included in one or two survey 
years, which makes it impossible to track perceptions and behaviour over time. This restricts the 
analysis to examining the direction and significance of the relationships between independent and 
dependent variables. Despite their constraints, to date the Afrobarometer surveys are still the only 
cross-national database on African countries that include information for individuals on their ethnic 
identity, perceptions and participation in violence. It therefore remains a valuable source of 
information for scholars exploring the impact of intangible characteristics. 
A final concern is with the definitions for the dependent variables for violence in this research. In the 
first two analyses, I study the effects of horizontal inequalities on ethnic conflict. This type of conflict 
involves one or more groups classified by a marker of ethnicity, and is a subset within all armed 
conflicts, defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program as the use of armed force between two or 
more actors resulting in 25 battle deaths in one year. However, in Chapter 5 of the thesis, I address 
political violence more broadly by investigating individuals’ reported support for and use of political 
violence. These dependent variables capture affectivity towards violence, but do not differentiate 
between the subsets of political violence. Since they are likely to encompass non-ethnic violence and 
low-level conflicts (under 25 deaths), it is difficult to link the results of Chapter 5 directly back to the 
first two empirical chapters. Nevertheless, the strong and highly significant correlation between 
identity salience and use of violence in Chapter 5 suggests that the political violence measured in the 
Afrobarometer is often linked to identity. With the advent of more detailed conflict event data for 
smaller conflicts such as in the Social Conflict Analysis Database, future research will be able to 
investigate the effect of horizontal inequalities on different scales and types of conflict.  
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6.6 - Final remarks 
The findings of this thesis can be summarized in three points. First, they teach us that to better 
comprehend the factors that shape conflict, it is important to break down these factors and 
disaggregate their effects. This holds true for horizontal inequalities, political exclusion, and social 
capital. The relationship between these factors and conflict can be explained through the motivation 
and opportunity mechanisms. In this thesis I argue that the nature of this relationship is likely due to 
the extent of the association with either mechanism. Second, the research also highlights the 
importance of intangible characteristics. Often perception and ‘reality’ do not match with each other, 
so how scholars operationalize inequalities will be critical to their effect on decisions to engage in 
violence. The discrepancy between objective and subjective differences must be taken into 
consideration when conducting analysis on the effects of inequalities. Third, individual factors should 
not be underestimated. Attachment to ethnic identity is a strong indicator of grievances, violent 
affectations and behaviour. States seeking to reduce domestic conflict risk would benefit from social 
cohesion within their society, which would serve to reduce subnational divisions and increase ‘good’ 
social capital. This can be done by constructing a national identity through the education system, such 
as in Botswana (Dryden-Peterson and Mulimbi, 2017) or by promoting other policies of social 
integration, such as villagization in Tanzania (Wangwe, 2005). Finally, above all else, this research has 
established that human behaviour is complex and cannot be fully understood from the perspective of 
just one discipline. Scholars need to take a multidisciplinary approach and combine elements from all 
the social sciences, if they wish to improve their understanding of why individuals and groups make 
the decision to engage in violence. 
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Scholars have long sought to understand why and how ethnic conflict occurs, and why it persists. 
Despite the rapid expansion of the field of conflict studies in the past few decades, there is still much 
we do not yet fully understand, and there are important issues that have not been addressed. First, 
to date there is no definitive consensus on the nature of the connection between horizontal 
inequalities -- differences between culturally defined groups -- and ethnic conflict. Quantitative 
studies have shown socioeconomic and political horizontal inequalities to be positively associated to 
ethnic conflict in some cases, but unrelated in others. The diversity of the findings implies that 
horizontal inequalities and conflict share a complex relationship, and the underlying mechanisms 
require further investigation. Second, the positive relationship between political inequalities and 
conflict is often attributed to the grievances formed when groups are excluded from political access, 
despite strong evidence pointing specifically toward political discrimination by the state (repression) 
as the main cause of rebellion. Third, researchers studying inequalities have mainly relied on 
information that has been ‘objectively’ measured. However, they acknowledge that people develop 
grievances based on their own perceptions, rather than the information at academics’ disposal. 
Perceptions may be shaped by ‘objective’ inequalities, but are also likely to be influenced by other 
factors at the individual level, such as how strongly individuals identify with their ethnic group, their 
personal wealth, or their educational background. Fourth, grievances alone are usually insufficient to 
mobilize individuals toward violence. Social capital, which functions as the glue that holds 
communities together, is often required for individuals to commit to a larger cause and mobilize 
collectively. Most of the literature on social capital has touted its positive effects for development 
and governance, but its role in the context of violent collective action is ambiguous and remains 
understudied. 
Despite acknowledging the substantial role that perceptions, identities, and social capital have in 
shaping conflict, due to their intangible nature, scholars do not yet have much empirical evidence to 
support their claims. These concepts could be considered the ‘dark matter’ of conflict, to borrow a 
term from astrophysics. Dark matter accounts for a significant proportion of all matter in the 
universe, but because its properties do not interact with ordinary matter such as light, it cannot be 
observed with the instruments currently at our disposal. Nevertheless, its presence and effect on 
gravitational forces is undisputed in theories of astrophysics. In a similar way, how individuals 
perceive inequalities is far more difficult to observe than the inequalities themselves, but perceptions 
are critical to understanding whether inequalities lead to violence or not. Categorizing people 
according to a preconceived notion of identity can be problematic because identity can have a 
different meaning for every individual, but how individuals associate with their identity will 
undoubtedly have an effect on the way they view the status of their identity group. How social 
161 
 
capital is measured remains a topic of ongoing debate, but it is evident that the glue that holds a 
community together can influence how communities respond to difficult circumstances. 
The aim of this thesis was to analyze the relationship between inequalities and conflict in a 
systematic manner, and to reassess the theoretical assumptions made by the conflict literature at 
the group and individual level by accounting for this ‘dark matter’. In order to achieve this, I tackled 
the problems outlined above using a three-pronged approach that consists of 1) disaggregating the 
concepts by their components, 2) constructing a framework that links the individual and group levels 
of analysis, and 3) exploring the role of intangible characteristics such as perceptions, identity 
salience, and social capital. The structure of the thesis is as follows: in the first two chapters, the 
effects of socioeconomic and political horizontal inequalities on ethnic conflict were studied both 
independently and in unison, with moderating factors at the national and subnational level also 
taken into account. In the other two empirical chapters of the thesis, I focused on how group and 
individual characteristics influence perceptions and decisions at the individual level. The chapters are 
described in further detail below. 
In Chapter 2, I examined the relationships of educational, economic and population size inequalities 
between groups with conflict incidence in the context of motivation and opportunity mechanisms. I 
hypothesized that by inducing strong grievances, educational inequalities are more likely to 
incentivize disadvantaged ethnic group members to engage in conflict, in spite of the limited 
opportunities that educational inequalities might represent. I did not expect economic and 
population inequalities to lead to ethnic conflict because the grievances formed are unlikely to 
outweigh the limited opportunities for conflict. To test these hypotheses, I performed a multilevel 
logistic regression analysis on socioeconomic panel data derived from the DHS surveys, using ethnic 
group dyads as the unit of analysis. I find that educational inequalities are positively associated with 
ethnic conflict incidence, whereas economic and population size inequalities are negatively 
associated with ethnic conflict incidence. I also investigate the interactions of horizontal inequalities 
with economic and political context factors at the group and national level. The main findings for 
these interactions show the association between educational inequalities and conflict is stronger 
when the groups in the dyad are jointly wealthier. In addition, a higher joint educational level for 
groups is associated with less conflict, particularly under more autocratic regimes. 
The literature has found overwhelming evidence for a positive relationship between political 
inequalities and ethnic conflict, but tends to merge the effects of political exclusion and 
discrimination together. Chapter 3 focused on discerning between discriminated and non-
discriminated excluded groups, and investigating whether these groups had a different likelihood of 
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engaging in conflict. I hypothesized that discriminated groups will be more likely to engage in conflict 
than non-discriminated groups because the stronger grievances that members of discriminated 
groups nurture are likely to outweigh the opportunity constraints that they face. Furthermore, I 
assumed that socioeconomic horizontal inequalities and the share of elites might moderate the 
relationship between discrimination and conflict by altering the balance between the motivation and 
opportunity mechanisms. To test these hypotheses, a multilevel logistic regression analysis is 
conducted using panel data from the Ethnic Dyad Database. Additional political data from the EPR 
database is integrated into the existing dataset. The results show that discriminated groups are the 
driving force for the positive association between political exclusion and conflict. When political 
exclusion is split up into subcategories, dyads containing discriminated groups and groups in power 
are significantly more likely to engage in conflict than any other dyad. In fact, the analysis in Chapter 
3 shows that excluded groups who face active, intentional, and targeted discrimination by the state 
are more than twice as likely to be involved in conflict than excluded groups who do not face explicit 
discrimination. Furthermore, discriminated groups that simultaneously experience economic 
inequalities are less likely to be engaged in conflict. An increased share of elites within discriminated 
groups could precipitate the chances of the groups being involved in conflict. 
In the previous chapters, the relationship between group inequalities and conflict is theorized to 
function in part through the motivation mechanism, which suggests that members of groups that are 
relatively deprived may harbour collective grievances against more advantaged groups. Although this 
mechanism is well established in the conflict-inequality literature, the claim that relative deprivation 
of ethnic groups will be perceived as group grievances by its members has yet to be empirically 
tested. To address this question, Chapter 4 examined how group characteristics, such as relative 
group deprivation and the share of elites, are related to individual perceptions of collective 
grievances. Furthermore, it investigated how individual characteristics, such as an individual’s 
salience of identity and socioeconomic background, may moderate the relationship between group 
characteristics and collective grievances. Multilevel ordered logit regressions are run on cross-
sectional data taken from rounds 5 and 6 of the Afrobarometer surveys, with individuals taken as the 
unit of analysis. The findings provide some support for the theorized link between relative group 
deprivation and collective grievances. Individuals from groups who are relatively deprived or who 
have a relatively small population size are more likely to perceive collective grievances, but 
individuals from groups relatively deprived in education or with a large share of elites are not 
significantly more likely to feel aggrieved. The analysis highlights the importance of individual 
characteristics in the formation of grievances, as individuals who are poor or are strongly attached to 
their ethnicity are more likely to perceive collective grievances. Individual characteristics also have a 
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strong moderating effect on the relationship between group characteristics and perceived collective 
grievances. Individuals whose ethnic identity is salient are less likely to feel that their group is unfairly 
treated if their ethnic group is relatively deprived in education or wealth, but are more likely to feel 
their group is unfairly treated if their group contains a larger share of elites. Finally, highly-educated 
individuals belonging to smaller groups and rich individuals belonging to less educated groups or 
groups with a large share of elites are less likely to experience collective grievances. 
Research on the determinants of conflict has thus far paid little attention to the impact of intangible 
factors. Chapter 5 turned the attention toward social capital, an important element within 
communities that has been found to have an ambiguous relationship with violence. In this chapter, I 
distinguished between two dimensions of social capital, investigating their relationship with self-
reported support of and propensity for violence. In the context of the theoretical framework, 
structural social capital is theorized to allow easier diffusion of grievances and facilitate more 
opportunities for collective mobilization. Cognitive social capital is assumed to bring a community 
closer together, which is likely to reduce divisions and grievances. A multilevel ordered logit 
regression analysis is performed on round 5 of the Afrobarometer surveys. The results show that 
structural and cognitive social capital are to some extent oppositely related with indicators of 
violence. The structural social capital indicators of religious and community association membership 
are mostly positively correlated with attitudes towards violence and with violent behaviour. The 
exception is for the relationship between religious association membership and support for violence, 
although the more detailed analysis in Chapter 5 shows that the relationship is significant for inactive 
members of religious associations. For cognitive social capital indicators, the relationship is more 
complex. Particularized trust is consistently negatively correlated with support for and use of 
violence. However, generalized trust is insignificant for support for violence, and positively 
associated with the use of violence. The salience of identity is positively correlated with either form 
of violence and the attachment to a national identity has no  effect on the support for violence, 
although this coefficient is found to be positive in other model specifications in Chapter 5. In 
addition, perceived collective grievances are positively associated with both measures of violence. 
The findings of this thesis can be summarized in three points. First, they teach us that to better 
comprehend the factors that shape conflict, it is important to break down these factors and 
disaggregate their effects. This holds true for horizontal inequalities, political exclusion, and social 
capital. The relationship between these factors and conflict can be explained through the motivation 
and opportunity mechanisms. In this thesis I argue that the nature of this relationship is likely due to 
the extent of the association with either mechanism. Second, the research also highlights the 
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importance of intangible characteristics. Often perception and ‘reality’ do not match with each other, 
so how scholars operationalize inequalities will be critical to their effect on decisions to engage in 
violence. The discrepancy between objective and subjective differences must be taken into 
consideration when conducting analysis on the effects of inequalities. Third, individual factors should 
not be underestimated. Attachment to ethnic identity is a strong indicator of grievances, violent 
affectations and behaviour. States seeking to reduce domestic conflict risk would benefit from social 
cohesion within their society, which would serve to reduce subnational divisions and increase ‘good’ 
social capital. This can be done by constructing a national identity through the education system, 
such as in Botswana, or by promoting other policies of social integration, such as villagization in 
Tanzania. Finally, above all else, this research has established that human behaviour is complex and 
cannot be fully understood from the perspective of just one discipline. Scholars need to take a 
multidisciplinary approach and combine elements from all the social sciences if they wish to improve 
their understanding of why individuals and groups make the decision to engage in violence. 
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Wetenschappers hebben lang geprobeerd te begrijpen waarom en hoe etnisch conflict ontstaat en 
waarom het blijft voortbestaan. Ondanks de snelle uitbreiding van conflictstudies in de afgelopen 
decennia, is er nog veel dat we nog niet volledig begrijpen, en er zijn belangrijke kwesties die niet zijn 
aangekaart. Ten eerste is er tot op heden geen definitieve consensus over de aard van het verband 
tussen horizontale ongelijkheden - verschillen tussen cultureel gedefinieerde groepen - en etnische 
conflicten. Kwantitatieve studies hebben aangetoond dat sociaaleconomische en politieke horizontale 
ongelijkheden in sommige gevallen positief worden geassocieerd met etnische conflicten, maar in 
andere gevallen niet. De diversiteit van de bevindingen impliceert dat horizontale ongelijkheden en 
conflicten een complexe relatie delen, en de onderliggende mechanismen vereisen verder onderzoek. 
Ten tweede wordt de positieve relatie tussen politieke ongelijkheden en conflicten vaak toegeschreven 
aan de wrokgevoelens die ontstaan wanneer groepen worden uitgesloten van politieke toegang, 
ondanks krachtig bewijs dat specifiek wijst op politieke discriminatie door de staat (repressie) als de 
belangrijkste oorzaak van rebellie. Ten derde hebben onderzoekers die ongelijkheden bestudeerden 
voornamelijk vertrouwd op informatie die ‘objectief’ is gemeten. Ze erkennen echter dat mensen 
wrokgevoelens ontwikkelen op basis van hun eigen perceptie, in plaats van de informatie waarover 
academici beschikken. Percepties kunnen worden gevormd door ‘objectieve’ ongelijkheden, maar 
worden waarschijnlijk ook beïnvloed door andere factoren op individueel niveau, zoals hoe sterk 
individuen zich identificeren met hun etnische groep, hun persoonlijke rijkdom of hun educatieve 
achtergrond. Ten vierde zijn wrokgevoelens alleen onvoldoende om individuen te mobiliseren voor 
geweld. Sociaal kapitaal, dat fungeert als de lijm die gemeenschappen bij elkaar houdt, is vaak vereist 
voor individuen om zich in te zetten voor een groter doel en collectief te mobiliseren. De meeste 
literatuur over sociaal kapitaal heeft de positieve effecten aangeprezen voor ontwikkeling en bestuur, 
maar de rol ervan in de context van gewelddadige collectieve actie is dubbelzinnig en is nog te weinig 
onderzocht. 
Ondanks het erkennen van de substantiële rol die percepties, identiteiten en sociaal kapitaal spelen 
bij het vormgeven van conflicten, hebben geleerden vanwege hun ongrijpbare aard nog niet veel 
empirisch bewijs om hun beweringen te ondersteunen. Deze concepten kunnen worden beschouwd 
als de 'donkere materie' van conflict, om een term te lenen van astrofysica. Donkere materie is 
verantwoordelijk voor een aanzienlijk deel van alle materie in het universum, maar omdat de 
eigenschappen ervan niet in wisselwerking staan met gewone materie zoals licht, kan het niet worden 
waargenomen met de instrumenten die momenteel tot onze beschikking staan. Desalniettemin is de 
aanwezigheid en het effect ervan op zwaartekrachten onbetwist in theorieën over astrofysica . Op 
dezelfde manier is de manier waarop individuen ongelijkheden waarnemen, veel moeilijker waar te 
nemen dan de ongelijkheden zelf, maar percepties zijn van cruciaal belang om te begrijpen of 
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ongelijkheden tot geweld leiden of niet. Het categoriseren van mensen volgens een vooropgezet idee 
van identiteit kan problematisch zijn omdat identiteit voor elk individu een andere betekenis kan 
hebben, maar hoe individuen omgaan met hun identiteit zal ongetwijfeld een effect hebben op de 
manier waarop zij de status van hun identiteitsgroep bekijken. Hoe sociaal kapitaal wordt gemeten 
blijft een onderwerp van voortdurend debat, maar het is duidelijk dat de lijm die een gemeenschap bij 
elkaar houdt, beïnvloedt hoe gemeenschappen reageren op moeilijke omstandigheden. 
Het doel van dit proefschrift is om de relatie tussen ongelijkheden en conflicten op een systematische 
manier te analyseren en de theoretische veronderstellingen van de conflictliteratuur op groeps- en 
individueel niveau opnieuw te beoordelen door rekening te houden met deze 'donkere materie'. Om 
dit te bereiken, pak ik de hierboven geschetste problemen aan met behulp van een drieledige aanpak 
die bestaat uit 1) het uitsplitsen van de concepten op basis van hun componenten, 2) het construeren 
van een raamwerk dat de individuele en groepsniveaus verbindt, en 3) het verkennen van de rol van 
ongrijpbare kenmerken zoals percepties, opvallende identiteit en sociaal kapitaal. De structuur van het 
proefschrift is als volgt: in de eerste twee hoofdstukken werden de effecten van sociaaleconomische 
en politieke horizontale ongelijkheden op etnische conflicten zowel onafhankelijk als in samenhang 
bestudeerd, waarbij ook rekening wordt gehouden met modererende factoren op nationaal en 
subnationaal niveau. In de andere twee empirische hoofdstukken van het proefschrift heb ik me 
gericht op hoe groeps- en individuele kenmerken percepties en beslissingen op individueel niveau 
beïnvloeden. De hoofdstukken worden hieronder nader beschreven. 
In hoofdstuk 2 heb ik de relaties onderzocht tussen ongelijkheden op onderwijs-, economisch en 
bevolkingsniveau tussen groepen met het voorval van conflict tussen hen in de context van motivatie- 
en kansenmechanismen. Ik veronderstel dat door het induceren van sterke wrokgevoelens, educatieve 
ongelijkheden eerder kansarme etnische groepsleden ertoe aanzetten om in conflict te raken, ondanks 
de beperkte kansen die educatieve ongelijkheden kunnen bieden. Ik had niet verwacht dat 
economische en bevolkingsongelijkheid tot etnische conflicten zou leiden, omdat de gevormde 
wrokgevoelens waarschijnlijk niet opwegen tegen de beperkte mogelijkheden voor conflicten. Om 
deze hypothesen te testen, heb ik een multilevel logistieke regressieanalyse uitgevoerd op 
sociaaleconomische panelgegevens afgeleid van de DHS-enquêtes, met behulp van etnische 
groepsdyaden als analyse-eenheid. Uit de analyse blijkt dat opleidingsongelijkheden positief worden 
geassocieerd met etnische conflictincidentie, terwijl economische en populatiegrootte ongelijkheden 
negatief worden geassocieerd met etnische conflictincidentie. Ik onderzoek ook de interacties van 
horizontale ongelijkheden met economische en politieke contextfactoren op groeps- en nationaal 
niveau. De belangrijkste bevindingen voor deze interacties laten zien dat het verband tussen 
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onderwijsongelijkheid en conflict sterker is wanneer de groepen in de dyade gezamenlijk rijker zijn. 
Bovendien wordt een hoger gezamenlijk opleidingsniveau voor groepen geassocieerd met minder 
conflicten, vooral onder meer autocratische regimes. 
De literatuur heeft overweldigend bewijs gevonden voor een positieve relatie tussen politieke 
ongelijkheden en etnische conflicten, maar neigt ertoe de effecten van politieke uitsluiting en 
discriminatie samen te voegen. Hoofdstuk 3 was gericht op het onderscheiden van gediscrimineerde 
en niet-gediscrimineerde uitgesloten groepen en het onderzoeken of deze groepen een andere kans 
hadden om een conflict aan te gaan. Ik veronderstelde dat gediscrimineerde groepen eerder in conflict 
zullen raken dan niet-gediscrimineerde groepen, omdat de sterkere wrokgevoelens die leden van 
gediscrimineerde groepen koesteren waarschijnlijk groter zullen zijn dan de kansenbeperkingen 
waarmee zij worden geconfronteerd. Verder ging ik ervan uit dat sociaaleconomische horizontale 
ongelijkheden en het aandeel van elites de relatie tussen discriminatie en conflict zouden kunnen 
matigen door het evenwicht tussen de motivatie- en kansenmechanismen te veranderen. Om deze 
hypothesen te testen, wordt een multilevel logistieke regressieanalyse uitgevoerd met paneldata uit 
de Ethnic Dyad Database. Aanvullende politieke gegevens uit de EPR-database zijn geïntegreerd in de 
bestaande dataset. De resultaten laten zien dat gediscrimineerde groepen de motor zijn voor de 
positieve associatie tussen politieke uitsluiting en conflict. Wanneer politieke uitsluiting wordt 
opgesplitst in subcategorieën, zijn dyades met gediscrimineerde groepen en groepen aan de macht 
aanzienlijk vaker in conflict dan welke andere dyade. Uit de analyse in hoofdstuk 3 blijkt zelfs dat 
uitgesloten groepen die te maken hebben met actieve, opzettelijke en gerichte discriminatie door de 
staat meer dan twee keer zoveel kans hebben om in een conflict te worden betrokken dan uitgesloten 
groepen die niet worden geconfronteerd met expliciete discriminatie. Bovendien is het minder 
waarschijnlijk dat gediscrimineerde groepen die tegelijkertijd economische ongelijkheden ervaren, in 
conflict raken. Een groter aandeel elites binnen gediscrimineerde groepen zou de kans kunnen 
vergroten dat de groepen bij conflicten betrokken raken. 
In de vorige hoofdstukken wordt de relatie tussen groepsongelijkheden en conflicten verondersteld 
om gedeeltelijk via het motivatiemechanisme te functioneren. Deze mechanisme suggereert dat leden 
van groepen die relatief achtergesteld zijn, collectieve wrokgevoelens kunnen hebben tegen meer 
bevoordeelde groepen. Hoewel dit mechanisme goed vastgesteld is in de literatuur over 
conflictongelijkheid, moet de bewering dat relatieve deprivatie van etnische groepen door haar leden 
als collectieve wrokgevoelens wordt gezien, nog empirisch worden getest. Om deze vraag te 
beantwoorden, onderzoekt hoofdstuk 4 hoe groepskenmerken, zoals relatieve groepsgebrek en het 
aandeel van elites, gerelateerd zijn aan individuele percepties van collectieve wrokgevoelens. Verder 
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onderzoekt het hoe individuele kenmerken, zoals iemands opvattingen over identiteit en 
sociaaleconomische achtergrond, de relatie tussen groepskenmerken en collectieve wrokgevoelens 
kunnen matigen. Multilevel geordende logit-regressies worden uitgevoerd op transversale gegevens 
uit rondes 5 en 6 van de Afrobarometer-enquêtes, met individuen als analyse-eenheid. De bevindingen 
bieden enige ondersteuning voor het theoretische verband tussen relatieve achterstelling van groepen 
en collectieve wrokgevoelens. Individuen uit groepen die relatief achtergesteld zijn of die een relatief 
kleine populatiegrootte hebben, hebben meer kans om collectieve wrokgevoelens waar te nemen, 
maar individuen uit groepen die relatief achtergesteld zijn in het onderwijs of met een groot deel van 
de elites, hebben geen significant grotere kans om wrokgevoelens te hebben. De analyse benadrukt 
het belang van individuele kenmerken bij de vorming van wrokgevoelens, omdat personen die arm zijn 
of sterk gehecht zijn aan hun etniciteit, vaker collectieve wrokgevoelens ervaren. Individuele 
kenmerken hebben ook een sterk modererend effect op de relatie tussen groepskenmerken en 
waargenomen collectieve wrokgevoelens. Personen met een opvallende etnische identiteit hebben 
minder vaak het gevoel dat hun groep oneerlijk wordt behandeld als hun etnische groep relatief weinig 
onderwijs of rijkdom heeft, maar hebben meer kans dat hun groep oneerlijk wordt behandeld als hun 
groep een groter aandeel elites bevat. Ten slotte hebben hoogopgeleide personen die tot kleinere 
groepen behoren en rijke personen die tot lager opgeleide groepen behoren of groepen met een groot 
aandeel elites, minder kans om collectieve wrokgevoelens te ervaren. 
Onderzoek naar de determinanten van conflict heeft tot nu toe weinig aandacht besteed aan de impact 
van immateriële factoren. Hoofdstuk 5 richtte de aandacht op sociaal kapitaal, een belangrijk element 
binnen gemeenschappen dat een dubbelzinnige relatie met geweld bleken te hebben. In dit hoofdstuk 
heb ik onderscheid gemaakt tussen twee dimensies van sociaal kapitaal en hun relatie onderzocht met 
zelf-gerapporteerde steun voor- en neiging tot geweld. In de context van het theoretische kader wordt 
structureel sociaal kapitaal getheoretiseerd om een gemakkelijkere verspreiding van wrokgevoelens 
te faciliteren en meer mogelijkheden voor collectieve mobilisatie te creëren. Verondersteld wordt dat 
cognitief sociaal kapitaal een gemeenschap dichter bij elkaar kan brengen, wat waarschijnlijk 
verdeeldheid en wrokgevoelens vermindert. Een multilevel geordende logit-regressieanalyse wordt 
uitgevoerd op ronde 5 van de Afrobarometer-enquêtes. De resultaten tonen dat structureel en 
cognitief sociaal kapitaal tot op zekere hoogte een tegengestelde  relatie hebben met  indicatoren van 
geweld. De structurele indicatoren voor sociaal kapitaal van lidmaatschap van religieuze en 
gemeenschapsverenigingen zijn meestal positief gecorreleerd met steun voor geweld en met 
gewelddadig gedrag. De uitzondering is voor de relatie tussen lidmaatschap van religieuze 
verenigingen en steun voor geweld, hoewel de meer gedetailleerde analyse in hoofdstuk 5 laat zien 
dat de relatie significant is voor inactieve leden van religieuze verenigingen. Voor cognitieve 
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indicatoren van sociaal kapitaal is de relatie complexer. Bijzonder vertrouwen is consistent negatief 
gecorreleerd met steun voor en gebruik van geweld. Algemeen vertrouwen is echter onbeduidend 
voor steun voor geweld en wordt positief geassocieerd met het gebruik van geweld. Het belang van 
identiteit is positief gecorreleerd met beide vormen van geweld en de gehechtheid aan een nationale 
identiteit heeft geen effect op de ondersteuning van geweld, hoewel deze coëfficiënt positief is 
bevonden in andere modelspecificaties in hoofdstuk 5. Bovendien, waargenomen collectieve 
wrokgevoelens worden positief geassocieerd met beide maten van geweld. 
De bevindingen van dit proefschrift kunnen in drie punten worden samengevat. Ten eerste leren ze 
ons dat het, om de factoren die conflict vormen, beter te begrijpen, belangrijk is om deze factoren op 
te splitsen en hun effecten op te splitsen. Dit geldt voor horizontale ongelijkheden, politieke uitsluiting 
en sociaal kapitaal. De relatie tussen deze factoren en conflicten kan worden verklaard door de 
motivatie- en kansenmechanismen. In dit proefschrift beargumenteer ik dat de aard van deze relatie 
waarschijnlijk te wijten is aan de mate van associatie met beide mechanismen. Ten tweede benadrukt 
het onderzoek ook het belang van immateriële kenmerken. Vaak komen perceptie en ‘realiteit’ niet 
overeen, dus de manier waarop wetenschappers ongelijkheden operationaliseren, is van cruciaal 
belang voor hun effect op beslissingen om geweld aan te gaan. De discrepantie tussen objectieve en 
subjectieve verschillen moet in acht genomen worden bij het uitvoeren van een analyse van de 
effecten van ongelijkheden. Ten derde mogen individuele factoren niet worden onderschat. 
Gehechtheid aan etnische identiteit is een sterke indicator van wrokgevoelens, steun voor- en neiging 
tot- geweld. Staten die het binnenlandse conflictrisico willen verminderen, zouden baat hebben bij de 
sociale cohesie binnen hun samenleving, die zou dienen om subnationale divisies te verminderen en 
‘goed’ sociaal kapitaal te vergroten. Dit kan door een nationale identiteit op te bouwen via het 
onderwijssysteem, zoals in Botswana, of door ander beleid bedoeld om sociale integratie te 
bevorderen, zoals de dorpsontwikkelingsbeleid in Tanzania. Ten slotte heeft dit onderzoek bovenal 
aangetoond dat menselijk gedrag complex is en niet volledig kan worden begrepen vanuit het 
perspectief van slechts één discipline. Geleerden moeten een multidisciplinaire benadering volgen en 
elementen uit alle sociale wetenschappen combineren, als ze hun begrip van waarom individuen en 
groepen de beslissing willen nemen om geweld te gebruiken, willen verbeteren. 
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